Maria Semenova

Bank Depositor Behavior in Russia in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis

An international team of economists examines the factors influencing the behavior of Russian depositors in the immediate aftermath of that countrys 1998 financial crisis, drawing upon two largely unutilized data sources—data from the Russian state savings bank Sberbank and a November 1998 household survey. After first reviewing the evolution of the household deposit market during the 1990s, they explore regional variations in net withdrawals from Sberbank branches during the period August-October 1998 as well as identify characteristics of individual/household depositors making (or attempting to make) such withdrawals. More severe runs on Sberbank outlets are found to be associated with more affluent and entrepreneurial regions, regions of more youthful and less educated population closer to Moscow, and areas with greater media freedom. Subsequent public opinion survey analysis of the socioeconomic correlates of runs on all Russian banks during the 1998 crisis reveals some interesting differences (in the effects of education in particular) on the propensity to successfully withdraw deposits.

Does Banking System Transparency Enhance Bank Competition? Cross-Country Evidence

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Informal loans in Russia: credit rationing or borrower’s choice?

This paper examines the strategies of Russian households for choosing either the formal or informal banking sector as a source of credit. We aim to learn why households refuse to become clients of a bank and prefer to instead raise funds by borrowing from individuals – friends, colleagues, relatives, and other private parties. We use the results of “Monitoring the Financial Behavior of the Population” (2009-2010), a national survey of Russian households. Our results suggest that a household’s choice of the informal credit market is based not only on economic factors, but also on some institutional ones, including financial literacy, trust in the banking sector, and credit discipline. We show that choosing the informal market is explained by a lack of financial literacy, measured by mathematical competence and home accounting, as well as by a lack of trust in the banking sector as a whole. Borrowers from private parties demonstrate a higher degree of credit discipline: those who believe that repaying a loan is not obligatory are less frequently among informal borrowers and they choose the bank credit market. Our findings, however, are still in line with credit rationing theory. We show that better financial conditions reduce a household’s probability to use both formal and informal credit markets in favor of pure bank borrowing.

Market Discipline and the Russian Interbank Market

The interbank market plays an important role in the overall function of the financial system. The efficiency of the interbank market, in turn, depends largely on its inherent disciplining mechanisms. This paper investigates the discipline mechanisms of Russias interbank market, testing the hypothesis that market discipline in Russia was strong enough to constrain excessive risk-taking by participating banks before, during, and after the 2008- 2009 financial crisis. The existence of quantity-based market discipline is investigated using Heckmans sample selection model and the efficiency of market discipline is studied with a panel data model. Our approach detects market discipline only during the financial crisis, not before or after. Even during the crisis, its efficiency in curbing bank risk-taking was rather low. JEL Classification: G21, G01, P2. Keywords: market discipline, interbank market, risk-taking, banks, Russia

Save or Borrow – What Determines Russian Households’ Financial Strategies?

This paper examines what influences Russian households’ decisions to save and borrow. We use the 2008 data from the 17th round of the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE). Our results show that the determinants of saving and borrowing are not only those suggested by economic theory but also include psychological and sociological considerations: smarter respondents, who are satisfied with their lives and inclined to help other people, are more likely to save. Those who enjoy stable or improving financial conditions and/or are satisfied with them are more likely to save and less likely to borrow. Financial literacy, a factor cited by institutional theory as positive for both saving and borrowing from banks, lost its significance at the onset of the financial crisis. Household income, suggested by economic theory as a basis for choosing a financial strategy, was found to have much less influence on savings and to have a positive influence on borrowing, confirming the rationing theory rather than inter-temporal choice theory. Surprisingly, the fear of job loss does not make people save more, contrary to the precautionary motive.

Currency Shifts As a Market Discipline Device: The Case of the Russian Market for Personal Deposits

Market discipline in the personal deposit market is of great importance for regulators. In developing economies, which rely much and are dependent on the dollar and euro, changes in the currency structure of the deposits may be strategic and work as an additional disciplining mechanism. Our study sheds light on this mechanism of currency shifts in the Russian market for personal deposits. Using data on more than 900 Russian banks for 2005–2015, we provide evidence that less risky banks — at least in terms of capital adequacy and liquidity — demonstrate higher growth of both the volume and the share of deposits denominated in foreign currency, even when the exchange rate volatility component is extracted. This mechanism continued working during the financial crisis of 2008–2009.

Informal Loans in Russia: Why Not to Borrow from a Bank?

After the 2008 crisis, the Russian consumer loan market shows high growth rates, accompanied by the quality deteriorating even faster. At the same time, a great proportion of households are not attracted by the banks and borrow informally. In this paper, we aim to learn why households refuse to become bank clients, using the data from a 2009–2010 national survey of Russian households. Our results suggest that households choice of the informal credit market is based not only on credit rationing, but also on a lack of financial literacy, credit discipline and trust in the banking sector as a whole.

Does Biological Endowment Matter for Demand for Financial Services? Evidence from Russian Household Survey

There are many studies revealing factors which influence the demand for financial services. However genetic features, determining the individual’s overall postnatal behaviour, have not been studied within this context. This paper extends the previous literature by studying to what extent individual biological endowment, proxied by prenatal testosterone (PT) (measured by the 2D:4D ratio), can determine personal demand for bank services and insurance. We use data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of 2011–2012. Our findings confirm the existence of the link between inherent biological variation and financial inclusion: PT affects the use of bank cards, intention to take out a loan, having a bank deposit and the consumption of insurance products.

Market Discipline in the Interbank Market: Evidence from Russia

The efficiency of the interbank market depends largely on its inherent disciplining mechanisms. This paper investigates the discipline mechanisms of Russia’s interbank market, testing the hypothesis that market discipline in Russia was strong enough to constrain excessive risk-taking by participating banks before, during, and after the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The existence and efficiency of quantity-based market discipline are investigated using the Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimations. Our approach detects market discipline only during the financial crisis, not before or after. Even during the crisis, the efficiency of market discipline in curbing bank risk-taking was rather low.

Sitting on the fence: does having a ‘dual-director’ add to bank profitability?

This article investigates how the combination of positions between the Board of Directors and the management affects bank’s profitability. We use the 2010 bank-level data from 112 countries (Bankscope). Our results suggest that the positions combination reduce both banks’ ROA and ROE. We also show that the higher is the proportion of the Board members, who also hold a managerial position, the lower is the profitability of a bank. Thus, the corporate governance regulation should go beyond a simple restriction on holding simultaneously the CEO and the head of Board of Directors positions.