Maria van der Schaar

Locke and Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition

To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this distinction turns out to be very different from the way it is made by Arnauld.To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this distinction turns out to be very different from the way it is made by Arnauld.

The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory

The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. This means that a cognitive act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to explain or elucidate our epistemic notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some of the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem.

The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood

The meaning of a declarative sentence and that of an interrogative sentence differ in their aspect of mood. A semantics of mood has to account for the differences in meaning between these sentences, and it also has to explain that sentences in different moods may have a common core. The meaning of the declarative mood is to be explained not in terms of actual force (contra Dummett), but in terms of potential force. The meaning of the declarative sentence (including its mood) is called the assertion-candidate, which is explained by what one must know in order to be entitled to utter the declarative with assertive force. Both a cognitive notion (knowledge) and a pragmatic notion (assertive force) are thus part of the explanation of the assertion-candidate. Davidson’s criticism that such a theory is in need of an account of the distinction between standard and non-standard uses of the declarative is answered: without counter-indications an utterance of a declarative sentence is understood as having assertive force. The meaning of an interrogative sentence, the question-candidate, and that of the other sentence types can ultimately be explained in terms of their specific relations to the assertion-candidate. Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory is used to show the philosophical relevance of a semantics of mood. The constructivist notion of proposition needs to be embedded in a theory of the assertion-candidate, which fulfils the offices of being the meaning of the declarative sentence, the content of judgement and assertion and the bearer of epistemic truth.

Assertion and grounding: a theory of assertion for constructive type theory

Taking Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting-point a theory of assertion is developed, which is able to account for the epistemic aspects of the speech act of assertion, and in which it is shown that assertion is not a wide genus. From a constructivist point of view, one is entitled to assert, for example, that a proposition A is true, only if one has constructed a proof object a for A in an act of demonstration. One thereby has grounded the assertion by an act of demonstration, and a grounding account of assertion therefore suits constructive type theory. Because the act of demonstration in which such a proof object is constructed results in knowledge that A is true, the constructivist account of assertion has to ward off some of the criticism directed against knowledge accounts of assertion. It is especially the internal relation between a judgement being grounded and its being known that makes it possible to do so. The grounding account of assertion can be considered as a justification account of assertion, but it also differs from justification accounts recently proposed, namely in the treatment of selfless assertions, that is, assertions which are grounded, but are not accompanied by belief.

Metaphysics and the Logical Analysis of ‘Nothing’

There has always been an affinity between Twardowski’s students and the members of the Vienna Circle. Both are analytic philosophers in a broader sense of the term: convinced that philosophy can be done in a scientific way, they were interested in logic, and opposed to speculative metaphysics and irrationalism. Especially in the early thirties, the two groups came to know each other better. In 1930, Carnap came to Warsaw for several lectures. And in 1934, Ajdukiewicz, Łukasiewicz, Tarski and other members of the Lvov-Warsaw School went to the pre-conference of the first international congress on the unity of science in Prague, and met there Frank, Neurath, Carnap and Reichenbach. This contact was continued at the first congress in Paris, 1935, where scientific philosophy was the topic. None of the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School identified him- or herself with the Vienna Circle, for there are some important differences.

Mere Belief as a Modification

The chapter uses the method of linguistic phenomenology to explain how belief in the sense of mere opinion can be understood as botched knowing. The distinction between attributive and nonattributive terms plays a central role in this explanation of belief. Several kinds of nonattributive terms are distinguished, modifying, restrictive and restorative terms, each being of use in the explanation of epistemic notions. And several forms of modification are distinguished: semantic, conceptual and ontological modification.

Judgement and the Emergence of Logical Realism in Britain

Why has the theory of judgement and proposition been central for the transition from British idealism to early analytic philosophy? In order to be able to answer this question, one has to know more about the theory of judgement in British idealism and the nineteenth century in general. Early analytic philosophy, that is, before 1905, consists of at least these aspects: logical realism, an atomistic theory of wholes and parts and a new method of analysis. I will focus here on logical realism as it is defended by Moore and Russell. Leaving the theory of wholes and parts and the new method for the next chapter, the central question here is: How did a new, British variant of logical realism, that is, a new theory of judgement and proposition, emerge from British idealism?

Judgement, Propositional Attitudes and the Proposition (1908–1944)

We have seen in Chapters 1 and 2 that early Stout, Russell and Moore share the following theses: 1. Every act has an object. 2. Each object has being, independently of our knowing it; these objects may be either actual or possible. 3. The cognitive relation between subject and object is a direct one; there is no representation of the object to which the act is directed. 4. The object of judgement has a propositional structure, and may function as object of other propositional attitudes. 5. The proposition contains the objects which the proposition is about, and we need to have a cognitive relation to its objects in order to understand the proposition. 6. There is no distinction between propositions and states of affairs, which means that the truth of propositions is understood as primitive, or that an identity theory of truth is defended. 7. A distinction in language is a prima facie argument for a similar distinction in thought and the world; grammar is a guide to logic and ontology.

Tropes and Predication

Three ontological distinctions are relevant when giving an account of tropes: I. The dependent/independent distinction II. The general/particular distinction III. The abstract/concrete distinction

Psychologism and the Problem of Error (1899–1907)

The beginning of analytic philosophy is marked by a certain tension. On the one hand, it is true that ’twentieth-century analytic philosophy is distinguished in its origin by its non-psychological orientation’, as Peter Hacker puts it.1 On the other hand, psychological theories of wholes and parts, and of judgement and intentionality have played an important role precisely in its origin, as we have seen in the former chapter. In the nineteenth century, psychology was the new successful science, whose methods were considered to be as exact as those of the natural sciences, or even to be identical with those methods. One hoped to develop for philosophy exact laws by taking psychology as its foundation.2 Insofar as philosophy is concerned with perception, judgement, concepts, inferences and acts and states of knowledge, a science of the human mind seems to be relevant. Right from the beginning of the nineteenth century, though, philosophers also criticised the use of psychology as far as the theoretical and normative parts of philosophy are concerned. In order to account for the objectivity or universal validity of truth and logic, psychology cannot be foundational to philosophy. Kant had shown, for example, that a normative, applied logic, in which psychology may play a role, presupposes a pure logic, that is, a logic that is independent of psychological concepts (KdrV A 52 ff). In Britain, opposition to the use of psychological methods in philosophy started with the British idealists. Especially the atomistic method in association-psychology was severely criticised by Bradley, and he distinguished between the psychological and the logical idea as we have seen in the first chapter.