Mark A. Lutz

Gender and cooperative behavior: economic man rides alone

Neoclassical theory posits an undifferentiated economic agent whose self-interested behavior promotes a tendency to free ride in the provision of public goods. Challenges to this rigid portrayal of human character have come from a variety of directions. A dozen years ago Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames conducted experiments which showed that (virtually all male) economic graduate students tended to free ride significantly more than a mixed population of high school students. In this paper, we argue that gender may also influence the degree to which humans act in a self-interested versus cooperative manner. We test this hypothesis by replicating the Marwell and Ames experiments using a similar, albeit simplified, methodology, with a sample of only college students separated into economists and non-economists. After controlling for group size, gender, and exposure to economics courses, we find that a key factor affecting the level of cooperation is gender.

The Mondragon co‐operative complex: an application of Kantian ethics to social economics

Remarks that Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative, admonishing us not to treat others as mere means, can be seen to pave the way for an ethics of worker ownership, where the staff decides and assumes the role of residual claimant. Could large corporations convert worker ownership and still prosper and grow? It is in trying to answer this type of question that scholars all over the world have been interested in the development of what is generally regarded as the world’s most famous and most successful worker co‐operative: the Mondragon Co‐operative Complex. After reviewing some of the major reorganizations at Mondragon, summarizes the co‐operative’s economic performance up to 1995. Assesses the prospects of maintaining economic democracy while competing with large transnational corporations which have access to low‐cost labour in the Third World.

Pragmatism,Instrumental Value Theory and Social Economics

Since the summer of 1970, when the membership of the Catholic Economic Association voted to change its name to the Association for Social Economics and accepted a revised version of its aims and objec? tives, the association has grown not only in membership but also in heterogeneity. It seems to have been easier to agree on what is wrong with positivistic, mainstream economics than to define a normative conception of economic science that would command sufficient adher? ence by most of its members, and so give the association greater coher? ence, strength, and unity. Over the last half dozen years, a small but vocal and articulate group of members has been trying to fill this gap by rallying around the instrumental ethics of John Dewey and Clarence Ayres.1 It is the purpose of this paper to examine the desirability of reconstructing social eco? nomics along an outline provided by this pragmatic outlook. In the process, we have to expose the reader to some of the more significant and relevant aspects in the historical evolution of pragmatism; a devel? opment characterized by an increasingly strong emphasis on naturalism and atheism which culminated in the writings of Clarence Ayres. Our critical survey will conclude that such a naturalistic ethics does not provide the kind of common ground that social economists have been looking for.

On the norm of equality

Perceiving discrimination and unequal treatment as a problem implies an underlying value of human equality. Argues that such prescriptive equality is more powerful and more persuasive to the extent that it is built on a presumption of descriptive human equality. Explores the philosophical prerequisites for holding the presumption of actual equality. In the last part, surveys critically the general stance of economics regarding an affirmation of descriptive equality.

Social economics, justice and the common good

A precise definition of “social economics” has been the subject of much debate for the last 30 years and, as yet, there seems to be no general consensus of opinion. This paper attempts to embrace the apparent pluralism of viewpoints as a temporary instrument to encourage critical debate and dialogue in order to work towards a unified concept of social economics.

Centering Social Economics on Human Dignity 1

The paper explores a social economics centered on the normative value of human dignity. The first part of the paper explores the philosophical meaning of the concept. In the process, great weight is given to Alan Gewirths “dialectically necessary argument” for human dignity, grounding the concept in human agency. The second part explores some of the apparent major implications: a rejection of both positive methodology and cultural relativism; the questioning of economic rationality and the efficiency norm; much of commercial advertising; and cost-benefit analysis. It also serves as a critique of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the institution of the wage system and of an unqualified application of cost-benefit analysis.

The 'Dismal Science' - Still? Economics and Human Flourishing

Abstract This paper is an attempt to evaluate critically standard economic theory from the point of view of self-realization ethics and psychology. In doing so, there is considerable reliance on Abraham Maslows well-known theory of personality development. According to his penetrating insight, it is insecurity that keeps a person trapped in a world of materialism – be it a desperate survival mentality, a preoccupation with excessive sexuality, or an unabashed and omnipresent consumerism. Feeling secure, on the other hand, opens the gates to psychological health and real personal autonomy. Over time there has accumulated a considerable amount of empirical evidence supporting such a Maslowian insecurity-materialism link. The present paper surveys the problem of economic insecurity, especially the anxiety of job loss. Since there is ample evidence that, in todays globalized world, this problem is quite serious and increasingly widespread, it would follow that Maslowian personality theory predicts a large part of the population finding it increasingly hard to embark on a life of personal flourishing. Economic theory, with its traditional emphasis on competitive markets for both output and input, its unflagging support of unregulated international trade and outsourcing, its tacit consent for the new lean, mean, and flexible corporation, and its purely instrumental treatment of work and workers, for all these reasons, must share much of the blame for what appears to be a massive stunting of personality development. In this regard, the dismal science of the nineteenth century may still warrant the same designation today.

Cardinal Issues in the Future of Social Economics: A Humanistic View*

Social economics must be seeking its unity in the forces of human nature. That is no easy task. Elsewhere (Lutz, 1990, 407-42), I have indicated that our Association can be characterized as a rather heterogeneous group with several divergent orientations, but with a common core: a strong conviction that economic thinking and discourse cannot be carried out in an ethical vacuum, and that it is this explicit ethical foundation which is so distinctive for social economics as an alternative to ordinary economics. The challenge before us, therefore, is essentially twofold: first, to develop and articulate this core further, and second, to indicate how such a foundation can generate meaningful guidance for policy makers. In what follows, I will attempt to indicate how this double challenge might apply to the humanistic tradition in social economics, a tradition that dates back 180 years to J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi. As its name implies, the humanistic perspective centers upon the human person and human welfare. It does so explicitly and candidly and without apologies.1 As does conventional economics, we stress human agency and autonomy and like to make generalizations

Revisiting the Relevance of International Trade Theory

Probably one of the most controversial contributions to the literature of international trade theory was offered by the late social economist John Culbertson. In his view, low wage competition among corporations in a world characterized by capital mobility and massive trade deficits undermines the foundation trade theory based on David Ricardo’s celebrated notion of comparative advantage. Instead, there are several good reasons to believe that international trade with China, India, Vietnam, etc. will be governed by absolute advantage. The current essay is dedicated to the virtually ignored work of Culbertson, and it is meant as an invitation for social economists to critically evaluate the argument and in the process make an attempt to point out where it goes wrong.

Commenting on Gendered Economics: Mushroom Men, Straw Men, and Real Persons

This comment is offered as a defense of humanistic economics whose feminist credentials have been questioned by Julie Nelson. To her, our contribution is little less than orthodox economics, an ideology enshrining masculine values. We find her arguments based on a clear misreading or misinterpretation of our work. Especially needing correction is her charge that our key notion of a dual self is contaminated by traditional hierarchy and masculinized reason, and the idea of a ‘mushroom man’ operating in a social vacuum. Once her arguments, which we find contrived, are deconstructed it can be readily seen that there remains little difference between her own and our economics.