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Dive into the research topics where Mario Čagalj is active.

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Featured researches published by Mario Čagalj.


acm/ieee international conference on mobile computing and networking | 2002

Minimum-energy broadcast in all-wireless networks: NP-completeness and distribution issues

Mario Čagalj; Jean-Pierre Hubaux; Christian Enz

In all-wireless networks a crucial problem is to minimize energy consumption, as in most cases the nodes are battery-operated. We focus on the problem of power-optimal broadcast, for which it is well known that the broadcast nature of the radio transmission can be exploited to optimize energy consumption. Several authors have conjectured that the problem of power-optimal broadcast is NP-complete. We provide here a formal proof, both for the general case and for the geometric one; in the former case, the network topology is represented by a generic graph with arbitrary weights, whereas in the latter a Euclidean distance is considered. We then describe a new heuristic, Embedded Wireless Multicast Advantage. We show that it compares well with other proposals and we explain how it can be distributed.


international conference on computer communications | 2005

On selfish behavior in CSMA/CA networks

Mario Čagalj; Saurabh Ganeriwal; Imad Aad; Jean-Pierre Hubaux

CSMA/CA protocols rely on the random deferment of packet transmissions. Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes would play by the rules. This can be dangerous, since the nodes themselves control their random deferment. Indeed, with the higher programmability of the network adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or firmware is likely to grow; by doing so, a user could obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. We use a game-theoretic approach to investigate the problem of the selfish behavior of nodes in CSMA/CA networks, specifically geared towards the most widely accepted protocol in this class of protocols, IEEE 802.11. We characterize two families of Nash equilibria in a single stage game, one of which always results in a network collapse. We argue that this result provides an incentive for cheaters to cooperate with each other. Explicit cooperation among nodes is clearly impractical. By applying the model of dynamic games borrowed from game theory, we derive the conditions for the stable and optimal functioning of a population of cheaters. We use this insight to develop a simple, localized and distributed protocol that successfully guides multiple selfish nodes to a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium.


ieee symposium on security and privacy | 2008

Jamming-resistant Key Establishment using Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping

Mario Strasser; Srdjan Capkun; Christina Pöpper; Mario Čagalj

We consider the following problem: how can two devices that do not share any secrets establish a shared secret key over a wireless radio channel in the presence of a communication jammer? An inherent challenge in solving this problem is that known anti-jamming techniques (e.g., frequency hopping or direct-sequence spread spectrum) which should support device communication during the key establishment require that the devices share a secret spreading key (or code) prior to the start of their communication. This requirement creates a circular dependency between antijamming spread-spectrum communication and key establishment, which has so far not been addressed. In this work, we propose an uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) scheme that breaks this dependency and enables key establishment in the presence of a communication jammer. We perform a detailed analysis of our UFH scheme and show its feasibility, both in terms of execution time and resource requirements.


ieee international conference computer and communications | 2006

Secure Localization with Hidden and Mobile Base Stations

Srdjan Capkun; Mario Čagalj; Mani B. Srivastava

Keywords: NCCR-MICS ; NCCR-MICS/CL3 Reference LCA-CONF-2005-029 Record created on 2005-12-07, modified on 2017-05-12


ieee international conference computer and communications | 2007

Non-Cooperative Multi-Radio Channel Allocation in Wireless Networks

Márk Félegyházi; Mario Čagalj; Shirin Saeedi Bidokhti; Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Channel allocation was extensively studied in the framework of cellular networks. But the emergence of new system concepts, such as cognitive radio systems, has brought this topic into the focus of research again. In this paper, we study in detail the problem of competitive multi-radio multi-channel allocation in wireless networks. We study the existence of Nash equilibria in a static game and we conclude that, in spite of the non-cooperative behavior of such devices, their channel allocation results in a load-balancing solution. In addition, we consider the fairness properties of the resulting channel allocations and their resistance to the possible coalitions of a subset of players. Finally, we present three algorithms that achieve a load-balancing Nash equilibrium channel allocation; each of them using a different set of available information.


IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing | 2007

Wormhole-Based Anti-Jamming Techniques in Sensor Networks

Mario Čagalj; Srdjan Capkun; Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Due to their very nature, wireless sensor networks are probably the category of wireless networks most vulnerable to “radio channel jamming”-based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. An adversary can easily mask the events that the sensor network should detect by stealthily jamming an appropriate subset of the nodes; in this way, he prevents them from reporting what they are sensing to the network operator. Therefore, even if an event is sensed by one or several nodes (and the sensor network is otherwise fully connected), the network operator cannot be informed on time. We show how the sensor nodes can exploit channel diversity in order to create wormholes that lead out of the jammed region, through which an alarm can be transmitted to the network operator. We propose three solutions: The first is based on wired pairs of sensors, the second relies on frequency hopping, and the third is based on a novel concept called uncoordinated channel hopping. We develop appropriate mathematical models to study the proposed solutions.


IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing | 2008

Secure Location Verification with Hidden and Mobile Base Stations

Srdjan Capkun; Kasper Bonne Rasmussen; Mario Čagalj; Mani B. Srivastava

In this work, we propose and analyze a new approach for securing localization and location verification in wireless networks based on hidden and mobile base stations. Our approach enables secure localization with a broad spectrum of localization techniques, ultrasonic or radio, based on the received signal strength or signal time of flight. Through several examples, we show how this approach can be used to secure node-centric and infrastructure-centric localization schemes. We further show how this approach can be applied to secure localization in mobile ad hoc and sensor networks.


IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications | 2009

Efficient MAC in cognitive radio systems: A game-theoretic approach

Mark Felegyhazi; Mario Čagalj; Jean-Pierre Hubaux

In this paper, we study the problem of efficient medium access control (MAC) among cognitive radio devices that are equipped with multiple radios and thus are capable of transmitting simultaneously at different frequencies (channels). We assume that radios contend on each channel using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. We study two MAC problems: (i) the allocation of the available channels among radios, and (ii) the optimal usage of each allocated channel by the radios occupying it. Both problems are studied in a game-theoretic setting, where devices aim to selfishly maximize their share of the available bandwidth. As for the first problem, we show that the ldquoprice of anarchyrdquo is close to 1, that is, Nash equilibria imply nearly system optimal allocations of the available channels. For the second problem, we design a game such that it admits a unique Nash equilibrium that is is both fair and Pareto-optimal. Furthermore, we propose simple mechanisms that enable selfish cognitive radio devices not only to coordinate efficiently on the available channels but also to optimally use every single allocated channel.


Wireless Networks | 2005

Energy-efficient broadcasting in all-wireless networks

Mario Čagalj; Jean-Pierre Hubaux; Christian Enz

Abstract In all-wireless networks, minimizing energy consumption is crucial as in most cases the nodes are battery-operated. We focus on the problem of power-optimal broadcast, for which it is well known that the broadcast nature of radio transmissions can be exploited to optimize energy consumption. This problem appears to be difficult to solve [30]. We provide a formal proof of NP-completeness for the general case and give an NP-completeness result for the geometric case; in the former, the network topology is represented by a generic graph with arbitrary weights, whereas in the latter a Euclidean distance is considered. For the general case, we show that it cannot be approximated better than O(log N), where N is the total number of nodes. We then describe an approximation algorithm that achieves the O(log N) approximation ratio. We also describe a new heuristic, Embedded Wireless Multicast Advantage. We show that it compares well with other proposals and we explain how it can be distributed.


ieee international conference computer and communications | 2007

Border Games in Cellular Networks

Márk Félegyházi; Mario Čagalj; Diego Dufour; Jean-Pierre Hubaux

In each country today, cellular networks operate on carefully separated frequency bands. This separation is imposed by the regulators of the given country to avoid interference between these networks. But, the separation is only valid within the borders of a country, hence the operators are left on their own to resolve cross-border interference of their cellular networks. In this paper, we focus on the scenario of two operators, each located on one side of the border. We assume that they want to fine-tune the emitting power of the pilot signals (i.e., beacon signals) of their base stations. This operation is crucial, because the pilot signal power determines the number of users they can attract and hence the revenue they can obtain. In the case of no power costs, we show that there exists a motivation for the operators to be strategic, meaning to fine-tune the pilot signal powers of their base stations. In addition, we study Nash equilibrium conditions in an empirical model and investigate the efficiency of the Nash equilibria for different user densities. Finally, we modify our game model to take power costs into account. The game with power costs corresponds to the well-known prisoners dilemma: The players are still motivated to adjust their pilot powers, but their strategic behavior leads to a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium.

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Jean-Pierre Hubaux

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

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Márk Félegyházi

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

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Nitesh Saxena

University of Alabama at Birmingham

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