Mark J. Fenske
University of Guelph
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Featured researches published by Mark J. Fenske.
Emotion | 2003
Mark J. Fenske; John D. Eastwood
Three experiments evaluated whether facial expression can modulate the allocation of focused attention. Identification of emotionally expressive target faces was typically faster when they were flanked by identical (compatible) faces compared with when they were flanked by different (incompatible) faces. This flanker compatibility effect was significantly smaller when target faces expressed negative compared with positive emotion (see Experiment 1A); however, when the faces were altered to disrupt emotional expression, yet retain feature differences, equal flanker compatibility effects were observed (see Experiment 1B). The flanker-compatibility effect was also found to be smaller for negative target faces compared compatibility with neutral target faces, and for both negative and neutral target faces compared with positive target faces (see Experiment 2). These results suggest that the constriction of attention is influenced by facial expressions of emotion.
Perspectives on Psychological Science | 2012
John D. Eastwood; Alexandra Frischen; Mark J. Fenske; Daniel Smilek
Our central goal is to provide a definition of boredom in terms of the underlying mental processes that occur during an instance of boredom. Through the synthesis of psychodynamic, existential, arousal, and cognitive theories of boredom, we argue that boredom is universally conceptualized as “the aversive experience of wanting, but being unable, to engage in satisfying activity.” We propose to map this conceptualization onto underlying mental processes. Specifically, we propose that boredom be defined in terms of attention. That is, boredom is the aversive state that occurs when we (a) are not able to successfully engage attention with internal (e.g., thoughts or feelings) or external (e.g., environmental stimuli) information required for participating in satisfying activity, (b) are focused on the fact that we are not able to engage attention and participate in satisfying activity, and (c) attribute the cause of our aversive state to the environment. We believe that our definition of boredom fully accounts for the phenomenal experience of boredom, brings existing theories of boredom into dialogue with one another, and suggests specific directions for future research on boredom and attention.
Frontiers in Psychology | 2012
Anne E. Ferrey; Alexandra Frischen; Mark J. Fenske
The motivational incentive of reward-related stimuli can become so salient that it drives behavior at the cost of other needs. Here we show that response inhibition applied during a Go/No-go task not only impacts hedonic evaluations but also reduces the behavioral incentive of motivationally relevant stimuli. We first examined the impact of response inhibition on the hedonic value of sex stimuli associated with strong behavioral-approach responses (Experiment 1). Sexually appealing and non-appealing images were both rated as less attractive when previously encountered as No-go (inhibited) than as Go (non-inhibited) items. We then discovered that inhibition reduces the motivational incentive of sexual appealing stimuli (Experiment 2). Prior Go/No-go status affected the number of key-presses by heterosexual males to view erotic-female (sexually appealing) but not erotic-male or scrambled-control (non-appealing) images. These findings may provide a foundation for developing inhibition-based interventions to reduce the hedonic value and motivational incentive of stimuli associated with disorders of self-control.
Acta Psychologica | 2012
Asma Hanif; Anne E. Ferrey; Alexandra Frischen; Kathryn Pozzobon; John D. Eastwood; Daniel Smilek; Mark J. Fenske
Successful goal-directed behavior requires self-regulation to override competing impulses. Emerging evidence suggests that attention may mediate such acts, but little is known about the specific operations through which attention might influence self-regulation. Here we test this often-implicit assumption by manipulating attention mechanisms in two ways: one controlling the inhibition of inappropriate responses; the other controlling the breadth of attention. Participants significantly improved their performance on a self-regulation task after practice on a response inhibition task (Experiment 1) and after the induction of a broad focus of attention in a visual discrimination task (Experiment 2). We propose that such manipulations enhance self-regulation by engaging mechanisms that enhance the salience of goal-related representations and reduce the activation of competing goal-irrelevant neural representations. By more efficiently resolving conflict among the signals vying to drive behavior, pre-engaging attention may also help to conserve resources needed for continued self-regulation.
