Marijke Verpoorten

Self-Reported Food Insecurity in Africa During the Food Price Crisis

This article analyzes data on self-reported food insecurity of more than 50,000 individuals in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 2005–2008, when global food prices increased dramatically. The average level of self-reported food insecurity was high but remarkably stable over time, at about 54%. However, this average hides large heterogeneity, both within countries and across countries. In eight of the sample countries, self-reported food security improved, while it worsened in the ten other countries. Our results suggest that heterogeneous effects in self-reported food security are consistent with economic predictions, as they are correlated with economic growth and net food consumption (both at the household and country level). Specifically, in the face of rising food prices, self-reported food security improved on average in rural households, while it worsened in urban households – a finding that holds when using global prices or domestic food prices. Improvements in food security over time were also positively correlated with net food exports and GDP per capita growth. While the self-reported indicator used in this paper requires further study and one should carefully interpret the results, our findings suggest the need for a critical evaluation of the currently used data and numbers in the public debate on food prices and food insecurity.

The Impact of Armed Conflict on Economic Performance: Evidence from Rwanda

Important gaps remain in the understanding of the economic consequences of civil war. Focusing on the conflict in Rwanda in the early 1990s, and using micro data, this article finds that households and localities that experienced more intense conflict are lagging behind in terms of consumption six years after the conflict, a finding that is robust to taking into account the endogeneity of violence. Significantly different returns to land and labor are observed between zones that experienced low- and high-intensity conflict which is consistent with the ongoing recovery. Distinguishing between civil war and genocide, the findings also provide evidence that these returns, and by implication the process of recovery, depend on the form of violence.

Detecting Hidden Violence: The Spatial Distribution of Excess Mortality in Rwanda

Rwanda experienced several forms of internal violence, including civil war, genocide, reprisal killings and (counter-)insurgency. While these events all occurred in 1990-1998, their geographic location within Rwanda differred, with the genocide especially severe in the South of the country, the civil war and reprisal killings mostly taking place in the North and East, and the (counter-)insurgency concentrated in the Northwest. In order to assess the relative impact of the different forms of violence, this article derives a detailed spatial pattern of excess mortality from the population census. In line with previous evidence on the death toll of armed conflict in Rwanda, we find significant high-high excess mortality clusters in the southern province of Butare, in and around Kigali City, and in the eastern province Kibungo. Furthermore, we present the first quantitative evidence to date of high excess mortality in the northwestern porvince Gisenyi, indicating that the 1995-1998 (counter-)insurgency inflicted a much higher death toll on the population than presently acknowledged by the Rwandan government, the UN and large western donors.

Leave None to Claim the Land: A Malthusian Catastrophe in Rwanda?

More than 200 years after its first publication, the Malthusian thesis is still much debated, albeit in a modified form. Rather than predicting a global catastrophe, most neo-Malthusians stress the local character of the relationship between population pressure, natural resource scarcity, and conflict as well as its dependency on the socio-political and economic context. This softened version of Malthus’s thesis has received little empirical support in cross-country studies. In contrast, a number of subnational analyses have provided some evidence for local conditional Malthusian catastrophes, although ‘catastrophe’ is a big word since these studies have largely focused on low-intensity violence. This article adds to the small body of subnational studies, but focuses on a high-intensity conflict – the Rwandan genocide. In particular, it provides a meso-level analysis of the relation between population pressure and the intensity of violence measured by the death toll among the Tutsi across 1,294 small administrative units. The results indicate that the death toll was significantly higher in localities with both high population density and little opportunity for young men to acquire land. This finding can be interpreted as support for the neo-Malthusian thesis. On the other hand, it is possible that another mechanism operated – in densely populated areas, it may have been relatively easy for the elite to mobilize the population, because of dependency relations through the land and labor market. Alternatively, in densely populated areas, there may have been more lootable assets, and the violence may have been opportunistic rather than driven by need or by fear.

