Mark A. Sabbagh

Theory of Mind Development in Chinese Children: A Meta-Analysis of False-Belief Understanding Across Cultures and Languages

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of childrens false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-childrens false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind.

Individual differences in executive functioning predict preschoolers' improvement from theory-of-mind training

Twenty-four 3.5-year-old children who initially showed poor performance on false-belief tasks participated in a training protocol designed to promote performance on these tasks. Our aim was to determine whether the extent to which children benefited from training was predicted by their performance on a battery of executive functioning tasks. Findings indicated that individual differences in executive functioning performance strongly and consistently predicted improvement in childrens false-belief performance and their ability to appropriately explain false-belief-based behavior, both during the training period and during the posttest. These findings were robust after statistically controlling for several relevant covariates. These results are consistent with the suggestion that executive functioning skills promote developments in theory of mind by facilitating the ability to reflect upon and learn from relevant experience.

Decoupling beliefs from reality in the brain: an ERP study of theory of mind.

Theory of mind, attributing behaviors to mental states, is a cognitive ability central to human social interactions. To investigate the neural substrates of theory of mind reasoning, we recorded human event-related brain potentials (ERP) while participants made judgments about belief and judgments about reality. A late ERP component (peaking around 800 ms post-stimulus) with a left frontal scalp distribution, which was inconsistent with a source in the anterior paracingulate cortex and consistent with a source possibly in the left orbitofrontal cortex, differentiated judgments about belief and about reality. This late left frontal component is probably associated with the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental states from reality.

Selective Social Learning: New Perspectives on Learning From Others

This special issue was motivated by the recent, wide-ranging interest in the development of childrens selective social learning. Human beings have a far-reaching dependence on others for information, and the focus of this issue is on the processes by which children selectively and intelligently learn from others. It showcases some of the finest current work in this area and also aims to encourage new lines of investigation and new ways of thinking about how children learn from others. This issue also serves to highlight this new direction in basic research for the broader community of researchers, educators, and practitioners. Research on issues related to the facilitation of social learning has clear relevance to early educational contexts. In addition, by bringing together a varied pool of research on the same general topic, developmental scientists can discern the consistencies and themes that emerge from their collective efforts. The work presented here illustrates the breadth of childrens selectivity across ages and domains of development, and it highlights the growing range of methods that can be recruited to investigate selectivity. This new research leads the field to reconsider the various ways in which social information guides learning and calls for novel theoretical accounts of these developments.

on the specificity of the relation between executive function and children's theories of mind

Contents: W. Schneider, R. Schumann-Hengsteler, B. Sodian, Introduction and Overview. J. Towse, N. Cowan, Working Memory and Its Relevance for Cognitive Development. C. Zoelch, K. Seitz, R. Schumann-Hengsteler, From Rag(Bag)s to Riches: Measuring the Developing Central Executive. P.D. Zelazo, L. Qu, U. Muller, Hot and Cool Aspects of Executive Function: Relations in Early Development. B. Sodian, Theory of Mind--The Case for Conceptual Development. L.J. Moses, S.M. Carlson, M.A. Sabbagh, On the Specificity of the Relation Between Executive Function and Childrens Theory of Mind. D.F. Bjorklund, C.A. Cormier, J.S. Rosenberg, The Evolution of Theory of Mind: Big Brains, Social Complexity, and Inhibition. B. Sodian, C. Hulsken, The Developmental Relation of Theory of Mind and Executive Functions: A Study of Advanced Theory of Mind Abilities in Children With ADHD. W. Kain, J. Perner, What fMRI Can Tell Us About the ToM-EF Connection: False Beliefs, Working Memory, and Inhibition. M. Hasselhorn, C. Mahler, D. Grube, Theory of Mind, Working Memory, and Verbal Ability in Preschool Children: The Proposal of a Relay Race Model of the Developmental Dependencies. H. Tager-Flusberg, R.M. Joseph, Theory of Mind, Language, and Executive Functions in Autism: A Longitudinal Perspective. W. Schneider, K. Lockl, O. Fernandez, Interrelationships Among Theory of Mind, Executive Control, Language Development, and Working Memory in Young Children: A Longitudinal Analysis. K. Oberauer, Executive Functions, Working Memory, Verbal Ability, and Theory of Mind--Does It All Come Together?

