Mark F. Owens

Competition and the Strategic Choices of Churches

In this paper, we examine how the decisions of churches are impacted by the decisions of rival churches. Using a novel data set of Christian churches in two suburban Nashville, TN counties, we estimate a model of strategic interaction, based on empirical models of discrete games, which accounts for the location and denomination of churches. We focus on a churchs decision of whether to provide a weekday child care program. Empirical evidence indicates that churches compete more strongly with nearby same-denomination churches than with different-denomination churches. These effects diminish with distance. Using our estimates, we conduct counterfactual simulations to examine the impact of an increase in the number of church adherents, the number of preschool aged children, and we also remove for-profit providers from the sample.

The effects of welfare vehicle asset rules on vehicle assets

Before 1996, households were typically ineligible for welfare if they had assets worth more than

Provision and Price of Child Care Services: For-Profits and Nonprofits

1000, where

The Effects of Federal Housing Assistance on Exiting Welfare and Becoming Employed for Welfare Recipients

1500 from each vehicles value was excluded from this determination. However, the 1996 welfare reform act began allowing states to increase their asset limits and vehicle exclusions. This may prompt low-income households to reallocate resources to or from vehicles. We examine the effects of state vehicle asset rules on vehicle assets. Results show that liberalizing asset rules increases vehicle assets and that this increase is driven largely by eligible individuals increasing vehicle assets, with no evidence indicating that ineligible individuals reduce vehicle assets to become eligible.

Minimum wage restrictions and employee effort in incomplete labor markets: An experimental investigation

We study the market for child care services, with a special focus on examining competition between for- and nonprofits. We estimate a two-stage oligopoly model of product differentiation. The first stage estimates a model of endogenous market structure and the second stage corrects for market structure to examine the prices charged and capacity choices for child care centers. We find that the actions of “same-type” providers have a statistically significant impact on a provider’s entry and pricing decisions but we fail to find evidence that the actions of “other types” have a significant impact. Nonprofit child care providers and Head Start centers do not appear to crowd out for-profit providers. Further, we find that for-profits and nonprofits respond differently to market characteristics generating spatial differences in the types of center available in a market. Our data suggest that for-profits are more likely to enter markets with higher percentages of economically disadvantaged students, but they primarily serve those who work, rather than live, in the market. The prevalence of disadvantaged students does not impact the entry decision of nonprofits leaving disadvantaged areas with relatively fewer non-profit options to serve residents. Policies to encourage for-profit daycare would likely lead centers to locate in markets where they can provide service for workers, whereas a policy to encourage nonprofit entry might be more effective in providing low cost care for nearby residents.

The effects of information and competition on racial discrimination: Evidence from a field experiment

Welfare reforms success in encouraging employment may be affected by the federal housing program because many households receive welfare and housing assistance. Housing assistance could discourage employment because housing subsidies are reduced proportionally with earnings; alternatively, it could encourage employment by increasing stability and allowing more resources to be allocated toward employment-related expenses. We examine housing assistances effects on exiting welfare and becoming employed. Remaining on welfare is positively associated with receiving housing assistance, but fixed effects models suggest this is due to correlation with unmeasured factors rather than a causal effect. We find little association between housing assistance and employment.