Marian David

Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty.

Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis suggested by Brentano.- 1 Brentanos Final View.- 2 Attribution in Modo Recto and in Modo Obliquo.- 3 Object and Content.- 4 Other Intentional Attitudes.- 5 Immanent Objects and Transcendent Objects.- 6 Conclusion.- Martys Philosophical Grammar.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Descriptive Psychology of Meaning: Linguistic Functions.- 3 Propositions Show What would be the Case were they True.- 4 Vagueness.- 5 Meaning Change, Inner Form and Universals.- 6 Marty and Wittgenstein: Two Conceptions of Philosophical Grammar.- Meaning and Expression: Marty and Grice on Intentional Semantics.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Philosophy of Language as a General Theory.- 3 Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.- 4 Primary and Secondary Intentions.- 5 Auto-Semantic Language Devices.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty on Form and Content in Language.- 1 Inner Speech Form in some of Martys Early Works.- 2 Logic, Grammar and Psychology.- 3 Form and Content in Martys Later Works.- 4 Some Fundamental Tenets of Universal Grammar.- Why a Proper Name has a Meaning: Marty and Landgrebe vs. Kripke.- 1 Preliminaries.- 2 Kripkes View.- 3 The Question of the Semantic Status of Proper Names.- 4 Meaning and Lexical Meaning.- 5 Reference and Meaning in Marty.- 6 Ambiguity and Vagueness.- 7 Landgrebes Solution.- 8 Conclusion.- The Categorical and the Thetic Judgement Reconsidered.- 1 Marty and Transformational Grammar.- 2 Categorical and Thetic Judgements.- 3 Reinterpreting the Categorical-Thetic Distinction.- 4 Conclusion.- Classical and Modern Work on Universals: The Philosophical Background and Martys Contribution.- 1 Categories of Meaning vs. Categories of Expression.- 2 Relativism and Colour.- 3 Natural Non-Absolute Universals.- Marty and Magnus on Colours.- Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth.- 1 Aristotle and Brentano.- 2 Existence and Reality.- 3 Bases and Operations.- 4 Collectives are Non-Real.- 5 Relations are Non-Real.- 6 Space is Non-Real.- 7 States of Affairs are Non-Real.- 8 On the Origins of our Concepts of Existence and Truth.- 9 A Correspondence Theory of Intentionality.- 10 The Ontology of Truth.- 11 Wertverhalte or Value-Contents.- 12 A Postscript on Martian Aesthetics.- Marty on Grounded Relations.- Marty on Time.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Tasks of a Philosophy of Time.- 3 Marty on the Ontology of Time.- 4 Marty on the Consciousness of Time.- 5 Conclusion.- Martys Theory of Space.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Martys Two Basic Metaphysical Theses.- 3 A Sketch of Martys Argument.- 4 Conclusion.- Judgement-Contents.- 1 Preliminary Remark.- 2 Conceptual Framework.- 3 Martys Judgement-Contents.- 4 Comments.- 5 Final Remark.- of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty.- 1 Phenomenologists and Brentanists.- 2 Marty on Subjectless Sentences.- 3 Dauberts Discussion of Marty.- 4 Shortcomings in Marty.- 5 Martys Theory in Phenomenological Perspective.- Marty and the Lvov-Warsaw School.- Two Letters from Marty to Husserl.- A Bibliography of Works by and on Anton Marty.- 1 Works by Marty.- 2 Works on Marty.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.

Minimalism and the Facts About Truth

Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth 1 . I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate explanation—a move that deprives it from giving support to Minimalism. At the heart of Minimalism lies a theory of truth for propositions. It is called the minimal theory, or MT for short. It consists of a collection of axioms. Each axiom is a proposition of the form

