Mario Daniele Amore

Gender Interactions Within the Family Firm

We analyze whether gender interactions at the top of the corporate hierarchy affect corporate performance. Using a comprehensive data set of family-controlled firms in Italy, we find that female directors significantly improve the operating profitability of female-led companies. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we assess executive transitions using a triple-difference approach complemented by propensity score matching and instrumental variables. Finally, we show that the positive effect of female interactions on profitability is reduced when the firm is located in geographic areas characterized by gender prejudices and when the firm is large. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.

Local Political Uncertainty, Family Control and Investment Behavior

Estimating difference-in-differences models on a comprehensive dataset of Italian companies, we provide novel insights into the literature on political uncertainty and firm investment. We first establish that local political uncertainty leads to declining investment. Next, we show that family control neutralizes this effect: family firms are more likely than other firms to invest during politically uncertain times, especially when operating in industries dependent on public spending and/or managed by family members. Finally, we document that this investment resilience of family firms under political uncertainty translates into significantly greater profitability and growth.

Return to Political Power in a Low Corruption Environment

We use exogenous changes in the size of local municipalities in Denmark to estimate the effect of political power on the income of politicians and their family members. We exploit two dimensions of political power: heterogeneity in politicians’ roles within a given district, and exogenous increases in political power as proxied by population and budget size. Our difference-in-differences results indicate that an increase in political power has: 1) an economically small but statistically significant effect on the income of re-elected politicians; 2) an economically larger effect on income of influential politicians such as coalition party leaders and mayors; and 3) an economically large effect on politicians’ offspring. We estimate a positive and significant elasticity of income to political power, which spans from 3 percent for re-elected candidates to 14 percent for mayors. To control for differential changes in electoral competition, we instrument the likelihood of re-election with average party votes in other municipalities and in national elections. We conclude that, even in a low-corruption environment, there is an economically relevant return to political power — beyond the return to office holding — which mostly benefits influential politicians and their offspring.

Corporate Governance and International Trade

We investigate how corporate governance affects the ability of firms to compete in international markets. Our empirical analysis draws on a variety of methods, including instrumental variable regressions, natural experiments and event studies. We find that firms subject to worse corporate governance are hurt more by the increase in foreign competition, especially so if they are less productive, located closer to foreign competitors, and face higher financial constraints.

Ownership similarity in mergers and acquisitions target selection

We study how ownership similarity between two firms affects the likelihood of an acquisition between them. Assortative matching arguments suggest that similarity between acquiring and target firms can encourage acquisition behavior, since more similar partners can better understand one another and combine resources in a more efficient way. Previous research has confirmed this expectation focusing on traits related to industry, strategy, and technology. We contribute to this literature by examining similarity in the type of dominant owner. We hypothesize and find evidence in a sample of 14,000 Italian companies that acquisitions are more likely to occur among firms with similar owners.

Peer Firms and Board Appointments in Family Firms

ABSTRACT This paper examines how neighbouring companies affect family firms’ decision to appoint non-family directors. Results indicate that being geographically close to firms with non-family directors increases a focal firm’s likelihood of having non-family members in its own board. This finding holds using a regulatory change that generates exogenous variations in the boards of local peer firms. Moreover, this finding is stronger when the firm is smaller, when the age similarity between local firm leaders is higher, and when the firm is located in areas that are densely populated or that feature strong attachment to the local community.

Board Connections and Debt Structure in Family Firms

We investigate the effect of board interlocks on family firms’ debt structure. Using a comprehensive panel data set from Italy, our empirical evidence indicates that interlocked directors facilitate family firms’ access to external debt, mostly in the form of trade debt. During episodes of liquidity dry-ups, board interlocks prove useful to withstand funding shortages and, in turn, to cope with the negative effects of the recession. These findings are consistent with the view that interlocked directors act as information and resource providers along the supply chain.

Social Capital and Family Control

I empirically investigate the effect of social capital on family control in a comprehensive data set from Italy. Exploiting historically-driven variations in social capital provided by the experience of self-government during the Middle Ages, I find that when social capital is weak, family control and management of companies are more prevalent. These results provide novel evidence on the pervasive influence of culture on organizational structures.

Executive Gender and Corporate Results: Evidence from Banking Deregulation

We investigate whether the gender of top executives influences a firm’s reaction to competitive pressures. Our empirical approach is based on policy changes that varied the exposure of US banks to competition during the late 1990s. Results suggest that while banks with female executives experience significantly higher financial performance under low competition, they tend to underperform when competition increases. At the same time, we find that the presence of female leaders improves the capital stability of banks subject to greater competition. Overall, our study highlights strong interactions between executive gender and market structures in the determination of business outcomes.