Developmental Differences in the Structure of Executive Function in Middle Childhood and Adolescence

Although it has been argued that the structure of executive function (EF) may change developmentally, there is little empirical research to examine this view in middle childhood and adolescence. The main objective of this study was to examine developmental changes in the component structure of EF in a large sample (N = 457) of 7–15 year olds. Participants completed batteries of tasks that measured three components of EF: updating working memory (UWM), inhibition, and shifting. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test five alternative models in 7–9 year olds, 10–12 year olds, and 13–15 year olds. The results of CFA showed that a single-factor EF model best explained EF performance in 7–9-year-old and 10–12-year-old groups, namely unitary EF, though this single factor explained different amounts of variance at these two ages. In contrast, a three-factor model that included UWM, inhibition, and shifting best accounted for the data from 13–15 year olds, namely diverse EF. In sum, during middle childhood, putative measures of UWM, inhibition, and shifting may rely on similar underlying cognitive processes. Importantly, our findings suggest that developmental dissociations in these three EF components do not emerge until children transition into adolescence. These findings provided empirical evidence for the development of EF structure which progressed from unity to diversity during middle childhood and adolescence.

The children's social understanding scale: construction and validation of a parent-report measure for assessing individual differences in children's theories of mind

Childrens theory of mind (ToM) is typically measured with laboratory assessments of performance. Although these measures have generated a wealth of informative data concerning developmental progressions in ToM, they may be less useful as the sole source of information about individual differences in ToM and their relation to other facets of development. In the current research, we aimed to expand the repertoire of methods available for measuring ToM by developing and validating a parent-report ToM measure: the Childrens Social Understanding Scale (CSUS). We present 3 studies assessing the psychometric properties of the CSUS. Study 1 describes item analysis, internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and relation of the scale to childrens performance on laboratory ToM tasks. Study 2 presents cross-validation data for the scale in a different sample of preschool children with a different set of ToM tasks. Study 3 presents further validation data for the scale with a slightly older age group and a more advanced ToM task, while controlling for several other relevant cognitive abilities. The findings indicate that the CSUS is a reliable and valid measure of individual differences in childrens ToM that may be of great value as a complement to standard ToM tasks in many different research contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Mid-frontal EEG alpha asymmetries predict individual differences in one aspect of theory of mind: Mental state decoding

Abstract Mental state decoding is the aspect of theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning that requires individuals to make judgments about others’ mental states based solely on immediately available information. We investigated whether individual differences in resting, task-independent frontal EEG alpha asymmetries predicted performance on the “Mind in the Eyes” (MIE) task, which is an established measure of mental state decoding skills. Group analyses showed that mental state decoding skills were stronger among those with right-lateralized frontal activation. Individual differences analyses showed that the degree of relative right mid-frontal activation predicted performance on the task. These findings establish a neural correlate of individual differences in one aspect of ToM, and hypotheses about the precise mechanism involved are discussed.

For love or money? What motivates people to know the minds of others?

Mood affects social cognition and “theory of mind”, such that people in a persistent negative mood (i.e., dysphoria) have enhanced abilities at making subtle judgements about others’ mental states. Theorists have argued that this hypersensitivity to subtle social cues may have adaptive significance in terms of solving interpersonal problems and/or minimising social risk. We tested whether increasing the social salience of a theory of mind task would preferentially increase dyspshoric individuals’ performance on the task. Forty-four dysphoric and 51 non-dysphoric undergraduate women participated in a theory of mind decoding task following one of three motivational manipulations: (i) social motivation (ii) monetary motivation, or (iii) no motivation. Social motivation was associated with the greatest accuracy of mental state decoding for the dysphoric group, whereas the non-dysphoric group showed the highest accuracy in the monetary motivation condition. These results suggest that dysphoric individuals may be especially, and preferentially, motivated to understand the mental states of others.

Serotonin and Dopamine Gene Variation and Theory of Mind Decoding Accuracy in Major Depression: A Preliminary Investigation.

Theory of mind–the ability to decode and reason about others’ mental states–is a universal human skill and forms the basis of social cognition. Theory of mind accuracy is impaired in clinical conditions evidencing social impairment, including major depressive disorder. The current study is a preliminary investigation of the association of polymorphisms of the serotonin transporter (SLC6A4), dopamine transporter (DAT1), dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4), and catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) genes with theory of mind decoding in a sample of adults with major depression. Ninety-six young adults (38 depressed, 58 non-depressed) completed the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes task’ and a non-mentalistic control task. Genetic associations were only found for the depressed group. Specifically, superior accuracy in decoding mental states of a positive valence was seen in those homozygous for the long allele of the serotonin transporter gene, 9-allele carriers of DAT1, and long-allele carriers of DRD4. In contrast, superior accuracy in decoding mental states of a negative valence was seen in short-allele carriers of the serotonin transporter gene and 10/10 homozygotes of DAT1. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for integrating social cognitive and neurobiological models of etiology in major depression.