Theories of Truth

A theory of truth is supposed to tell us what it is for something to be true or false. But what kind of “something” is at issue here? What are the bearers of truth and falsehood? Philosophical discussions of truth tend to revolve around four broad categories of truth bearers: sentences (utterances), statements (assertions), beliefs (judgments, thoughts), and propositions. The significant differences among these four categories are responsible for a considerable amount of complexity in the theory of truth. It seems unlikely that a single feature could account for ‘x is true’ with ‘x’ ranging over truth bearers of arbitrary type. Instead, a general theory of truth will have to take the form of a disjunction: x is true just in case x is either a true sentence or a true statement or a true belief or a true proposition. Here the general notion of truth is partitioned into four subnotions, sentence-truth, statement-truth, belief-truth, and proposition-truth, each of which will have to be given its own account. Still, the over-all theory will aim to show that the general notion of truth is not just a bare disjunction; it will aim to show that the subnotions are all tied (each in its own manner) to a single explanatory ground. One way to achieve this is by selecting a category of basic truth bearers and taking the associated subnotion of truth as primary, while treating the others as derived. The primary notion has to be explained in terms of some feature that does not itself contain any notion of truth. The derived notions have to be explained in terms of the primary notion together with certain relations that hold between the basic truth bearers, on the one hand, and the non-basic truth bearers on the other. A theory with this structure will give at least some unity to the general notion of truth.Thank you very much for reading theories of truth. As you may know, people have look hundreds times for their favorite novels like this theories of truth, but end up in harmful downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of tea in the afternoon, instead they are facing with some malicious virus inside their laptop. theories of truth is available in our digital library an online access to it is set as public so you can download it instantly. Our book servers spans in multiple locations, allowing you to get the most less latency time to download any of our books like this one. Kindly say, the theories of truth is universally compatible with any devices to read.

ANALYTICITY, CARNAP, QUINE, AND TRUTH

Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, in particular, it will also do away with truth. I shall argue that there is, indeed, no way for Quine to protect truth against the type of argument he himself advanced in “Two Dogmas” against Carnap’s notion of analyticity. If he wants to keep his argument, Quine has to discard truth along with analyticity. At the end of the paper I suggest an interpretation of Quine on which he can be seen as having done just that.

Truth as One and Many

entitled, on the basis of his own principles, is not that GWT is false, but rather that the evidence is too weak to establish beyond reasonable doubt that GWT is true. My own evaluation of the evidence is very different. It may be that many of the models are problematic, and certainly none is perfect; but to conclude on the basis of imperfections in the models that we should reject GWT is a serious non sequitur. There is a raft of compelling data: temperature measurements, cryosphere melting, sea level rise (witnessed for example by the increasing frequency of use of the Thames Barrier since it was established in 1983, though heroic sceptics suggest that the sea isn’t rising—England is sinking!) And the models are constantly improving. There are many more claims in this book that need to be addressed: Foss’s discussion of Gaia theory, Lynn White, Niles Eldrige, E. O. Wilson, Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott (chapters 7–10) deserves extensive critique and comment. Foss and I differ significantly in our assessment of these thinkers, but I cannot explore these differences here. In fact I share some of Foss’s misgivings about deep ecology and non-anthropocentric intrinsic value, but the grounds of these worries are very different to those of Foss. I will conclude with some comments on Foss’s hubristic final chapter, in which he addresses human destiny, which he sees as a consequence of the fact that selfconscious intelligence has come to constitute the nervous system of Gaia. The argument is: nervous systems are adaptively advantageous to organisms; we are Gaia’s nervous system; therefore we are advantageous to Gaia. It is therefore our destiny and our duty to act in a way to shape and manage the planet. There are many things that can be said about this argument. One is that it certainly isn’t clear that the combination of an opposable thumb and a prefrontal cortex has done a lot to enhance life on Earth. (That experiment continues to deliver very mixed results.) In any case Gaia has been chugging along for 3.8 billion years well enough without self-conscious intelligence; how can it be seriously suggested that the explosive emergence of self-conscious intelligence in the geological eye-blink of at most a few hundred millennia is an event of such momentous significance for the planet? But in any case, treating self-conscious intelligence as the nervous system of Gaia is metaphor, and it is far from clear that Foss is entitled to read human destiny as the literal truth behind this metaphor. However, even if he is right that we are Gaia’s nervous system (or its analogue) Foss isn’t entitled to infer from this supposed fact that we should take charge of the planet—that is to draw an evaluative conclusion from a descriptive premise, committing precisely the flagrant error for which environmentalists were castigated in earlier chapters. This is a tiresome book: a painful parade of gratuitous and flawed intuitions and egregious error.