Margaret Greenwood

Technology transfer projects in developing countries--furthering the Project Management perspectives

Abstract This paper attempts to broaden the analysis of the technology transfer phenomenon by refocusing research attention on the level of performance assessment of technology transfer projects. An holistic evaluation framework based on the considerations of an extended Project Life Cycle model is proposed to overcome some of the shortcomings of conventional approaches to project evaluation. This also reinforces the need for open systems thinking in assessing and managing risk of technology transfer projects. The discussion is based on two case studies which articulate the experiences with two integrated mechanisms of technology transfer used in Algeria from 1965 to 1990: turnkey and “product-in-hand”. The aim is to gain a better understanding of the processes of technology transfer and to contribute to the improvement of associated managerial practices in developing economies.

Earnings Management in English NHS Hospital Trusts

In this paper we review the financial reporting incentives associated with the requirement to breakeven for English NHS Trusts. We also investigate the distribution of reported income and estimate discretionary accruals thereby contributing to the limited literature on earnings management in not-for-profit hospitals. We find that Trust managers use discretion over accruals to report income within the target range around zero. The results are robust to recent challenges to earnings management explanations arising from the use of distributional and aggregate accruals methodologies. Our findings indicate that a precise and challenging financial breakeven target based on current cost residual income is associated with wide-spread use of discretionary accruals to an extent that weakens the accountability of NHS Trusts.

The Governance of CEO Incentives in English NHS Hospital Trusts

Institutional arrangements for the governance of CEO pay and turnover in English NHS Hospital Trusts replicate best practice for listed companies but with the additional feature of centrally imposed performance measurement. In this paper we investigate the impact of this unique combination of incentives on the relationship between CEO pay/turnover and Trust financial and operating performance in the period 1998–2005. We identify a strong association between poor Trust performance and CEO turnover but find little evidence that remuneration committees relate pay to performance in the best performing Trusts. Our findings raise questions about the economic rationale for remuneration committees in the governance of NHS Hospital Trusts.

Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations

English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).

Audit fees and audit adjustments: evidence from Welsh local authorities

This paper exploits the availability of pre-audit financial statements to investigate the scale and incidence of audit adjustments and their impact on audit fees in Welsh local authorities. Adjustments to the politically-sensitive general fund, which represent a significant proportion of all adjustments, are associated with increased audit fees. The authors also found that audit adjustments on average result in more conservative reporting of the surplus/deficit and the balance on the general fund, with the number and value of downward adjustments exceeding those of upward movements.