Mark Jonathan McKenzie

Strategic Voting in the California Recall Election

Given people’s interest in all things California, the novelty of the recall mechanism, and the presence of a bona fide action hero in the race, it is not surprising that the 2003 California recall election attracted an inordinate amount of national attention. The circus-like atmosphere should not, however, obscure the interesting implications of the recall election for our understanding of the broader phenomenon of strategic voting. We argue that partisans faced two different strategic voting scenarios in California, with Democrats confronting a slightly more subtle set of criteria and circumstances than Republicans. Drawing on individual-level survey data designed to gauge candidate affect and second-choice preferences, we find that strategic voting was common (although by no means unanimous) among those whose preferences placed them in a position to cast such a strategic vote.

The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts

Redistricting cases offer a unique opportunity to test the effects of partisan favoritism in judging and to investigate when partisanship might influence decision making distinctly from ideology. How partisan are federal judges? In an analysis of federal district court cases from 1981 to 2007, this study finds that federal judges are neither neutral arbiters nor crass partisans. Instead, judging in redistricting cases can best be described in terms of constrained partisanship. When redistricting law is clear, judges eschew decision making that furthers their party’s interests. However, where legal precedent is ambiguous, partisan favoritism exacts a strong influence on judicial behavior.