Maria Jarymowicz

Toward a Human Emotions Taxonomy (Based on Their Automatic vs. Reflective Origin)

Certain emotional processes “bypass the will” and even awareness, whereas others arise due to the deliberative evaluation of objects, states, and events. It is important to differentiate between the automatic versus reflective origins of emotional processes, and sensory versus conceptual bases of diverse negative and positive emotions. A taxonomy of emotions based on different origins is presented. This taxonomy distinguishes between negative and positive automatic versus reflective emotions. The automatic emotions are connected with the (a) homeostatic and (b) hedonistic regulatory mechanisms. The reflective emotions—uniquely human—are described in reference to deliberative processes and appraisals based on two types of conceptual and verbalized evaluative standards: (a) ideal self-standards and (b) general, axiological standards of good and evil.

Origin of Emotion Effects on ERP Correlates of Emotional Word Processing: The Emotion Duality Approach

We distinguish two evaluative systems which evoke automatic and reflective emotions. Automatic emotions are direct reactions to stimuli whereas reflective emotions are always based on verbalized (and often abstract) criteria of evaluation. We conducted an electroencephalography (EEG) study in which 25 women were required to read and respond to emotional words which engaged either the automatic or reflective system. Stimulus words were emotional (positive or negative) and neutral. We found an effect of valence on an early response with dipolar fronto-occipital topography; positive words evoked a higher amplitude response than negative words. We also found that topographically specific differences in the amplitude of the late positive complex were related to the system involved in processing. Emotional stimuli engaging the automatic system were associated with significantly higher amplitudes in the left-parietal region; the response to neutral words was similar regardless of the system engaged. A different pattern of effects was observed in the central region, neutral stimuli engaging the reflective system evoked a higher amplitudes response whereas there was no system effect for emotional stimuli. These differences could not be reduced to effects of differences between the arousing properties and concreteness of the words used as stimuli.

Understanding Human Emotions

The simple distinction between negative and positive emotions does not add very much to the understanding of the nature of human emotions. One type of pleasure is not similar to another. One type of pain is not comparable with another experience of suffering. It has to be taken into account that emotions, as evaluative processes of different types, are mostly automatic. In the case of humans, however, emotions are also partly based on deliberative thinking and reflection. Purely affective reactions arise as a consequence of subcortical mechanisms. This means that some emotions are automatic and based on uncontrolled, and even unconscious premises. On the other hand, evaluation can be due to reflective judgments, based on concepts that allow an understanding of what is positive or negative in reality. This understanding is not only from ones own point of view but also from a general point of view. Moreover, it is an understanding not only related to the present but also to the past or future (anticipated) reality. In this type of specifically human emotions, affects are provoked as a consequence of deliberative appraisals. The author postulates the categorization of the negative and the positive emotions, referring to different automatic and reflective sources. These sources are: (1) affective (homeostatic and hedonic)—leading to automatic emotions, and conceptual (concepts of the ideal self and abstract axiological concepts of good and evil)—leading to reflective emotions.

Self-We-Others Schemata Differentiation as a Base for Personal Agency and Social Attitudes

The extent to which the Self-schema is differentiated from the cognitive schemata representing other people has important meaning for diversification of social vs. individual identity (Snyder and Fromkin, 1980; Brewer, 1991; Jarymowicz, 1993), socialization and individuation (Ziller, 1964), and interdependence and individualism (Waterman, 1981). All these concepts must be taken into account in order to gain a better understanding of the social world (Greenwald and Pratkanis, 1984; Baumeister, 2005; Leary and Tangney, 2013).

Affect and Intellect in Judgments: Factors Which Determine Level of Evaluative Heterogeneity

What determines whether someone has a one-sided view of the world or perceives both the negative and positive aspects of something? To understand the factors which determine the extent to which human judgments are absolute we have to take into account studies of conscious and non-conscious information processing (Reber, 1993; Underwood, 1996; Hassin et al., 2005), and implicit and explicit emotions (Zajonc, 1980; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Ohme, 2007), which can be interpreted as evaluative processes of different types (Reykowski, 1968; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996; Sander and Scherer, 2009). Understanding human judgment requires a knowledge of psychology and neurobiology (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996, 2012; Sander et al., 2003; Sander and Scherer, 2009; Armony and Vuilleumier, 2013), both of which help to explain the conditions in which individuals make extreme, absolute evaluations and the mechanisms which enable more complex, moderate and nuanced appraisals. We argue that models of judgment processes should refer to the dual mind theories (Epstein, 1990; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Liberman, 2003; Deutsch and Strack, 2006; Kahneman, 2011), and emphasize the distinction between affective (automatic) vs. intellectual (reflective) premises of evaluative appraisals (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal, 2006; Jarymowicz, 2009; Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015).

