Margaret Tierney

Software engineering standards: the ‘formal methods debate’ in the uk

This paper traces the evolution of two standards, Def Stan 00-55 and 00-56, regualtin the identification and productin of safety-critical software for defence applications, issued by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as interim standards in 1991. The standards—00-55, in particular—have become an important forum for articulating the interests of those who work in the UK safety-critical software engineering field; a debate which has largely revolved around the intergral role 00-55 demands for formal methods of sofware development for safety-critical functions or components. In recounting the stor of their gestation within the MoD during the early 1980s; their controversial release in draft form in 1989; and their subsequent second release as interim standards in 1991, the aim has been to illuminate some of the current ‘politics’ of formal methods of software production, and to consider how the standards are reshaping the discipline of software engineering.

Potential Difficulties in Managing Safety-Critical Computing Projects: a Sociological View

The paper reviews the emergence of project management frameworks in commercial computing environments. It suggests that there is a tension between “scientific” and “industrial” solutions to controlling software development, and that most strategies for dealing with the management of the software labour process, and of relations with users and the rest of the organisation, are shaped by the latter set of concerns. In contrast, certain kinds of safety-critical software development depend heavily on a “scientific” commercial environment and labour process — formal methods, and their practitioners, being a case in point. After reviewing some of the work practices of formal methodists in high-integrity computing, the paper concludes with some research questions about the special difficulties facing project managers of safety-critical projects.

Safety-critical and securtiy-critical computing in britain: an exploration

This paper explores the development and assessment, in the UK, of computer systems which are critical to human safety (focusing promarily on railways, civil aviation, offshore oil and defence), and also of those critical to national security are identified, ranging from ad hoc and unsystematic pratices, through good software engineering to the use of formal, mathematical methods. We discuss whether the resultant systems are safe and secure, and highlight two key problems: how to demonstrate safety and security, in advance of use; and how to ensure safe human computer interaction.