Maria D. Van Kerkhove

Pandemic Potential of a Strain of Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings

Swine Flu Benchmark The World Health Organization (WHO) announced on 29 April 2009, a level-5 pandemic alert for a strain of H1N1 influenza originating in pigs in Mexico and transmitting from human to human in several countries. Fraser et al. (p. 1557, published online 11 May; see the cover) amassed a team of experts in Mexico and WHO to make an initial assessment of the outbreak with a view to guiding future policy. The outbreak appears to have originated in mid-February in the village of La Gloria, Veracruz, where over half the population suffered acute respiratory illness, affecting more than 61% of children under 15 years old in the community. The basic reproduction number (the number of people infected per patient) is in the range of 1.5—similar or less than that of the pandemics of 1918, 1957, and 1968. There remain significant uncertainties about the severity of this outbreak, which makes it difficult to compare the economic and societal costs of intervention with lives saved and the risks of generating antiviral resistance. An international collaborative effort has analyzed the initial dynamics of the swine flu outbreak. A novel influenza A (H1N1) virus has spread rapidly across the globe. Judging its pandemic potential is difficult with limited data, but nevertheless essential to inform appropriate health responses. By analyzing the outbreak in Mexico, early data on international spread, and viral genetic diversity, we make an early assessment of transmissibility and severity. Our estimates suggest that 23,000 (range 6000 to 32,000) individuals had been infected in Mexico by late April, giving an estimated case fatality ratio (CFR) of 0.4% (range: 0.3 to 1.8%) based on confirmed and suspected deaths reported to that time. In a community outbreak in the small community of La Gloria, Veracruz, no deaths were attributed to infection, giving an upper 95% bound on CFR of 0.6%. Thus, although substantial uncertainty remains, clinical severity appears less than that seen in the 1918 influenza pandemic but comparable with that seen in the 1957 pandemic. Clinical attack rates in children in La Gloria were twice that in adults (<15 years of age: 61%; ≥15 years: 29%). Three different epidemiological analyses gave basic reproduction number (R0) estimates in the range of 1.4 to 1.6, whereas a genetic analysis gave a central estimate of 1.2. This range of values is consistent with 14 to 73 generations of human-to-human transmission having occurred in Mexico to late April. Transmissibility is therefore substantially higher than that of seasonal flu, and comparable with lower estimates of R0 obtained from previous influenza pandemics.

Association between Zika virus and microcephaly in French Polynesia, 2013–15: a retrospective study

BACKGROUND The emergence of Zika virus in the Americas has coincided with increased reports of babies born with microcephaly. On Feb 1, 2016, WHO declared the suspected link between Zika virus and microcephaly to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. This association, however, has not been precisely quantified. METHODS We retrospectively analysed data from a Zika virus outbreak in French Polynesia, which was the largest documented outbreak before that in the Americas. We used serological and surveillance data to estimate the probability of infection with Zika virus for each week of the epidemic and searched medical records to identify all cases of microcephaly from September, 2013, to July, 2015. Simple models were used to assess periods of risk in pregnancy when Zika virus might increase the risk of microcephaly and estimate the associated risk. FINDINGS The Zika virus outbreak began in October, 2013, and ended in April, 2014, and 66% (95% CI 62-70) of the general population were infected. Of the eight microcephaly cases identified during the 23-month study period, seven (88%) occurred in the 4-month period March 1 to July 10, 2014. The timing of these cases was best explained by a period of risk in the first trimester of pregnancy. In this model, the baseline prevalence of microcephaly was two cases (95% CI 0-8) per 10,000 neonates, and the risk of microcephaly associated with Zika virus infection was 95 cases (34-191) per 10,000 women infected in the first trimester. We could not rule out an increased risk of microcephaly from infection in other trimesters, but models that excluded the first trimester were not supported by the data. INTERPRETATION Our findings provide a quantitative estimate of the risk of microcephaly in fetuses and neonates whose mothers are infected with Zika virus. FUNDING Labex-IBEID, NIH-MIDAS, AXA Research fund, EU-PREDEMICS.

