Maria Miceli

The envious mind

This work provides an analysis of the basic cognitive components of envy. In particular, the roles played by the envious partys social comparison with, and ill will against, the better off are emphasised. The ill will component is characterised by the enviers ultimate goal or wish that the envied suffer some harm, and is distinguished from resentment and sense of injustice, which have often been considered part of envy. The reprehensible nature of envy is discussed, and traced back to the analysis of its components. Finally, we explore both points of overlap and distinguishing features between envy and other emotions such as jealousy or emulation, and make a few general remarks, pointing to the necessity of overcoming conceptual looseness in the notion of envy.

How to Silence One’s Conscience: Cognitive Defenses Against the Feeling of Guilt

This work presents an analysis of the feeling of guilt and in particular of the cognitive defenses against it. It shows how the need to avoid or mitigate the feeling, with the suffering implied, affects the perception and judgment of oneself and others. It is in fact claimed that to copy with their guilt people try to alter the appraisal processes implied by the emotion. Once described the main cognitive components of the feeling of guilt, an analysis is offered of the interventions of the cognitive defenses on such components, to alter the original appraisal processes underlying the feeling.

EMOTIONAL AND NON-EMOTIONAL PERSUASION

A relevant issue in the domain of natural argumentation and persuasion is the interaction (synergic or conflicting) between “rational” or “cognitive” modes of persuasion and “irrational” or “emotional” ones. This work provides a model of general persuasion and emotional persuasion. We examine two basic modes for appealing to emotions, arguing that emotional persuasion does not necessarily coincide with irrational persuasion, and showing how the appeal to emotions is grounded on the strict and manifold relationship between emotions and goals, which is, so to say, “exploited” by a persuader. We describe various persuasion strategies, propose a method to formalize and represent them as oriented graphs, and show how emotional and non-emotional strategies (and also emotional and non-emotional components in the same strategy) may interact with and strengthen each other. Finally, we address the role of uncertainty in persuasion strategies and show how it can be represented in persuasion graphs.

Anxiety as an “epistemic” emotion: An uncertainty theory of anxiety

Abstract This paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework placing anxiety in a perceived control perspective. We analyse the basic cognitive components of anxiety with reference to the need for control, both pragmatic and epistemic. We address the difference between fear and anxiety by pointing to the special role played in anxiety by the need for epistemic control and uncertainty reduction. We examine some typical “questions” of anxiety, and some typical “answers” or coping strategies, with special reference to their relationships with either need for control. We focus on the need for epistemic control, its relationship with pragmatic control, its impact on the amount of anxiety experienced, and its role in anxiety-proneness. We address worry and its relationships with anxiety and the needs for control. Finally, we compare our approach with related models, point to its implications for clinical treatment, and discuss the interplay of conscious and unconscious processes in anxiety.

Hope: The Power of Wish and Possibility

This work proposes an analysis of the cognitive and motivational components of hope, its basic properties, and the affective dispositions and behaviors it is likely to induce. In our view current treatments of hope do not fully account for its specificity, by making hope overlap with positive expectation or some specification of positive expectation. In contrast, we attempt to highlight the distinctive features of hope, pointing to its differences from positive expectation, as well as from a sense of successful agency, optimism, trust, and faith. Fear and anxiety are also addressed, and the latter is analyzed as a state of mind implying both fear and hope. Finally, the relationship between hope and motivation is explored, and “active” hope is compared with “passive” hope. Some concluding remarks summarize the results of our analysis, and stress the role of hope in fostering the individual’s well-being.This work proposes an analysis of the cognitive and motivational components of hope, its basic properties, and the affective dispositions and behaviors it is likely to induce. In our view current treatments of hope do not fully account for its specificity, by making hope overlap with positive expectation or some specification of positive expectation. In contrast, we attempt to highlight the distinctive features of hope, pointing to its differences from positive expectation, as well as from a sense of successful agency, optimism, trust, and faith. Fear and anxiety are also addressed, and the latter is analyzed in terms of as a state of mind implying both fear and hope. Finally, the relationship between hope and motivation is explored, and ‘active’ hope is compared with ‘passive’ hope. Some concluding remarks summarize the results of our analysis, and stress the role of hope in fostering the individual’s well-being.

The Cognitive-Motivational Compound of Emotional Experience

We present an analysis of emotional experience in terms of beliefs and desires viewed as its minimal cognitive constituents. We argue that families of emotions can be identified because their members share some of these constituents. To document this claim, we analyze one family of emotions—which includes the feeling of inferiority, admiration, envy, and jealousy—trying to show that the distinctiveness of each emotion is due to the specific compound of beliefs and desires it implies, whereas the kinship among related emotions is due to their sharing of cognitive or motivational components. Finally, we address the gestalt problem, that is, the question of how it is possible that emotions, although consisting of several “atomic” elements, are felt as unitary experiences.

Nature and mechanisms of loss of motivation

Loss of motivation refers either to the weakening of a motive q or to the loss of energy and persistence with which some subordinate goal p is planned for and pursued in view of q. Although interrelated, such aspects can be kept distinct, and the present work focuses on the loss of strength of the subordinate goal. An analysis is provided of such mental attitudes as subjective frustration, negative expectation, disappointment, and discouragement so as to clarify their respective roles in favoring loss of motivation. The necessary cognitive conditions for the occurrence of loss of motivation are singled out; namely, goal p should be an intention, and a disappointment should occur in regard to the instrumental relationship between p and q, ps attainability, or ps convenience. Both advantages and limits of the model are discussed.

Basic Principles of Psychic Suffering: A Preliminary Account

The aim of the present work is to propose an analysis of psychic suffering and the criteria to account for its occurrence and intensity. Psychic suffering is defined as the suffering implied by a frustrating assumption, that is, a particular kind of discrepancy between a belief and a goal, embedding a time specification for both the goal and the belief representation. Psychic suffering is distinguished from cognitive distress due to interruption, overload or malfunctioning of mental processes. General criteria for both psychic suffering and cognitive distress are identified and discussed, including the kind of goal according to a variety of parameters (such as terminal vs instrumental; pursued vs not pursued; achievement vs maintenance, etc.), as well as the crucial role played by attention, self-awareness and expectations. Relations between suffering and negative emotions and the limits of the approach are discussed.

Dependence relations among autonomous agents (abstract)

The main thesis of this work is that human interactions are neither unpredictable nor bounded, but they are undertaken autonomously on the grounds of a number of basic principles and conditions. Among these, a crucial role is played by the objective dependence relationships holding among agents. In this paper we report about a first step in providing a computational theory of dependence as a tool for interaction control. We define non social as well as social dependence, and try to show how dependence relationships are organized into complex patterns (such as multiparty, multigoal, unilateral, and bilateral dependence). We then show how a given set of dependence relationships may produce new dependence relationships. Finally, we explore the relationship between dependence and influencing, describing how an agents dependence on another is predictive of ones goal of influencing the other, as well as of the latters power of influencing the former.

Effects of different interaction attitudes on a multi-agent system performance

This paper explores the respective advantages of different interaction attitudes of simple agents in a common simulated environment. The attitudes (solitary, parasite, selfish, and social) have been defined along the two dimensions of self-sufficiency and help-giving. A number of experiments have investigated (a) in what degree the performance of a social system would be impaired by the presence of different kinds of exploiter; (b) which degree of self-sufficient attitude would be more advantageous. Two results are presented and discussed: the robustness of the “social” interaction attitude (both giving and seeking help), that allows to tolerate the exploiters without risking dangerous consequences for the entire social system; and the importance of the self-sufficient attitude, compared with a total dependence on or exploitation of others.