Maria Alessandra Rossi

Patent disclosure and R&D competition in pharmaceuticals

The prominent role played by patents within the pharmaceutical domain is unquestionable. In this paper, we focus on a relatively neglected implication of patents: the effect of patent-induced information disclosure on the dynamics of R&D and market competition. The study builds upon the combination of two large datasets, linking the information about patents to firm-level data on R&D projects and their outcome. Two case studies in the fields of anti-inflammatory compounds and cancer research complement our analysis. We argue that patent disclosure induces R&D competition and shapes firms’ technological trajectories. In fact, we show that under conditions of uncertainty, patent disclosure can contribute to generate knowledge spillovers, promoting multiple parallel research efforts on plausible targets and stimulating private investment and competition.

The knowledge economy, the crash and the depression

This paper reviews a recent strand of research emphasizing how the present institutions of the knowledge economy may be jeopardizing the very promise of growth and prosperity that the increased use of knowledge is generally reported to bring about. The excessive privatization of knowledge generates self-reinforcing vicious and virtuous circles of accumulation of intellectual property and investment in human capital, which increase global inequality. The present institutions of the global economy entail also a reduction of global investment opportunities that is one of the causes of the present global depression. Absent spontaneous antidotes to these phenomena, economic and science policies should aim at redressing the balance between public and private knowledge. Because of the distortion of incentives, stemming from uncompensated knowledge externalities at the international level, these policies should necessarily be coordinated at global level

The Institutional Design of European Competition Policy

This paper analyzes the institutional design of the European competition policy system. Besides the multi-level public enforcement, the paper describes other two fundamental dimensions of the European competition policy system: the relationship between public and private enforcement and that between competition law enforcement and sector specific regulation, with particular regards with the Electronic Communications sector. The main effort of the paper consists in representing the EU Competition policy system as a web of vertical and horizontal relationships among a large set of actors, sometimes coordinated by formal or informal mechanisms but still characterized by competence overlaps and strategic interdependencies. Finally the paper aims at assessing the relevant economic trade-offs associated to these overlaps and interactions in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the system, giving some policy suggestions for the future evolution of its overall design.