Marilynn B. Brewer

The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time

Mfost of social psychologys theories of the self fail to take into account the significance of social identification in the definition of self. Social identities are self-definitions that are more inclusive than the individuated self-concept of most American psychology. A model of optimal distinctiveness is proposed in which social identity is viewed as a reconciliation of opposing needs for assimilation and differentiation from others. According to this model, individuals avoid self-construals that are either too personalized or too inclusive and instead define themselves in terms of distinctive category memberships. Social identity and group loyalty are hypothesized to be strongest for those self-categorizations that simultaneously provide for a sense of belonging and a sense of distinctiveness. Results from an initial laboratory experiment support the prediction that depersonalization and group size interact as determinants of the strength of social identification.

The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?

Allport (1954) recognized that attachment to ones ingroups does not necessarily require hostility toward outgroups. Yet the prevailing approach to the study of ethnocentrism, ingroup bias, and prejudice presumes that ingroup love and outgroup hate are reciprocally related. Findings from both cross-cultural research and laboratory experiments support the alternative view that ingroup identification is independent of negative attitudes toward outgroups and that much ingroup bias and intergroup discrimination is motivated by preferential treatment of ingroup members rather than direct hostility toward outgroup members. Thus to understand the roots of prejudice and discrimination requires first of all a better understanding of the functions that ingroup formation and identification serve for human beings. This article reviews research and theory on the motivations for maintenance of ingroup boundaries and the implications of ingroup boundary protection for intergroup relations, conflict, and conflict prevention.

Social Identity Complexity

In this article, we introduce the concept of social identity complexity—a new theoretical construct that refers to an individuals subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities. Social identity complexity reflects the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups of which a person is simultaneously a member When the overlap of multiple ingroups is perceived to be high, the individual maintains a relatively simplified identity structure whereby memberships in different groups converge to form a single ingroup identification. When a person acknowledges, and accepts, that memberships in multiple ingroups are not fully convergent or overlapping, the associated identity structure is both more inclusive and more complex. In this article, we define the concept of social identity complexity and discuss its possible antecedents and consequences. Results from initial studies support the prediction that social identity complexity is affected by stress and is related to personal value priorities and to tolerance of outgroup members.

Social Exclusion and Selective Memory: How the Need to belong Influences Memory for Social Events

The need to belong has been forwarded as a pervasive human motive, influencing a range of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. The current research explored the influence of belongingness needs on the selective retention of social information. Just as physical hunger results in selective memory for food-relevant stimuli, it was hypothesized that social hunger, aroused when belongingness needs were unmet, would result in selective memory for socially relevant stimuli. In two studies, the authors used a simulated computer chat room to present brief acceptance or rejection experiences to participants. Participants then read a diary containing both social and individual events. In both, rejection experiences resulted in selective memory for the explicitly social events of the diary. The implications of these results for the existence and consequences of a basic need to belong are discussed.

Self-evaluation effects of interpersonal versus intergroup social comparison

Two studies tested the prediction that the outcome of social comparison will differ depending on whether interpersonal or intergroup comparison processes have been engaged. Results of an experiment in which college student participants were assigned to membership in a minority or majority social category confirmed the predicted three-way interaction effect of in-group salience, target group membership, and upward-downward comparison on self-assessments of academic ability. Majority group members exhibited contrast effects in their self-ratings following exposure to a videotape of an in-group member displaying either very high or very low academic competence. Self-evaluations of minority group members revealed assimilation effects in response to in-group comparisons and contrast effects in response to out-group comparisons. In a second, follow-up experiment, this in-group assimilation effect was found to be dependent on intergroup contrast.

The Importance of Being We: Human Nature and Intergroup Relations.

The author discusses the nature of in-group bias and the social motives that underlie ethnocentric attachment to ones own membership groups. Two common assumptions about in-group bias are challenged: that in-group positivity necessitates out-group derogation and that in-group bias is motivated by self-enhancement. A review of relevant theory and research on intergroup relations provides evidence for 3 alternative principles: (a) in-group attachment and positivity are primary and independent of out-groups, (b) security motives (belonging and distinctiveness) underlie universal in-group favoritism, and (c) attitudes toward out-groups vary as a function of intergroup relationships and associated threats to belonging and distinctiveness

Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance

Social identity complexity refers to the way in which individuals subjectively represent the relationships among their multiple ingroup memberships. More specifically, individuals with low social identity complexity see their ingroups as highly overlapping and convergent, whereas those with high complexity see their different ingroups as distinct and cross-cutting membership groups. The present study tested the hypothesis that perceived overlap among ingroup memberships would be negatively related to ingroup inclusiveness and tolerance for outgroups, such that individuals with high overlap (low complexity) would be less tolerant and accepting of outgroups in general than those with low overlap (high complexity). Results from a telephone interview survey of adult residents of the state of Ohio supported this hypothesis. Individual differences in complexity of perception of their national, religious, occupational, political, and recreational social identities were systematically related to their attitudes toward ethnic outgroups and diversity.

Cross-Cultural Differences in Relationship- and Group-Based Trust

Two experiments explored differences in depersonalized trust (trust toward a relatively unknown target person) across cultures. Based on a recent theoretical framework that postulates predominantly different bases for group behaviors in Western cultures versus Eastern cultures, it was predicted that Americans would tend to trust people primarily based on whether they shared category memberships; however, trust for Japanese was expected to be based on the likelihood of sharing direct or indirect interpersonal links. Results supported these predictions. In both Study 1 (questionnaire study) and Study 2 (online money allocation game), Americans trusted ingroup members more than outgroup members; however, the existence of a potential indirect relationship link increased trust for outgroup members more for Japanese than for Americans. Implications for understanding group processes across cultures are discussed.

What are we really priming? Cue-based versus category-based processing of facial stimuli.

Results from 5 experiments provide converging evidence that automatic evaluation of faces in sequential priming paradigms reflects affective responses to phenotypic features per se rather than evaluation of the racial categories to which the faces belong. Experiment 1 demonstrates that African American facial primes with racially prototypic physical features facilitate more automatic negative evaluations than do other Black faces that are unambiguously categorizable as African American but have less prototypic features. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 further support the hypothesis that these differences reflect direct affective responses to physical features rather than differential categorization. Experiment 5 shows that automatic responses to facial primes correlate with cue-based but not category-based explicit measures of prejudice. Overall, these results suggest the existence of 2 distinct types of prejudice.

In-Group Identification as a Function of Depersonalization, Distinctiveness, and Status

Artificial social categories were created in a laboratory context in order to test predictions regarding the relative importance of group size and status as determinants of in-group favoritism. Subjects were assigned to categories of “overestimator” or “under estimator” and were told that one category included a majority of college students while the other represented a minority. Prior to category assignment, half of the subjects had been given confidentiality instructions designed to make them feel highly depersonalized. Based on feedback about test performance, status differentials between the two estimation categories were introduced. Consistent with predictions, there was a three-way interaction between depersonalization, in-group size, and in-group status as determinants of evaluative in-group bias on social trait ratings. Under control conditions (no depersonalization), group status and majority size both contributed to positive valuations of the in-group. Under the depersonalization condition, however, subjects valued minority group membership more than majority categorization, and the effect of status was eliminated.