Maria Helena Guimarães

How Pervasive are National Regulations in Intra-EU Trade?

The use of national regulations in the Internal Market for goods provides a relevant illustration of the nature of product market liberalization in the EU. This study shows that the number of national regulations has been increasing, that all EU Member States resort to them, and that their pervasiveness differs across countries and industries. We argue that national regulations are a form of “renationalizing” the Community initiative of market liberalization, as they are intended to protect the economic interests of Member States. Additionally, it is suggested that as further EU market liberalization comes about, EU Member States will continue to defend their national preferences by resorting to national regulations.

The Single Market: Trade Barriers and Trade Remedies

In this article we investigate how well the single market functions in practice by examining barriers to trade in goods markets and we discuss efforts to improve the governance of the single market. We use two unique datasets of specific trade obstacles to empirically examine which barriers continue to undermine EU cross-border trade, and whether non-judicial remedies have provided some degree of effective informal market governance in tackling trade impediments. Based on four hypotheses on country, industry and policy variables we test the probability of removing trade barriers in the pre-litigation phase of infringement proceedings rather than by Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decisions. We then assess the usage and effectiveness of the informal mechanism Solvit to resolve trade obstacles in the single market. We conclude that informal mechanisms operate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ as judicialization remains the last resort option when informal co-operation does not achieve the desired goals.

SINGLE MARKET NON-COMPLIANCE: HOW RELEVANT IS THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING?

This paper investigates the role of the national institutional setting in explaining Single Market non-compliance regarding non-tariff barriers in intra-European Union (EU) trade. Using data on infringements to Single Market law we show that the quality of domestic institutional characteristics is relevant to explain non-compliance among EU countries. While government independence from political pressures and higher levels of representativeness and accountability reduce the propensity of member states to infringe upon Single Market laws, better regulatory quality increases the probability of non-compliance at industry level, suggesting that increases in competition may generate protectionist measures that violate Single Market law.

Incumprimento Protecionista no Mercado Único da União Europeia

Protectionist Non-Compliance in the Single Market of the European Union Although the single market of the European Union (EU) supposes the inexistence of barriers in intracommunity trade, such barriers persist, hindering the free circulation of goods between the member states. The main argument proposed in this article is that governments of EU countries tend to accept infringements on freedom of circulation and to maintain the protectionist status quo in sectors in which groups of economic interest are most influential. Based on a statistical analysis of two databases made available by the European Commission, the article highlights the prevalence of such protectionist infractions in the EU, with a particular analysis made on how national protection is more frequent in sectors with a greater capacity for pressure, namely in the agricultural sector. The European experience is a useful comparison point for other integration projects in so far as it reveals how protectionist pressures from economic groups can lead to persistent violations of the regulations in agreements, demonstrating the need for continuous efforts by regional institutions to oppose such non-compliance.

The Commission, the Single Market and the Crisis: The Limits of Purposeful Opportunism*

The economic and financial crisis opened a window of opportunity to place the Single Market back on top of the European agenda as part of a two-tiered crisis response, which also included reinforced financial supervision and economic co-ordination. We argue that the Commission acted as a ‘purposeful opportunist’ in both tiers; but whereas in economic governance issues there was breakthrough change in the Commissions achievements and competences, in the Single Market realm policy change was fairly modest. Using process tracing analysis our goal is to explain why the Commission did not succeed in furthering a genuine Single Market reform. Our findings suggest that the Commissions entrepreneurship was constrained by the limited salience of Single Market issues in the crisis context and by the lack of actual political commitment from the other relevant stakeholders. Thus, our research highlights the limits of the Commissions opportunistic behaviour in less advantageous circumstances.

A governação do Mercado Único da União Europeia: a importância dos métodos informais

A Comissao Europeia tem reforcado a governacao do mercado unico e tem procurado conter as medidas protecionistas dos Estados membros, enfatizando a importância da eficaz monitorizacao destas medidas nacionais para garantir o adequado funcionamento do mercado unico. Este estudo analisa a eficacia das estrategias informais de governacao do mercado unico destinadas a eliminar dos obstaculos a livre de circulacao de bens na Uniao Europeia. Sustentamos a analise em duas bases de dados originais fornecidas pela Comissao Europeia - uma relativa aos processos de infracao no mercado unico de bens e outra contendo as queixas das empresas relativas a obstaculos encontrados a circulacao de bens que foram apresentadas junto do sistema de governacao informal Solvit. Recorremos tambem aos relatorios anuais da Comissao Europeia sobre a monitorizacao do cumprimento da legislacao da UE. A analise mostra a crescente utilizacao e a eficacia do sistema Solvit, medida pela taxa de resolucao dos casos que lhe sao apresentados e pelo tempo necessario a sua resolucao. No âmbito deste sistema, a aprendizagem e a socializacao dos atores com as formas e metodos de resolver problemas pragmaticos encontrados no mercado unico levam a estabilizacao de padroes de interacao e a cooperacao voluntaria, com beneficios para a eficacia do sistema e evitando os custos monetarios, de tempo e reputacao associados aos procedimentos judiciais. No entanto, a eficacia do Solvit decorre tambem das suas interligacoes com o nivel judicial, no contexto da governacao multinivel do mercado unico. A governacao informal opera na “sombra hierarquica” do Tribunal de Justica Europeu, ou seja, sob a ameaca do uso destes mecanismos judiciais, o que facilita a resolucao informal dos problemas e das distorcoes que prevalecem no mercado unico. Este estudo debruca-se sobre uma area da integracao europeia - o mercado unico de bens - ainda insuficientemente investigada quanto a prevalencia do incumprimento das suas normas. Enquanto a maioria dos estudos de Ciencia Politica enfatiza os mecanismos judiciais para fazer face ao incumprimento, esta pesquisa privilegia a otica da governacao. Cruzamos, assim, a literatura sobre governacao da Uniao Europeia com a literatura sobre incumprimento. A discussao da eficacia dos instrumentos de governacao do mercado unico da UE pode ser importante para outros projetos de integracao regional interessados em aprofundar o nivel da integracao dos seus mercados.