‘What are all the soldiers going to do?’ demobilisation, reintegration and employment in Rwanda

Western donors are heavily engaged in Rwandas Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme for former combatants. This engagement reflects the commitment of the donors to implement a new post‐conflict agenda in a very difficult situation. When this agenda goes beyond mere economic development, we argue that donors should not drift too far away from their first task: combating poverty. More often than not, development and security are two sides of one coin. Addressing one side without considering the other is bad practice. Demobilisation is really a topic that has both a developmental as well as a security aspect. Donors, as well as the Rwandan government, focus too narrowly on the security or military aspect of demobilisation. This reflects the status of the Rwandan government. It is very focussed on its own security to the detriment of other elements. We argue that these other elements, access to jobs and education, equity and broad based development should be dealt with as a matter of priority. If not, they will once more undermine security. Given the enormous amount of money invested in the demobilisation programme, donors should do much more to use their monitoring capacities to their full potential.

Civil War and Political Participation: Evidence from Uganda

We show that armed conflict in Uganda affects civic participation, measured by the frequency of political discussion and local meeting attendance. Relying on four rounds of nationally representative individual-level data on civic participation bracketing a large number of battle events, we find that civic participation increases in districts in which battle events took place. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies, including difference-in-difference and IV estimates, suggest that the relationship is causal. However, unlike previous studies, we find that experiencing violence does not affect formal electoral participation.

Armed conflict and schooling in Rwanda: Digging deeper

Abstract We study how armed violence affected educational outcomes in Rwanda during the nineties, relying on two waves of population census data and on a difference-in-differences identification strategy. Results indicate that the violence caused a drop of about 1 year of education for the individuals exposed to the violence at schooling age. The drop was slightly larger for girls than for boys. While increased dropouts and school delays explain the drop in primary schooling, secondary schooling was mainly affected by a drop in enrolments. Finally, in a within-country analysis, we find no robust link between subnational variations in the drop in schooling and the intensity of the 1994 genocide – the most intense conflict event that took place in the country over the studied period. We present possible explanations for the observed patterns and provide related policy implications.

Measure for Measure: How Well Do We Measure Micro-Level Conflict Intensity?

Rich measures of micro-level violent conflict intensity are key for successfully providing insight into the legacy of civil war. Yet, the debate on how exactly conflict intensity should be measured has just started. This paper aims to fuel this awakening debate. It is demonstrated how existing and widely available data - population census data - can provide the basis for a useful measure of micro-level conflict intensity: a fine Wartime Excess Mortality Index (WEMI). It is argued that the proposed measure is particularly well suited for studying the legacy of civil wars that are characterized by a large death toll and by different forms of violence. The measure is illustrated for the case of Rwanda and it is shown that, in a straightforward empirical application of the impact of armed conflict on schooling, the estimated impact varies widely across WEMI and a large set of alternative conflict intensity measures for Rwanda. While the conflict intensity measure proposed in this paper requires further study and one probably needs a combination of various methodologies, this finding suggests the need for a careful understanding of what underlies the different measures and methodologies in use.

To fish or not to fish? Resource degradation and income diversification in Benin

This paper looks at the relationship between natural resource degradation and income diversification for fishing communities in southern Benin. We find that the higher the degradation of the fishery stock, the more fishers diversify their income away from the fishery sector. However, given the rapid natural resource degradation, the level of income diversification that we find is surprisingly low and far from sufficient to relieve the stress on the lakes. In explaining the low level of income diversification, our results suggest that education plays a role.

From Vice to Virtue? Civil War and Social Impact in Uganda

We show that armed conflict affects social capital as measured by trust and associational membership. Using the case of Uganda and two rounds of nationally representative individual-level data bracketing a large number of battle events, we find that self-reported generalized trust and associational membership decreased during the conflict in districts in which battle events took place. Exploiting the different timing of two distinct waves of violence, we provide suggestive evidence for a rapid recovery of social capital. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies, including difference-in-difference and instrumental variable estimates, suggests that these relationships are causal.