Marialaura Pesce

Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods

We study economies that involve both small and large traders as well as the choice of a public project. Within this framework, we establish two sufficient conditions under which the set of competitive allocations coincides with the core. Our first core equivalence result holds under the assumption that there is a countably infinite set of large traders similar to each other. The second result, independent of the number of large traders, requires the existence of a coalition of small traders with the same characteristics of the large traders. Finally, we show how the generalized Aubin approach to cooperation may dispense with both conditions.

Are Asymmetrically Informed Individuals Irremediably Envious

In most economies, in particular in presence of uncertainty, a fair allocation does not exist. The main focus of this paper is on possibility of simultaneously resolving the equity and efficiency problems in economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We prove that if a cautious attitude towards uncertainty is socially accepted, then it is possible to have equitable and efficient allocations via a competitive equilibrium mechanism.