Mark D. Brewer

Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization

Party polarization in the House of Representatives has increased in recent decades. Explaining this development has been difficult, given current interpretations of American elections. The dominant framework for interpreting elections has been to see them as candidate-centered, or individualistic. This framework may have seemed appropriate as a way to see elections during the 1970s and 1980s, when identification with parties declined and split-ticket voting increased. With increasing party differences, however, the presumptions that campaigns focus on candidates separate from parties, and that voters are less partisan in their voting, do not provide a satisfactory framework for understanding our current situation. This proposed book explains the emergence of party polarization by focusing on how the constituencies of House districts affect partisan outcomes and the subsequent voting behavior of House members. This proposed analysis is premised on the simple argument that members are elected from districts, and an explanation of polarization must begin with districts. The origins of polarization lie in the realignment of the electoral bases of the parties, and the shifting demographic composition of America. Liberal voting is more likely among members from urban, lower-income, largely non-white districts. Conservative voting is more likely among members from higher-income, largely white districts. Realignment has resulted in Democrats representing urban, lower-income, heavily non-white districts, while Republicans are more likely to come from suburban-rural, more affluent, white districts. Perhaps most important, the percentage of districts with a substantial proportion of non-whites is steadily increasing in the United States. The analysis will focus primarily on changes since the 1960s.

The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict within the American Electorate

Recent research has outlined important changes in partisanship among political elites in the United States. Specifically, the effect of partisanship on politicians’ vote choice and other political behavior has risen, and the number of issue areas where partisan conflict is present has increased. This article examines whether similar changes have taken place among the general electorate. Using data from the NES Cumulative Datafile, the findings presented here do point to changes in partisanship among the mass public. Once thought to be in decline, mass partisanship has rebounded significantly in recent years. In a related development that is perhaps more important, partisanship has become more pervasive within the electorate, with partisan conflict now penetrating into a greater number of issue areas. Partisanship has become relevant in the areas of racial and cultural issues while retaining its importance for issues involving economic equality.

Assessing Conventional Wisdom about Religion and Politics: A Preliminary View from the Pews

Given religious leaders’ frequent opportunities to communicate to a large and receptive audience, political messages delivered during religious services have the potential to make a considerable impact on American politics—with particular significance for political education and mobilization. Social scientists routinely conclude that such messages are indeed disseminated, a claim we test in this study. Is it in fact true that church– and temple–going Americans regularly receive political messages from their ministers, priests, and rabbis during worship services? If so, what forms do these pronouncements take? How intense are they? Is this communication limited to messages from the service leader or does it come from other parts of the service, either informal or ritualistic? Existing empirical assessments of this topic depend heavily on survey research, asking congregants (or, less often, members of the clergy) about the frequency and content of political messages. Although such studies are certainly valuable, we approach religious political communications in a more immediate way: by observing them directly. Our conclusions are based on two waves of attendance at weekly services during 1998–1999, varying by religious tradition and denomination, region, and other dimensions. We find that “political” messages, broadly defined, are indeed delivered quite often. However, content analysis of these messages reveals that they typically address matters of social justice and rarely other types of political activity or belief, such as specific public policies or civic involvement (including voting). Political references during services only very occasionally constituted calls to direct political action on the part of the worshiper. Ultimately, our findings suggest that political content does occur relatively frequently during U.S. religious services, supporting the accounts of other social scientists. Our analysis offers new insight as to the content and nature of the political messages Americans are exposed to during religious services.

Class, Race Issues, and Declining White Support for the Democratic Party in the South

The Democratic Party in the South has experienced a major loss of white voters in recent decades. Two major hypotheses have been proposed to explain this change. The dominant explanation in recent years has been that race issues have driven whites from the Democratic Party in the South. In this view, defections from the Democratic Party have occurred because whites oppose the partys positions on race issues. In contrast, others have suggested that class divisions have emerged as important, with affluent whites increasingly supportive of the Republican Party because they find its positions more compatible with their interests. Using NES data, this article assesses the evidence for these hypotheses, examining the impact of income position and race issues on partisan behavior since 1952. While both factors affect partisan support, income has come to have a relatively greater effect on partisan support than race issues. The evidence clearly indicates that class divisions in the South have steadily increased and that affluent whites have steadily shifted to the Republican Party. The implications are significant for understanding the dramatic changes in the South in recent decades. Much has been made of the tensions over race issues, and the findings presented here lend further support to the importance of race issues in southern electoral politics. However, these findings also suggest that class divisions are a steadily increasing source of political cleavage in this region. The current state of electoral politics in the South cannot be properly understood unless both of these factors are taken into account.

Northern Democrats and Party Polarization in the U.S. House

: Over the last 25 years, there has been a steady increase in party voting in the U.S. House, with much of this increase attributed to changes in the South. We argue that changes in the North are also important. Democrats now win a higher percentage of elections in the North, and a larger percentage of the congressional party comes from the North. Northern Democrats became steadily more liberal in the 1980s and 1990s, which increased the liberal record of the entire party. We examine two factors in the rise in liberal voting in the North. First, Democrats now win more seats in urban, lower-income, nonwhite districts that tend to generate liberal voting records. Second, there has been an increase in the number of districts that tend to produce liberal-voting Democrats. Together, these changes have resulted in more liberal Democratic Party voting and greater polarization between the parties.

