Maria-Augusta Miceli

Pass-Through Pricing on Production Chains

We here want to analyze how the imperfect competition mark-up and pass-through are transmitted through the production chain and how they change, as a function of the number of firms existing at each production stage. In order to have an analytical closed form solution, we use the standard linear oligopoly framework. Without loss of generality and as first approximation, we assume an homogeneous good and constant returns to scale. The exercise, by using the well known standard results of Nash equilibrium with n firms and the monopoly double marginalization, obtains the mark-up solution parametric in the number of firms in S production stages.Results are mainly the followings, where the first two are just a confirmation of the two-stage results, the third is original: (i) Mark-up vanishes in the increasing number of firms, at any production stage. (ii) Pass-through increases in the number of firms, existing at each production stage, because competition transfers cost increases. (iii) Results are indifferent to the stage at which the larger number of firms happen. In other words, results do not discount the position in the sequence. Classical comparisons between integrated and decentralized chain have been computed with computed consequences on welfare results.

Cenni di Teoria dei Giochi (Elements of Game Theory)

Italian Abstract: Elementi di teoria dei giochi necessari ad implementare e risolvere giochi statici e dinamici con informazione completa e incompleta. Particolare attenzione e dettagli di soluzione sono esposti per i giochi bayesiani dinamici con informazione incompleta.English Abstract: Elements of game theory necessary to implement and troubleshoot static and dynamic games with complete information and incomplete are exposed. Particular attention and details are given for the dynamic Bayesian games with incomplete information.

Integrazione e Preclusione (Integration and Foreclosure)

Italian Abstract: Considero le implicazioni sul welfare delle imprese e dei consumatori della la maggior parte delle combinazioni di integrazioni orizzontali e verticali su una filiera in due segmenti in cui ogni segmento possa avere monopolio o oligopolio, bene omogeneo o differenziato, variabile strategica prezzo o quantita.English Abstract: I study the welfare implications of horizontal and vertical integration on a two stage production chain, where each segment can be in a monopoly or oligopoly regime, where goods can be homogeneous or differentiated and the strategic variable be price or quantity.

Pubblicità (Lecture Notes on Advertising)

Italian Abstract: Come e stata modellata la pubblicita in economia? Essenzialmente la pubblicita e un modo di espandere la domanda. Nel caso di differenziazione orizzontale, la pubblicita puo differenziare artificialmente un bene altrimenti omogeneo (pubblicita persuasiva) o rendere omogeneo un bene altrimenti artificialmente differenziato. Nel caso di differenziazione verticale puo invece informare sulla differenza fra i beni segnalando le differenze altrimenti ignote ai consumatori. Come tale rappresenta un segnale che elimina le asimmetrie informative ricostituendo il mercato per ogni qualita e facendo diminuire i costi di ricerca dei consumatori. English Abstract: How has advertising being traditionally modeled? In general advertising is a way to expand demand. In the case of horizontal differentiated goods, advertising may contribute in creating artificial differences between essentially homogeneous goods. In the case of vertical differentiated goods, advertising may inform consumer about differences, letting them choose their preferred goods and/or it can signal differences when consumers are less informed than suppliers. In the latter case advertising works as a signal that reduces information asymmetries, repairs market failure and reduces consumer search costs for goods.

R&D Subsidization Effect and Network Centralization: Evidence from an Agent-Based Micro-Policy Simulation

This paper presents an agent-based micro-policy simulation model assessing public RD then, we provide a simulation experiment where the pattern of the total level of R&D activated by a fixed amount of public support is analysed as function of companies’ network topology. More specifically, the suggested simulation experiment shows that a larger “hubness†of the network is more likely accompanied with a decreasing median of the aggregated total R&D performance of the system. Since the aggregated firm idiosyncratic R&D (i.e., the part of total R&D independent of spillovers) is slightly increasing, we conclude that positive cross-firm spillover effects - in the presence of a given amount of support - have a sizeable impact within less centralized networks, where fewer hubs emerge. This may question the common wisdom suggesting that larger R&D externality effects should be more likely to arise when few central champions receive a support.

Prezzi di Ramsey (Ramsey Prices)

Italian Abstract: Vengono derivati i prezzi di Ramsey (1927) in monopolio e duopolio di Cournot, esplicitando le soluzioni dovute a funzioni lineari.English Abstract: Ramsey Prices (1927) are derived in the simple cases of linear functions both in monopoly and Cournot duopoly setting.

Single Crossing Property

Hidden type contracts are examined in their simplest formulation in order to fully prove the role of the single crossing property to eliminate rendundant constraints and to show how this necessary condition constrains the parameters in the case of linear functions. Mechanism design examples are fully developed and their solutions computed and graphed.

Does Government Insolvency Imply Speculative Attacks

The aim is to show how and when government insolvency implies a fixed exchange rate regime crisis. To model these issues I try to unify a stylized macroeconomic model with a standard micro agent behavior toward asset pricing. The equilibrium condition between demand and supply of public debt, the latter coming from the current government budget constraint, shows the vitious circle between debt accumulation, default probabilities and interest payments. In this set up, the Treasury crisis is shown to be driven by two interdependent processes: (i) the rate at which the public debt stock accumulates; (ii) the rate at which the likelihood of default increases, which affects the domestic real interest rate. When the two processes lead debt to accumulate at a rate faster than r, debt accumulates at an increasing rate that reaches infinity in finite time. Under this kind of circumstance, the impossibility to offer the equilibrium return develops the run. An increasing second derivative of debt accumulation process is seen as a possible psycological threshold, that used as signal of default, may start the vitious spiral.