Marcus Düwell

The Cambridge handbook of human dignity: Interdisciplinary perspectives

This introduction to human dignity explores the history of the notion from antiquity to the nineteenth century, and the way in which dignity is conceptualised in non-Western contexts. Building on this, it addresses a range of systematic conceptualisations, considers the theoretical and legal conditions for human dignity as a useful notion and analyses a number of philosophical and conceptual approaches to dignity. Finally, the book introduces current debates, paying particular attention to the legal implementation, human rights, justice and conflicts, medicine and bioethics, and provides an explicit systematic framework for discussing human dignity. Adopting a wide range of perspectives and taking into account numerous cultures and contexts, this handbook is a valuable resource for students, scholars and professionals working in philosophy, law, history and theology.

Wofür braucht die Medizinethik empirische Methoden

ZusammenfassungDer Einsatz empirischer Forschungsmethoden in der Medizinethik hat zu Forderungen nach einem gewandelten Selbstverständnis der Medizinethik geführt, die sich mehr als eine integrierte Disziplin aus Sozialwissenschaften und Ethik verstehen solle. Dagegen wird hier die These vertreten, dass über Sinn und Unsinn des Einsatzes empirischer Methoden zunächst eine moralphilosophische Diskussion erforderlich ist. Medizinethiker müssen ausweisen können, welche empirischen Forschungsresultate zur Beantwortung normativer Fragen erforderlich sind. Ein solcher Ausweis beruht seinerseits jedoch auf normativen Annahmen, die ihrerseits moralphilosophischer Legitimation bedürfen. Der Beitrag untersucht daher den Einsatz empirischer Methoden in der Medizinethik im Hinblick auf Verhältnis von ethischem Grundlagendiskurs und Methodologie der angewandten Ethik. Abschließend wird gefragt, ob nicht ein Großteil von empirischen Studien in der Medizinethik aus forschungsethischen Gründen problematisch ist.AbstractDefinition of the problem The use of empirical methods in medical ethics and bioethics has generated proposals for reconceptualizing medical ethics as a discipline that integrates ethics and social science. Arguments The position taken in the present paper, by contrast, is that what is needed, in the first place, is a moral-philosophical evaluation of when it makes sense to employ empirical methods. Medical ethicists must demonstrate what empirical research is necessary for answering normative questions. Any such justification will, however, necessarily rely on normative assumptions that, for their part, require moral-philosophical justification. The paper examines the use of empirical methods in medical ethics in terms of the appropriate relationship between the methodology of applied ethics and debates over the foundations of ethics. The paper concludes by raising the question of whether it is not the case that most empirical studies in medical ethics are of dubious merit, by the accepted standards of research ethics.

Sozialwissenschaften, Gesellschaftstheorie und Ethik

In den letzten Jahren werden Studien zur so genannten ‚Empirischen Ethik‘ durchgeführt, die Meinungen der Bevölkerung zu moralisch strittigen Themenfeldern untersuchen. Auch in der Technikfolgenabschätzung gewinnen die Sozialwissenschaften im Rahmen der Partizipativen Technikfolgenabschätzung an Bedeutung. Allerdings ist das Verhältnis von Sozialwissenschaften und Ethik konzeptionell noch weitgehend unklar. Der Beitrag untersucht verschiedene Möglichkeiten, die Relevanz sozialwissenschaftlicher Studien und partizipativer Technikfolgenabschätzung zum ethischen Diskurs konzeptionell zu fassen. Während eine Angewandte Ethik, die ihre normativen Urteile weitgehend an faktische Überzeugungen der Bevölkerung delegiert, moralphilosophisch kritisch zu beurteilen ist, kann eine Reflexion auf das Verhältnis von Angewandter Ethik und Sozialethik eher zu einem geeigneten konzeptionellen Rahmen führen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es jedoch für die Angewandte Ethik von vorrangiger Bedeutung, die gesellschaftstheoretischen und sozialphilosophischen Dimensionen ihrer Themen zu diskutieren.

