Marianna Makri

THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

Little previous research has focused on the CEOs salary in family-controlled public firms. This lack is addressed by comparing and contrasting the executive compensation contracts of family-member CEOs and non-family CEOs. Data gathered during the years 1995 through 1998 from 253 randomly selected family-controlled public firms was analyzed. Professional managers with no family ties to firm owners were found to be compensated at a higher rate than executives with family ties. This relative pay disadvantage increases as the family ownership position improves (which depresses the pay of the family CEO) and R&D investments increase (which improve the pay of the professional CEO but not the family CEO). On the other hand, family ties protect a CEO from bearing excessive personal risk, as indicated by a greater compensation premium, as uncontrollable (systematic) business risk increases. These findings point to a complex company dynamic: when family-member CEOs are in charge, altruistic motives exist that often result in risk protection for the CEOs personal income rather than in higher pay for these executives. (SFL)

Diversification Decisions in Family-Controlled Firms

This study examines diversification decisions of family firms and suggests that on average family firms diversify less both domestically and internationally than non-family firms. When they do diversify, family firms tend to opt for domestic rather than international diversification, and those that go the latter route prefer to choose regions that are ‘culturally close’. Lastly, we find that family firms are more willing to diversify as business risk increases. The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 360 firms, 160 of them being family-controlled and the rest (200) non-family-controlled.

Affiliate directors and perceived risk bearing in publicly traded, family-controlled firms: The case of diversification

The present study examines the influence exerted by affiliate directors in the diversification decisions of family–controlled, publicly traded firms. Using a relational view based on the development of social capital, we argue that affiliate directors play a different role in boards of family firms vis–à–vis nonfamily firms. Specifically, we develop a set of hypotheses proposing that affiliate directors stimulate family firms to pursue diversification strategies by sharing their knowledge and experience with family executives, and hence reducing the perceived risk that may be associated with growth strategies. Affiliates can play this advisory role without reducing the control of family owners, and this facilitates the firms willingness to adopt growth–oriented strategies. Namely, affiliates who are business experts or support specialists would tend to encourage diversification. These effects are supported empirically.

Socioemotional Wealth as a Mixed Gamble: Revisiting Family Firm R&D Investments with the Behavioral Agency Model

Theoretical explanations for family firm underinvestment in R&D relative to nonfamily firms remain nascent. We revisit this question using a refinement to the behavioral agency model (BAM)—the mixed gamble—that allows us to examine the socioemotional trade–offs that R&D represents for the family firm and how this differentiates their R&D investment decision from nonfamily firms. We do so in an empirical context where R&D investment is of greatest importance—high–technology industries. Moreover, we examine three contingencies that allow us to explore heterogeneity across family firms in their R&D decisions due to their effect upon the familys socioemotional wealth mixed gamble: institutional investor ownership, related diversification, and performance hazard.

Executive compensation in North American high-technology firms: a contextual approach

After reviewing the literature surrounding the link between executive compensation and innovation activities of North American firms, we examine two gaps in the area. First, we analyze how contextual factors can affect CEO pay in high-technology companies. In particular, we study three contextual dimensions: political, economic, and social. Second, we consider the specific case of executive compensation in high-technology firms when family ties are present at the helm. Drawing on agency rationale and previous research, we develop a series of instrumental propositions intended to provide the theoretical basis for a future research agenda in the area.

A search theoretic model of productivity, science and innovation

Building on macroeconomic research on technology searches in response to diminishing technological opportunities, we develop an industry-level search theoretic model of productivity, knowledge sources, and innovation. We argue that increasing the use of science in technology development increases the novelty of ideas in the innovation search distribution and thus increases the likelihood of finding productivity improvements. We also propose that this relationship will hold outside the traditional science-based industries (pharmaceuticals, chemicals), and that there is no similar relationship between productivity and non-science patents. Random effect analyzes of 32 US manufacturing industries during 1985-1997 support these hypotheses.

Conflict Between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders: Much Ado About Nothing?

We examine the unique nature of conflict between controlling family owners and minority shareholders (principal–principal conflict) in publicly traded family controlled firms through examining shareholder proposals. Implicit in prior governance and family business research has been that nonfamily shareholders are likely to be in conflict with the dominant family owners. In general, we find that much of this fear may be unwarranted except under specific circumstances. Our findings elucidate sources of heterogeneity in family firm principal–principal conflict and add greater nuance to our understanding of this type of agency problem within family firms.

The Effect of Psychological Ownership on Corporate Entrepreneurship: Comparisons Between Family and Nonfamily Top Management Team Members

Does family membership differentiate family and nonfamily top management team (TMT) members’ ownership-based motivations to pursue corporate entrepreneurship? We adopt the concept of psychological ownership to answer this question. Based on a sample of 192 TMT members from 90 Korean companies, this study found that family and nonfamily TMT members do not differ in the levels of psychological ownership of the organization or that of the job, nor do the two groups differ in the emphasis they place on corporate entrepreneurship. Family involvement and nepotism mitigate this relationship, but only for nonfamily TMT members. These results help reconcile discrepant findings for family versus nonfamily TMT members’ agency and stewardship behaviors.

Executive compensation: Something old, something new

1. Introduction to Managing HR in North America 2. Staffing and Developing the Multinational Workforce 3. Advances in Technology-Based Training 4. New HR Challenges in the Dynamic Environment of Legal Compliance 5. The Changing Family and HRM 6. Ethics and HRM 7. Health, Safety and HRM 8. Competitive Advantage Through HRM 9. Counterproductive Leader Behavior 10. Outsourcing and HRM 11. The Costs of Employee Benefits 12. Executive Compensation: Something Old, Something New 13. HRM After 9/11 and Katrina 14. Concluding Thoughts