Risk Factors for Severe Outcomes following 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Infection: A Global Pooled Analysis

This study analyzes data from 19 countries (from April 2009 to Jan 2010), comprising some 70,000 hospitalized patients with severe H1N1 infection, to reveal risk factors for severe pandemic influenza, which include chronic illness, cardiac disease, chronic respiratory disease, and diabetes.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: quantification of the extent of the epidemic, surveillance biases, and transmissibility

Summary Background The novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) had, as of Aug 8, 2013, caused 111 virologically confirmed or probable human cases of infection worldwide. We analysed epidemiological and genetic data to assess the extent of human infection, the performance of case detection, and the transmission potential of MERS-CoV with and without control measures. Methods We assembled a comprehensive database of all confirmed and probable cases from public sources and estimated the incubation period and generation time from case cluster data. Using data of numbers of visitors to the Middle East and their duration of stay, we estimated the number of symptomatic cases in the Middle East. We did independent analyses, looking at the growth in incident clusters, the growth in viral population, the reproduction number of cluster index cases, and cluster sizes to characterise the dynamical properties of the epidemic and the transmission scenario. Findings The estimated number of symptomatic cases up to Aug 8, 2013, is 940 (95% CI 290–2200), indicating that at least 62% of human symptomatic cases have not been detected. We find that the case-fatality ratio of primary cases detected via routine surveillance (74%; 95% CI 49–91) is biased upwards because of detection bias; the case-fatality ratio of secondary cases was 20% (7–42). Detection of milder cases (or clinical management) seemed to have improved in recent months. Analysis of human clusters indicated that chains of transmission were not self-sustaining when infection control was implemented, but that R in the absence of controls was in the range 0·8–1·3. Three independent data sources provide evidence that R cannot be much above 1, with an upper bound of 1·2–1·5. Interpretation By showing that a slowly growing epidemic is underway either in human beings or in an animal reservoir, quantification of uncertainty in transmissibility estimates, and provision of the first estimates of the scale of the epidemic and extent of case detection biases, we provide valuable information for more informed risk assessment. Funding Medical Research Council, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, EU FP7, and National Institute of General Medical Sciences.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1): Pathways of Exposure at the Animal‐Human Interface, a Systematic Review

Background The threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses to humans remains significant, given the continued occurrence of sporadic human cases (499 human cases in 15 countries) with a high case fatality rate (approximately 60%), the endemicity in poultry populations in several countries, and the potential for reassortment with the newly emerging 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain. Therefore, we review risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans. Methods and Findings Several epidemiologic studies have evaluated the risk factors associated with increased risk of H5N1 infection among humans who were exposed to H5N1 viruses. Our review shows that most H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry. Most cases are sporadic, while occasional limited human-to-human transmission occurs. The most commonly identified factors associated with H5N1 virus infection included exposure through contact with infected blood or bodily fluids of infected poultry via food preparation practices; touching and caring for infected poultry; consuming uncooked poultry products; exposure to H5N1 via swimming or bathing in potentially virus laden ponds; and exposure to H5N1 at live bird markets. Conclusions Research has demonstrated that despite frequent and widespread contact with poultry, transmission of the H5N1 virus from poultry to humans is rare. Available research has identified several risk factors that may be associated with infection including close direct contact with poultry and transmission via the environment. However, several important data gaps remain that limit our understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans. Although infection in humans with H5N1 remains rare, human cases continue to be reported and H5N1 is now considered endemic among poultry in parts of Asia and in Egypt, providing opportunities for additional human infections and for the acquisition of virus mutations that may lead to more efficient spread among humans and other mammalian species. Collaboration between human and animal health sectors for surveillance, case investigation, virus sharing, and risk assessment is essential to monitor for potential changes in circulating H5N1 viruses and in the epidemiology of H5N1 in order to provide the best possible chance for effective mitigation of the impact of H5N1 in both poultry and humans. Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions or organizations with which they are affiliated.