Frontiers in Psychology | 2015
Anne E. Ferrey; Tyler J. Burleigh; Mark J. Fenske
Stimuli that resemble humans, but are not perfectly human-like, are disliked compared to distinctly human and non-human stimuli. Accounts of this “Uncanny Valley” effect often focus on how changes in human resemblance can evoke different emotional responses. We present an alternate account based on the novel hypothesis that the Uncanny Valley is not directly related to ‘human-likeness’ per se, but instead reflects a more general form of stimulus devaluation that occurs when inhibition is triggered to resolve conflict between competing stimulus-related representations. We consider existing support for this inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and further assess its feasibility through tests of two corresponding predictions that arise from the link between conflict-resolving inhibition and aversive response: (1) that the pronounced disliking of Uncanny-type stimuli will occur for any image that strongly activates multiple competing stimulus representations, even in the absence of any human-likeness, and (2) that the negative peak of an ‘Uncanny Valley’ should occur at the point of greatest stimulus-related conflict and not (in the presence of human-likeness) always closer to the ‘human’ end of a perceptual continuum. We measured affective responses to a set of line drawings representing non-human animal–animal morphs, in which each continuum midpoint was a bistable image (Experiment 1), as well as to sets of human-robot and human-animal computer-generated morphs (Experiment 2). Affective trends depicting classic Uncanny Valley functions occurred for all continua, including the non-human stimuli. Images at continua midpoints elicited significantly more negative affect than images at endpoints, even when the continua included a human endpoint. This illustrates the feasibility of the inhibitory-devaluation hypothesis and the need for further research into the possibility that the strong dislike of Uncanny-type stimuli reflects the negative affective consequences of cognitive inhibition.
Cognition | 2017
David De Vito; Mark J. Fenske
Potentially distracting or otherwise-inappropriate stimuli, thoughts, or actions often must be inhibited to prevent interference with goal-directed behaviour. Growing evidence suggests that the impact of inhibition is not limited to reduced neurocognitive processing, but also includes negative affective consequences for any associated stimuli. The link between inhibition and aversive response has primarily been studied using tasks involving attentional- or response-related inhibition of external sensory stimuli. Here we show that affective devaluation also occurs when inhibition is applied to fully-encoded stimulus representations in memory. We first replicated prior findings of increased forgetting of words whose memories were suppressed in a Think/No-think procedure (Experiment 1). Incorporating a stimulus-evaluation task within this procedure revealed that suppressing memories of words (Experiment 2) and visual objects (Experiment 3) also results in their affective devaluation. Given the critical role of memory for guiding thoughts and actions, these results suggest that the affective consequences of inhibition may occur across a far broader range of situations than previously understood.
Neuropsychologia | 2017
David De Vito; Naseem Al-Aidroos; Mark J. Fenske
ABSTRACT Stimuli appearing as visual distractors subsequently receive more negative affective evaluations than novel items or prior targets of attention. Leading accounts question whether this distractor devaluation effect occurs through evaluative codes that become associated with distractors as a mere artefact of attention‐task instructions, or through affective consequences of attentional inhibition when applied to prevent distractor interference. Here we test opposing predictions arising from the evaluative‐coding and devaluation‐by‐inhibition hypotheses using an electrophysiological marker of attentional inhibition in a task that requires participants to avoid interference from abstract‐shape distractors presented while maintaining a uniquely‐colored stimulus in memory. Consistent with prior research, distractors that matched the colour of the stimulus being held in memory elicited a Pd component of the event‐related potential waveform, indicating that their processing was being actively suppressed. Subsequent affective evaluations revealed that memory‐matching distractors also received more negative ratings than non‐matching distractors or previously‐unseen shapes. Moreover, Pd magnitude was greater on trials in which the memory‐matching distractors were later rated negatively than on trials preceding positive ratings. These results support the devaluation‐by‐inhibition hypothesis and strongly suggest that fluctuations in stimulus inhibition are closely associated with subsequent affective evaluations. In contrast, none of the evaluative‐coding based predictions were confirmed. HIGHLIGHTSTest competing hypotheses about how visual distractors become affectively devalued.Recorded event‐related potentials to distractors during visual‐memory maintenance.ERP index of distractor suppression (Pd component) linked to later stimulus ratings.Results confirm predictions from devaluation‐by‐inhibition hypothesis.Findings fail to confirm predictions from evaluative‐coding hypothesis.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | 2017
