Mark A. Stoler

From World War II to cold war: the emergence and development of George C. Marshall's transatlantic worldview and policies, 1939–1951

Although George C. Marshall served as US Secretary of State for only two years (from January 1947 to January 1949), he was responsible during that brief time period for the most important peacetime transatlantic initiatives in American history — most notably the European Recovery Programme that bears his name and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) whose formation would be completed a few months after he left office. While these initiatives clearly resulted from the growing Soviet-American conflict after the Second World War and the ensuing cold war, their roots lay in the strong transatlantic policies and strategies in which Marshall had participated, and which he had often initiated, during the Second World War. What follows is an analysis of those wartime policies and strategies, and their relationship to the postwar transatlantic policies and strategies Marshall championed as Secretary of State.

The Marshall Legacy

As we have explored in this conference, George C. Marshall was a soldier, a leader and manager, and a statesman and peacemaker during an utterly extraordinary professional career of nearly half a century. What then, with the passage of another half-century, is his legacy? I think we need to examine this on two levels: his legacy in specific major episodes in United States and world history; and his general or overall legacy. These of course overlap, but let me try to deal with them separately.

FDR and the Origins of the National Security Establishment

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Legacy In Military Affairs would appear to be obvious: under his leadership the United States during World War II created, almost from scratch, the largest and most powerful war machine the world had ever seen. In late 1939 the U.S. Army had numbered approximately 175,000 enlisted men and had ranked 19th in the world in size.2 By 1945 total U.S. armed forces consisted of more than 12 million personnel deployed around the world and totally triumphant over their Axis enemies. These forces included the largest army in U.S. history (nearly 8.3 million), the largest navy in world history (nearly 3.4 million plus 475,000 marines), and an air force of unsurpassed size and in sole possession of the atomic bomb.3 They also included some of the most successful and famous military commanders of the twentieth century, one of whom—Dwight D. Eisenhower—would himself be elected president a scant seven years after Roosevelt’s death.

Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders – By Gerhard L. Weinberg

nonorgasmic. Instead “nipple play” and oral and anal sex dominate, all directed towards orgasm and most involving penetration. The argument ignores the official promotion of heterosexual pleasure (sex therapy and the “erotic housewife”) and legislation that widened normative erotic boundaries. Shorter finally concedes “there is really no evidence that we are any more dedicated to sensation today than at any other time in history” (237). If, as he says, total body sex has emerged with the decline of hindrances, why has this not resulted in the dedicated hedonic pursuit and fulfillment of sexual desire? Shorter does not offer a conclusion that matches his opening claims; yet, despite this, the book is a “good read.”

Avoiding Entry into World War II

Book reviewed in this article: Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941

The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989

How can a democratic nation which distrusts centralised power create and maintain the institutions to defend itself without undermining the very liberty it is trying to perpetuate? In attempting to answer this central question, this volume begins with an analysis of the constitutional framework for American national security and describes several major aspects of American military service: the character and role of the citizen-soldier; the historical experience of the regular army intervening to maintain internal order; and the experience of black Americans in their efforts to serve equally in the nations armed forces. The book also explores tensions within the civil-military relationship, as exemplified by the dilemma posed for the army when Congress and the President gave conflicting guidance during the Reconstruction; George C. Marshalls views of military subordination to civil authority; and the sacking of Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. Finally, the book focuses on the role of the three branches of government in controlling the military, and in making war and military policy during the 20th century. Each chapter aims to provide a discussion of important, and sometimes neglected or controversial, aspects of the American military experience.

War by Conference

KEITH SAINSBURY. The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-Shek, 1943: The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. 373. £17.50,

Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect, 1890-1952

29.95 (US); KEITH EUBANK. Summit at Teheran. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985. Pp. 528.

From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War*

21.95 (US).