Ebola haemorrhagic fever outbreak in Masindi District, Uganda: outbreak description and lessons learned

BackgroundEbola haemorrhagic fever (EHF) is infamous for its high case-fatality proportion (CFP) and the ease with which it spreads among contacts of the diseased. We describe the course of the EHF outbreak in Masindi, Uganda, in the year 2000, and report on response activities.MethodsWe analysed surveillance records, hospital statistics, and our own observations during response activities. We used Fishers exact tests for differences in proportions, t-tests for differences in means, and logistic regression for multivariable analysis.ResultsThe response to the outbreak consisted of surveillance, case management, logistics and public mobilisation. Twenty-six EHF cases (24 laboratory confirmed, two probable) occurred between October 21st and December 22nd, 2000. CFP was 69% (18/26). Nosocomial transmission to the index case occurred in Lacor hospital in Gulu, outside the Ebola ward. After returning home to Masindi district the index case became the origin of a transmission chain within her own extended family (18 further cases), from index family members to health care workers (HCWs, 6 cases), and from HCWs to their household contacts (1 case). Five out of six occupational cases of EHF in HCWs occurred after the introduction of barrier nursing, probably due to breaches of barrier nursing principles. CFP was initially very high (76%) but decreased (20%) due to better case management after reinforcing the response team. The mobilisation of the community for the response efforts was challenging at the beginning, when fear, panic and mistrust had to be countered by the response team.ConclusionsLarge scale transmission in the community beyond the index family was prevented by early case identification and isolation as well as quarantine imposed by the community. The high number of occupational EHF after implementing barrier nursing points at the need to strengthen training and supervision of local HCWs. The difference in CFP before and after reinforcing the response team together with observations on the ward suggest a critical role for intensive supportive treatment. Collecting high quality clinical data is a priority for future outbreaks in order to identify the best possible FHF treatment regime under field conditions.

Estimating age-specific cumulative incidence for the 2009 influenza pandemic: a meta-analysis of A(H1N1)pdm09 serological studies from 19 countries

The global impact of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic (H1N1pdm) is not well understood.

Risk Factors Associated with Subclinical Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus—Cambodia, 2006

BACKGROUND We conducted investigations in 2 villages in Cambodia where outbreaks of influenza H5N1 occurred among humans and poultry to determine the frequency of and risk factors for H5N1 virus transmission. METHODS During May 2006, approximately 7 weeks after outbreaks of influenza H5N1 among poultry occurred, villagers living near households of 2 patients with influenza H5N1 were interviewed about potential H5N1 exposures and had blood samples obtained for H5N1 serological testing by microneutralization assay. A seropositive result was defined as an influenza H5N1 neutralizing antibody titer of 1:80, with confirmation by Western blot assay. A case-control study was conducted to identify risk factors for influenza H5N1 virus infection. Control subjects, who had seronegative results of tests, were matched with H5N1-seropositive persons by village residence, households with an influenza H5N1-infected poultry flock, sex, and age. RESULTS Seven (1.0%) of 674 villagers tested seropositive for influenza H5N1 antibodies and did not report severe illness; 6 (85.7%) were male. The 7 H5N1-seropositive persons, all of whom were aged<or=18 years, were younger than participants who tested seronegative for H5N1 antibodies (median age, 12.0 years vs. 27.4 years; P=.03) and were more likely than were the 24 control subjects to report bathing or swimming in household ponds (71.4% vs. 20.8%; matched odds ratio, 11.3; P=.03). CONCLUSIONS Avian-to-human transmission of influenza H5N1 virus remains low, despite extensive poultry contact. Exposure to a potentially contaminated environment was a risk factor for human infection.

Poultry movement networks in Cambodia: Implications for surveillance and control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI/H5N1)

Movement of poultry through markets is potentially important in the circulation and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza. However little is understood about poultry market chains in Cambodia. We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 715 rural villagers, 123 rural, peri-urban and urban market sellers and 139 middlemen from six provinces and Phnom Penh, to evaluate live poultry movement and trading practices. Direct trade links with Thailand and Vietnam were identified via middlemen and market sellers. Most poultry movement occurs via middlemen into Phnom Penh making live bird wet markets in Phnom Penh a potential hub for the spread of H5N1 and ideal for surveillance and control.

Studies Needed to Address Public Health Challenges of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic: Insights from Modeling

In light of the 2009 influenza pandemic and potential future pandemics, Maria Van Kerkhove and colleagues anticipate six public health challenges and the data needed to support sound public health decision making.