Class and Party: Secular Realignment and the Survival of Democrats outside the South

A common conclusion is that beginning in the late 1960s the policy stands of Democrats on civil rights and civil liberties issues alienated the white working class. Race is presumed to have driven a wedge between the white and non-white working class, and diminished class voting in American politics. The New Deal coalition has eroded, the South has moved into the Republican column, and class conflict is presumed to have steadily declined since the 1950s. These arguments, however, leave us unable to explain how the Democratic party managed to survive for over forty years as the majority party in Congress, even while it was losing the South. The party survived by steadily increasing its support outside the South. The focus of this analysis is whom the Democrats attracted over time, and what the evidence indicates about the presumed alienation of the white, working class. The conventional wisdom is largely based on analyses that assess class voting using self-identified class. We argue that measure does not capture the economic situation of the respondent. This analysis relies on the relative income situation of voters, which reflects the relative level of resources people have to live their lives. The focus is the relationship between relative income position and support for the Democratic party among non-Southern whites from 1952-1996. The results indicate a steady increase in support for the Democratic party among the less affluent since the 1950s. Differences in voting by income position are not decreasing, but, in fact, have been increasing since the 1970s.

Populism in American Politics

Abstract Populism undoubtedly has a long history in the politics of the US, and there is no doubt that populism has significantly affected American politics in a variety of ways. However, what exactly is meant by “populism” is frequently ambiguous and ill-defined. Political commentators routinely label individuals or ideas as populist, without even attempting to explain how and why the person or idea in question relates to populism. Scholars are not immune to acting in a similar fashion. Populism’s presence is more often asserted than demonstrated in any convincing way. Here I engage in a thorough examination of the substance of populism in American politics. All elements of American populism – its championing of the common people, it rural roots, its anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-government views, and its religious and cultural dimensions – will be explored. The paper closes with an attempt to suss out the place of populism in contemporary American politics.

Polarization and the politics of personal responsibility

Preface I: The Sources of Conflict in American Politics 1. Political Conflict in America: Over What? II: The Evolution of Liberal Thought 2. Americas Commitment to Individualism 3. Social Conditions and a Role for Government 4. Expanding the Concept of Societal Effects 5. Inequality and Social Justice III: The Conservative Response 6. Limited Government, Fiscal Restraint and Free Markets 7. The Threats of Communism, Socialism and Redistribution 8. Tradition, Religion and Rejection of Moral Relativism IV: Politics, Policy and the Personal Responsibility Debate 9. Focusing the Debate: Growing Partisan Differences 10. Policy Battles Over Responsibility 11. What Is and What Should Be Appendix: NES Questions Bibliography

Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre

ment in this part of the book is that if elite debate does not activate conflicting predispositions, then more information reduces attitude variability, but if elite debate activates multiple conflicting predispositions, information causes increased response variability. The theory, however, needs also to incorporate individuals’ possession of these values. For abortion, they show that increased information generally leads to increased response variability, but the effect of information applies both to individuals who are conflicted as well as those, like strong prochoice or pro-life supporters, who hold one of the values, but not both. The predispositions activated by the elite debate are less important than the values the individual holds. By Zaller’s resistance axiom, such pro-choice and pro-life advocates should reject considerations that conflict with their predispositions, reinforcing a one-sided balance of considerations that, in turn, should produce narrower attitude variability. For examining representation, it is important to know not that an issue can be characterized as reflecting ambivalence, uncertainty, or equivocation, but rather the kinds of individuals who are ambivalent or uncertain. Overall, many of Alvarez and Brehm’s results are consistent with their arguments, but there are enough instances where some ambiguous results might be better understood with a more comprehensive theory. For this reason, while their work will influence how we think about the public’s attitudes, there is still more room for theory refinement.

Courting the Catholic Vote: Obama, Romney, and the US Catholic Bishops in the 2012 Presidential Election

Perhaps no religious group received more attention during the 2012 presidential campaign than Roman Catholics. Both the Obama and Romney campaigns viewed this group as crucially important to victory, and went hard after their support. In this chapter we examine the place of Roman Catholicism in the 2012 presidential contest. After reviewing the historical role of Catholic voters in American elections, we discuss the involvement of the American Catholic bishops in US elections, with particular attention to their highly visible actions during the 2012 campaign. Finally, we discuss the numerous ways the Obama and Romney campaigns tailored their appeals to this critical group of American voters. Our analyses find that as a group American Catholics are quintessential swing voters, and as such are highly attractive to both major parties. At the same time, American Catholics are a highly variegated constituency, with significant internal divisions related to religiosity, ideology, ethnicity, and social class. These internal divisions make it unlikely that either party will be able to corner the market on the Catholic vote, and also make it difficult for the American bishops to shape the voting behavior of their flock to the degree that they might wish.