Marco Wyss

A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 1958–62

ABSTRACT As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies during the transfer of power. In Britain’s case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed forces. Yet, in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the agreement. Paradoxically, Britain’s cold war grand strategy created not only the need for the agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically counterproductive.

Alternative Perspectives on African Peacekeeping

This Special Issue of the Journal of International Peacekeeping aims to explore the conceptual periphery of multidimensional peacekeeping by shedding light on some of the concepts, activities or actors that are understudied or tangential to peacekeeping as usually understood or analysed. This is done through the African prism, as Africa has been the main laboratory of peacekeeping operations over the last two decades. Africa hosts most of the United Nations (UN)-led peacekeeping operations,1 and it is also a continent that can benefit from the involvement of its own regional and sub-regional organizations – be it the African Union (AU) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – with over the last years operations ranging from the AU-led AMIS I and II in Darfur and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the AU Mission in

Neutrality in the early Cold War: Swiss arms imports and neutrality

The aim of this article is to assess the sustainability of neutrality in the early Cold War. This issue is examined through the study of Switzerlands armament policy. The Swiss were able to maintain their status of a permanent neutral after the Second World War, and thus succeeded in upholding a centuries-long policy. Their armed neutrality, however, required modern weaponry. In search of this material Switzerland turned to the West, while refusing to purchase weapons from the East. The paper argues that Switzerlands self-imposed policy of armed neutrality increased Swiss dependence on western armaments, and thereby endangered its neutrality status and policy.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION IN EUROPE'S NEUTRAL AND NON-ALLIED STATES

Abstract Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland share a commitment to military non-alliance as a common Cold War legacy. But divergent threat perceptions and interpretations of neutrality have shaped their subsequent military transformation, leading to co-operation inside the EU and with NATO for most and a focus on homeland defence or domestic tasks for some.

The Armed Neutrality Paradox: Sweden and Switzerland in US Cold War Armaments Policy

This article presents the first comparative study of US policy towards two European neutrals, Sweden and Switzerland, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During this period, Sweden and Switzerland were integrated into the Western security regime through a series of diplomatic, economic and technological steps until certain parts of the Swedish and Swiss armed forces were hard to separate from their NATO counterparts. This pioneering multi-archival study shows not only that US policy towards the neutrals was coordinated in order to make them conform to US security demands (a fact previously unnoticed by historians), but it also points towards another surprising and previously unknown conclusion – which the article calls ‘the armed neutrality paradox’. The article argues that the transfers of military technology to Sweden and Switzerland, which were needed to make their neutrality credible, effectively undermined the very credibility that they were supposed to ensure. This technology became a conduit of foreign influence reaching straight into the nerve centre of the armed neutrals, and the more ubiquitous and advanced the technology got, the less control over its use the governments seemed to have. US policy, together with the efforts of the neutral governments to increase security, spawned this paradox.

Whose ‘West Africa’? The regional dynamics of peace and security

ABSTRACTThe articles of this Special Issue show how theoretical perspectives, normative frames, discursive strategies and conceptual issues shape, and are shaped by, intervention practices and the dynamics of peace and security in West Africa. As they construe and construct understandings of West African conflicts, they impact and justify conflict management practices. Put another way, how one defines the region called West Africa is not disassociated from one’s understanding of peace and security. The concepts are mutually constitutive. The increasing significance awarded to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’ said to be coming from the Sahel suggests how practices of security do not simply respond to ‘threats’ somehow, somewhere, in ‘West Africa’. As the focus on international intervention moves north toward the Sahel, it transforms the meaning and formation of West African states and the West African region as it connects them to the extra-regional dynamics from the ‘Sahel’ and ‘North Africa’.

France and the economic community of West African states: peacekeeping partnership in theory and practice

ABSTRACT Since the late 1990s, French policy-makers have promised an indirect approach to African security in partnership with regional organisations. Yet this shift towards capacity-building, Africanisation and multilateralisation has not necessarily been followed, and forceful French military interventions in Africa have still taken place. This article thus aims to assess whether, to what extent, and why the theoretical convergence of France’s African security policy and the peacekeeping aspirations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) does not necessarily translate into practice. Through the analysis of the evolution of France’s African security policy and ECOWAS’ peacekeeping record, the French capacity-building efforts in West Africa, and the roles of France and ECOWAS in the Ivorian and Malian crises, this article will show that convergence in practice depends on the nature of an individual crisis, as well as the political, strategic, and economic interests of both France and ECOWAS member states.

Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War : Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam

This article examines neutral Switzerlands recognition policy towards the divided states of Korea and Vietnam. Drawing comparisons with other neutrals, notably Austria and Sweden, allows us to assess the credibility of neutrality in the Global Cold War. All three neutrals explicitly or implicitly aimed to reinforce their neutrality through the principle of universality, which entailed the recognition of all regimes, no matter their political couleur. Yet this principle was not applied consistently, but rather pragmatically. Until the beginning of the 1970s, Switzerland, as well as Austria and Sweden, favoured the Western-oriented over the Communist halves of Korea and Vietnam. Thereby, this article argues, they undermined the credibility of neutrality. They were, however, willing to take that risk, because they feared that the recognition of North Korea and North Vietnam could irritate the United States, and provoke East German claims for recognition, which was undesirable due to the Hallstein doctrine and West Germanys economic weight. It was only with the rise of the Third World as a political force, and the softening of the US position that the neutrals, which saw themselves in competition with each other for status and influence, eventually recognised North Korea and North Vietnam.

The Advocate and Its Wealthy Client: Britain and Switzerland in the Early Cold War

In the immediate post-war period and during the early cold war, Britain regularly defended Switzerlands interests against the two emerging superpowers: the Soviet Union and especially the United States. This advocacy was not, however, altruistically motivated. In light of their experiences during the Second World War, British policy-makers could still see the benefits of a neutral Switzerland. But more importantly, the relatively wealthy Swiss were willing to pay for British support and a neutral Switzerland implied other financial, political, and strategic advantages. When there were no such advantages, London abstained from defending Berne. In the case of the negotiations leading to Switzerlands informal participation in the Western strategic embargo against the Eastern Bloc, Whitehall did not stand up to defend Swiss neutrality against US might. Yet this article demonstrates that even if the British had been willing to help the Swiss in their dealings with the Americans, they would have lacked the power to prevent Washington from imposing its will. Britains power continued to decline after the war, and advocacy for Switzerland could only be successful if the Swiss position was acceptable to the United States.