Human dignity and socialism

Conceptual clarifications: general overview The concepts of human dignity and socialism are both extremely indefinite and should here be understood in a broad sense. I will only briefly indicate how the concept ‘human dignity’ is here used (Lohmann 2013). Historically, social conceptions of a particular dignity and honour (for example, of a position, of a class, due to special achievements) can be differentiated from conceptions of general dignity accorded to all humans (for different reasons: for example ontological position in the cosmos, capacity to reason, creation in the image of god). Since the new beginning of international law after the Second World War, universal human dignity has been tied to the possession of human rights. Human dignity as a ‘basis’ of human rights is a morally grounded norm enacted as nationally and internationally applicable law through the shaping of political will. To respect, protect and guarantee these rights are in the first instance duties of the respective state, second of all states, and by means of a ‘horizontal effect’ of all humans as well. The content of ‘human dignity’ refers to the capabilities of humans for free, reflected self-determination, to their equal legal recognition and self-recognition and to the conditions of a minimum subsistence level which allow a life worthy of human dignity (in German, menschenwurdiges Leben ). ‘Socialism’ is an equally encompassing concept applicable to different conceptions of society which aspire to a social organization of the economy, of ownership structures, of society and/or of the state in criticism of capitalism and its associated individualism. Historically, the concept first appears as a category of philosophy of law ( sozialismo , A. Buonafede, 1798), following Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, in order to establish natural law on the basis of sociability against catholic views (Schnieder 1984). In England, the concept has been used only since 1837 for the designation of Robert Owens visions of society (Cole 1962). The development of socialist movements and corresponding conceptions range from early socialism (or, in Engels’ terms, ‘utopian socialism’, 1789–1848) in France, Marx’ scientific socialism and numerous variations (anarchistic socialism, state socialism, reform socialism, market socialism, democratic socialism etc.), the creation of labour unions and socialist, communist or social democrat parties in Europe to the present (Schnieder 1984; Wildt 2008). The different conceptions of socialism have highly differing normative ideas and demands.

Why and how should we represent future generations in policymaking

This paper analyses the main challenges (particularly those deriving from the non-identity problem and epistemic uncertainty concerning the preferences of future persons) to the idea that we should and can represent future generations in our present policymaking. It argues that these challenges can and should be approached from the perspective of human rights. To this end it introduces and sketches the main features of a human rights framework derived from the moral theory of Alan Gewirth. It indicates how this framework can be grounded philosophically, sketches the main features and open questions of the framework and its grounding, and shows how it can be used to deal with the challenges to the idea that future generations have rights that can be represented in our policymaking.

Interdisciplinarity, Applied Ethics and Social Science

The bonds between applied ethics and social science seem to become increasingly tight. This does not only manifest itself by social scientists and ethicists working together, but also by an increasing attention, from both sides, to the very nature of their cooperation. The debate on this topic has been ongoing for more than twenty years, but in the last years the discussion became more intense. However, one can doubt whether up until now the relevant questions have been sufficiently distinguished. Particularly the notion “empirical ethics” creates more confusion than clarification with regard to the different conceptual and methodological dimensions. The methodological debates show a wide spectrum of topics. This paper aims to make an inventory of the questions raised in the debate on the role of empirical research in (applied) ethics. We argue that there are at least five distinct groups of questions to be found in this debate, concerning: (1) the fact-value gap, (2) the notions of ‘discipline’ and ‘interdisciplinary’, (3) the nature of both ethics and social sciences, (4) the type of empirical research relevant for ethics, (5) the embeddedness of the individual researcher. The paper concludes with some suggestions for further debate.

Human dignity in Renaissance humanism

Renaissance humanism As a topic worthy of sustained and systematic scrutiny, human dignity first appeared on the philosophical agenda in the Renaissance. An indication of this is the appearance, from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards, of several tracts about the dignity and excellence of man. Yet, in spite of this apparently straightforward state of affairs, the Renaissance treatment of human dignity has also given rise to confusion. The reason for this is that we tend to read our own conceptions of human dignity into Renaissance discussions of it. Moreover, the new interest in human dignity in the fifteenth century is related to the revival of classical culture known as ‘Renaissance humanism’. The tendency to conflate this movement with later systems that have been labelled ‘humanism’, too, has been pervasive since the middle of the nineteenth century. In order to clear the ground, I must first disentangle the different meanings of the elastic notion of humanism. The word ‘Humanismus’ was coined in 1808 by the German theologian and pedagogue, Friedrich Niethammer, to denote the educational current that laid much store by the study of the classical languages and literature (Niethammer 1808). In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the word came to be applied to a variety of currents, positions and worldviews. Particularly influential was Georg Voigts use of the term to label the Renaissance programme of restoring ancient learning (Voigt 1859). Though the Renaissance scholars and thinkers who brought this movement about did not call themselves ‘humanists’, the label caught on. Since that time, ‘Renaissance humanism’ refers to the educational and cultural project to re-establish the liberal arts or studia humanitatis of antiquity, the pursuit of which was considered to be the privilege of free persons (as distinct from slaves). But, apart from this well-defined acceptation, ‘humanism’ acquired a wide range of other (sometimes conflicting) meanings. Here is a suitably loose description that attempts to cover some of their common features: ‘Humanism is also [i.e. in addition to being the designation for the cultural movement of the Renaissance] any philosophy which recognizes the value or dignity of man and makes him the measure of all things or somehow takes human nature, its limits, or its interests as its theme.’ Since such features have also been perceived in the culture of the Renaissance, the different meanings have blurred.

