Maria Petrova

Inequality and Media Capture

Peoples support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects. Mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion, even when voters understand that the media can be biased. I develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost. The model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom; this effect is stronger in democratic regimes. I find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross-country models.

Field Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian Parliamentary Elections

Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary elections held on December 4, 2011. We estimate the actual share of votes for the incumbent United Russia party to be at least 11 percentage points lower than the official count (36% instead of 47%). Our results suggest that the extent of the fraud was sufficient to have had a substantial impact on the outcome of the elections; they also confirm that the presence of observers is an important factor in ensuring the integrity of the procedure.

Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press

Does economic development promote media freedom? Do higher advertising revenues tend to make media outlets independent of political groups?in?uence? Using data on the 19th century American newspapers, I show that in places with higher advertising revenues, newspapers were more likely to be independent from political parties. Similar results hold when local advertising rates are instrumented by regulations on outdoor advertising and newspaper distribution. I also show that newly created newspapers were more likely to enter the market as independents in markets with higher advertising rates.

Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia

Do new communication technologies, such as social media, reduce collective action problem? This paper provides evidence that penetration of VK, the dominant Russian online social network, affected protest activity during a wave of protests in Russia in 2011. As a source of exogenous variation in network penetration, we use information on the city of origin of the students who studied together with the founder of VK, controlling for the city of origin of the students who studied at the same university several years earlier or later. We find that a 10% increase in VK penetration increased the probability of a protest by 4.6%, and the number of protesters by 19%. Additional results suggest that social media has affected protest activity by reducing the costs of coordination, rather than by spreading information critical of the government. In particular, VK penetration increased pro-governmental support and reduced the number of people who were ready to participate in protests right before the protests took place. Also, cities with higher fractionalization of network users between VK and Facebook experienced fewer protests. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that municipalities with higher VK penetration received smaller transfers from the central government after the occurrence of protests.

Chapter 17 - Media Capture: Empirical Evidence

Abstract This chapter overviews the empirical literature on the determinants and the consequences of media capture, i.e., the situation in which governments or other interest groups try to control the content of media outlets. We start by examining the evidence on the effect of media capture on the content of media outlets. Then we discuss the methods governments and other special interests use to control media. We review the literature on the determinants of media capture and the factors that affect the likelihood of media capture. Next, we present evidence on the effects of captured media on the behavior of people, as well as the effects of independent media in a captured environment. We conclude by discussing the factors that limit the effect of propaganda.

Politics, instability, and composition of international investment flows

We analyze the role of political instability for the composition of foreign investment, whether it takes the form of a majority- or minority-owned investment. We focus on the instability generated by the change of the party in power rather than on the risk of change of political regime or expropriation risk associated with this change. In majority-owned establishments, a foreign investor retains the control and enjoys fewer agency problems, while for minority-owned investments or joint ventures domestic partners of a foreign investor can lobby the government for preferential arrangements, such as firm-specific tax breaks. Political instability decreases the payoff of political connections in the future and decreases the attractiveness of minority-owned investments. The implications of our model are supported by empirical tests.

Evolution of Risk and Political Regimes

The risk of political predation impedes the achievement of economic prosperity. In this study, we analyze how the risk of predation evolves in different political regimes. Formally, we look at the interaction between a government and citizens in which, in each period, the government has an option to predate. Citizens prefer governments that are competent and non�?predatory and strive to replace ones that are not. Regimes differ in the degree to which citizens can succeed in doing so. In pure democracies, citizens can displace incumbent governments; in pure autocracies, they cannot; and in intermediate cases, they can do so in probability. After economic downturns, the posterior probability that the government is competent and benevolent declines. According to the model, in intermediate regimes, but not in others, governments can separate by type. One implication, then, is that these regimes are politically and economically more volatile, with higher levels of variation in assessments of political risk and in economic performance. Another is that in such regimes, political leadership can make an economic difference. Empirically, we test our argument by measuring the impact of economic downturns on the perceived risk of political expropriation in different regime types, using as instruments the incidence of natural disasters and unexpected terms of trade shocks.

Social Image, Networks, and Protest Participation

Social motivation plays a vital role in electoral participation, political contributions, and charitable donations. We examine the role of social image concerns in the decision to participate in political protests. We develop a dynamic model of protest participation, where socially-minded individuals use protest participation to signal their type. We then test predictions of the model using individual and city-level data from 2011-2012 political protests in Russia. We report several findings, consistent with the theory. First, list experiment results from a specially conducted survey imply that social signaling motives indeed were important for the decision to participate in protests. Second, participation in online protest groups increased offline protest participation. Third, participation in protests was associated with higher social capital in a city. Finally, the importance of both online social networks and offline social capital for protest participation diminished over time.

Social Media and Political Donations: New Technology and Incumbency Advantage in the United States

Can new technologies increase political competition? We study the impact of adopting Twitter on campaign contributions received by politicians. For identification, we compare donations just before and just after politicians open Twitter accounts in regions with high and low levels of Twitter penetration, controlling for politician-month fixed effects. We estimate that opening a Twitter account amounts to an increase of at least 2-3% in donations per campaign. This effect is stronger for new politicians, who were never elected before, for donations coming from new donors, for politicians who tweet more informatively, and for politicians from regions with lower newspaper circulation.