The Asymmetry Bias in Me, We–Others Distance Ratings. The Role of Social Stereotypes

Studies in cognitive and social psychology have revealed that the distance from X to Y may be estimated as shorter or longer than the same distance from Y to X. Results showed that this judgment depended on particular properties of compared objects and a reference point in social comparisons (Holyoak and Mah, 1982; Codol, 1987; Kaminska-Feldman, 1991, 2012; Arcuri and Serino, 1992; Hurtig et al., 1993; Hoorens, 1995; Otten and Van Der Pligt, 1996; Eiser et al., 2001). A similar type of illusion—called the asymmetry effect—was found in studies concerning diverse objects, including numbers or geometrical figures (Rosch, 1975), countries (Tversky, 1977) or self—others comparisons (Codol, 1984, 1993). Moreover, analogous asymmetry was displayed in estimations of psychological similarities between objects as in ratings of physical distances between objects (Codol, 1984, 1985). Thus, the asymmetry effect seems to be a universal phenomenon. The current focus concerns explications of the asymmetry effects in the self—others physical distance ratings. The main question raised is: what are the determinants of the asymmetry effects? We attempt to argue that the asymmetry in the self—other(s) distance ratings bias can be due to the self being a cognitive prototype in social perception or to the cognitive stereotypes of the other(s).

Fear and Hope in Intractable Conflicts: The Automatic vs. Reflective Attributes of Collective Emotional Orientations

The main goal of this chapter is based on Bar-Tal’s concept of collective emotional orientation. The purpose is to point out the asymmetric nature of fear vs. hope in guiding people in context of intractable conflicts. Fear as a primary, holistic, and diffusive emotion of automatic origin can easily become a core affect of a collective emotional orientation. In contrast, hope, as an emotion of reflective origin can be shared only if a collective reaches a cognitive consensus about their aims and the types of activities that will lead to their realization. Such a consensus and the dominance of hope over fear in a situation of conflict can happen only if people are able to engage in reflective, evaluative reasoning. It depends on the development of the reflective–evaluative system, which can influence the innate, automatic ones. The duality of the evaluative systems is a necessary condition of the ability to perceive intractable conflicts from different perspectives.

Nonspecific Impact of Reflective Mind on Implicit Evaluative Processes: Effects of Experimental Manipulations and Selected Dispositional Factors

There is a growing interest in the phenomena of mind duality, one of the most intriguing properties of human nature. A review of classic texts (Maslow, 1954; Reykowski, 1975; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Epstein, 1983) as well as more recent works (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; Clore and Huntsinger, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Gawronski and Creighton, 2013; Sherman et al., 2014; Strack and Deutsch, 2014) shows that the authors refer to the distinctions between mental codes (affective vs. intellectual), cognitive and evaluative processes (associative vs. propositional), levels of consciousness, and regulatory systems (automatic vs. controlled). Advances in neurobiological research help to understand interrelations between diverse brain structures and regulative rules. The alliance of psychology with neuroscience has become a standard in studies on emotions understood as evaluative processes (Ekman and Davidson, 1994; LeDoux, 1996, 2012; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Liberman, 2003; Sander and Scherer, 2009; Linquist et al., 2012; Imbir et al., 2015). The research conducted in our laboratory aims to differentiate between two evaluative systems: primary/automatic and reflective (Jarymowicz, 2008; Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015). On the basis of the neurobiological and psychological models we assume that interactions between these two systems are reciprocal. The purpose of this opinion article is to present some empirical arguments related to the nonspecific impact of the reflective system on the automatic one.

Mental Barriers and Links Connecting People of Different Cultures: Experiential vs. Conceptual Bases of Different Types of the WE-Concepts

There are numerous determinants of closeness in relationships between people. Cognitive representations of others in ones own mind are considered especially meaningful (Cooley, 1902; Durkheim, 1953; Markus and Moya, 2010). In particular, openness to others depends on the types of mental links between the Self and Others, leading to the formation of the WE concept. The WE concept has specific affective and behavioral components. Some studies have demonstrated it in a spectacular way. Brewer and Gardner (1996) found that the number of instances of the word “we” used in neutral texts correlated with the lower or higher degree of further conformist reactions in participants who read given text. The simple “we” label (used in neutral context), associated in the mind with social context, stimulated behavior oriented toward social expectations. The WE concept connects people, but at the same time can be the basis for powerful barriers and, sometimes, hostility. Empirical findings have shown the significance of the WE–THEY mental differentiation. Using the minimal group paradigm, psychologists demonstrated that even artificial groups (identified based on trivial criteria) displayed differentiation of in-group vs. out-group attitudes, especially evident in-group favoritism (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982). Even preschool children display out-group discrimination (Bar-Tal, 1996). In our studies (Jarymowicz, 2004), similarly to adults, the 9–10 years old participants displayed the IAT effect (Greenwald et al., 1998), connecting Pols rather with “flowers” and Germen rather with “insects.” However, people are able to develop mental representations in such a way as to be able to separate cognitive differentiation from evaluative discrimination.