Rachel L. Driscoll; Pat Barclay; Mark J. Fenske
Social pain is often associated with social rejection and shares neural correlates with the bothersome aspect of physical pain, which may also indicate an overlap in function. Pain has been described as a motivational signal to respond to the source of the pain in an adaptive way, such as by altering behavior. We tested whether social pain causes similarly adaptive alterations in behavior. Participants played computerized ball-tossing tasks with putative players—one who passed to and one who excluded the participant from play—in both a social and nonsocial version. We assessed the behavioral consequences of social pain by comparing the number of throws to each stimulus (social rejector vs. nonsocial rejector) over the course of the task. Posttask questionnaires assessed subjective feelings of social pain. A decrease in throws to the rejecting stimulus was only observed in the social version, indicating that rejection that is social in nature leads to change in behavior. Moreover, participants reported more negative feelings toward the rejecting stimulus in the social than in the nonsocial version. These subjective feelings of social pain mediated the effect of version of the game (social vs. nonsocial) on changes in behavior, indicating that social pain from social rejection causes changes in behavior.
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience | 2018
David De Vito; Anne E. Ferrey; Mark J. Fenske; Naseem Al-Aidroos
Ignoring visual stimuli in the external environment leads to decreased liking of those items, a phenomenon attributed to the affective consequences of attentional inhibition. Here we investigated the generality of this “distractor devaluation” phenomenon by asking whether ignoring stimuli represented internally within visual working memory has the same affective consequences. In two experiments we presented participants with two or three visual stimuli and then, after the stimuli were no longer visible, provided an attentional cue indicating which item in memory was the target they would have to later recall, and which were task-irrelevant distractors. Participants subsequently judged how much they liked these stimuli. Previously-ignored distractors were consistently rated less favorably than targets, replicating prior findings of distractor devaluation. To gain converging evidence, in Experiment 2, we also examined the electrophysiological processes associated with devaluation by measuring individual differences in attention (N2pc) and working memory (CDA) event-related potentials following the attention cue. Larger amplitude of an N2pc-like component was associated with greater devaluation, suggesting that individuals displaying more effective selection of memory targets—an act aided by distractor inhibition—displayed greater levels of distractor devaluation. Individuals showing a larger post-cue CDA amplitude (but not pre-cue CDA amplitude) also showed greater distractor devaluation, supporting prior evidence that visual working-memory resources have a functional role in effecting devaluation. Together, these findings demonstrate that ignoring working-memory representations has affective consequences, and adds to the growing evidence that the contribution of selective-attention mechanisms to a wide range of human thoughts and behaviors leads to devaluation.
Visual Cognition | 2018
David De Vito; Mark J. Fenske
ABSTRACT The multiple state theory of working memory suggests that representations are divided into two states: focused-on active representations and accessory memories held for later use. Here we tested two competing hypotheses regarding the neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for this separation: (1) that accessory memories undergo inhibition or (2) that accessory memories are amplified less than active representations. We explored whether accessory memories undergo affective devaluation, a known index of the involvement of inhibition in a visual task. On each trial participants memorized four items, were cued to focus on one, and then completed a visual search or an affective evaluation task. While search distractors matching the colour of an active item slowed search, those matching an accessory memory did not, replicating previous findings that only active items guide search. Also, accessory items were affectively devalued compared to baseline and active items, supporting the hypothesis that accessory memories undergo inhibition.