Dignity in traditional Chinese Daoism

‘Dignity’ (尊严, zūn yan) is, in the contemporary Chinese language, both a foreignism and a native term. As a foreignism, many scholars conceive the main function of dignity to be the communication of modern European ideas of human dignity, especially that of Kantian philosophy, to contemporary China which is thought to lack such ideas. Thus, in the Ci-Hai (辞海, literally a ‘sea of terms’), one of the few comprehensive Chinese dictionaries, the second definition of this word is: ‘The recognition and affirmation of the moral and social value of an individual or a social organization; The acknowledgment of the value of human life as the most fundamental dignity of human beings’ (Ci-Hai 2000: 2300). The Ci-Hai mentions nothing of the Chinese tradition of the concept, as if it does not play a role in Chinese philosophy. This would be a misunderstanding: a notion of dignity is central in both Confucianism and Daoism. The Confucian concept of dignity is similar to the one we find in Kantian philosophy: dignity is understood as human dignity and strongly related to action . In the Daoist tradition, ‘dignity’ functions very differently, but this does not mean, I will suggest, that it is of no interest to our understanding of the concept. Quite the contrary: the Daoist conception of dignity could contribute to the global discussion of the concept precisely because it offers a different perspective. I will first briefly attempt to outline the general features of the idea of Dao, and second discuss the substance and role of dignity in Daoism.

Human dignity: concepts, discussions, philosophical perspectives

The following introduction aims at an overview of relevant conceptual and philosophical distinctions and questions that discussions about human dignity are confronted with. I will mainly focus on questions about ‘human dignity’ that are relevant within the context of the human rights framework. First, I will explain why we are in need of a philosophical account of human dignity at all. Second, I will distinguish different ideal typical models of (human) dignity. Third, I will distinguish different conceptual questions related to different approaches to human dignity and their philosophical articulations. Fourth, I will investigate some relevant questions on the way towards an ethics of human dignity. Finally, I will propose some topics that I consider to be important questions for future philosophical debates about this concept.The following introduction aims at an overview of relevant conceptual and philosophical distinctions and questions that discussions about human dignity are confronted with. I will mainly focus on questions about ‘human dignity’ that are relevant within the context of the human rights framework. First, I will explain why we are in need of a philosophical account of human dignity at all. Second, I will distinguish different ideal typical models of (human) dignity. Third, I will distinguish different conceptual questions related to different approaches to human dignity and their philosophical articulations. Fourth, I will investigate some relevant questions on the way towards an ethics of human dignity. Finally, I will propose some topics that I consider to be important questions for future philosophical debates about this concept. Why develop a philosophical account of human dignity? When in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was signed, human dignity was introduced as a kind of moral reference point for an agreement that could provide normative guidance for the interpretation of the human rights framework in general. Most people believed that they knew what human dignity was about: a consensus within the humanistic tradition, a secularized version of the Judeo-Christian concept of Imago Dei, an overlap between the ethical doctrines of important thinkers like Kant and Confucius, the normative core of the natural law tradition, a moral–political statement against the atrocities of the Nazi regime etc. Although obviously not everyone endorsed the notion, it was generally assumed that its meaning and status were clear – and thus it appeared superfluous to strive for a theoretical explanation and justification of the concept.

Human Dignity and Future Generations

The questions of whether we have obligations towards future generations, why we have such obligations and what these obligations entail, are important topics of discussion in contemporary moral and political philosophy. While there seems to be political consensus on the view that we are obligated to adopt a policy of sustainability, the reasons why we should endorse such an obligation are highly contested. The dominant argument can be found in the so-called ‘Brundtland definition’ of ‘sustainable development’: ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (United Nations 1987: 37). In this line of thought, the obligation towards future generations is a normative reason for a sustainable politics. Of course, we also have reasons to act sustainably because of the rights of current (particularly the younger) generations, but various aspects of a sustainable politics are only necessary if we take future generations into account. Such an obligation to a long-term sustainable policy would assume that there is something about future generations that gives us obligations towards them. But if we attribute rights to future generations, we would assume that human rights should be attributed to beings that do not and may never exist. This problem is quite extensively discussed in terms of ‘rights of future generations’ or ‘intergenerational justice’ (for example, Grosseries and Meyer 2009; Hiskes 2009) but the concept of human dignity is hardly ever referred to. In the following I will briefly explain (1) the obstacles we are facing if we talk about human dignity in the context of future generations; (2) what such a conceptualization could look like; and (3) what further philosophical and practical issues arise from this.