Mark S. Hurwitz

Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts

Representation in political institutions, including the judiciary, is an important consideration for both political scientists and citizens. What factors systematically influence diversity among judges? In particular, does the method of selection affect the relative success of political minorities in attaining a seat on the bench? The answers to these questions have substantial normative and theoretical implications. We examine judges on all state supreme and intermediate appellate courts in 1985 and 1999 to assess the influence of various structural, political, and demographic factors on judicial diversity. We demonstrate that the ability of political minorities to attain a place in the judiciary is not solely a function of any single factor. Instead, their success is influenced by a multifaceted combination of factors contingent on time and the level of the court, and these influences differ for women and for minorities.

Acclimation and Attitudes: “Newcomer” Justices and Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court

Do newly appointed justices experience acclimation effects upon their ascent to the Supreme Court? We contend that acclimation is a process, as justices’ conformation to the doctrine of stare decisis is partly a function of tenure length. We find that precedent conformance is inversely related to tenure, with newcomers following legal precedents at rates significantly greater than more tenured colleagues; however, justices slowly but surely surrender to relatively unfettered judicial power at the Supreme Court, as attitudes increasingly dominate decisionmaking. While votes adhering to precedent are more prevalent for newcomers, all justices are overwhelmingly influenced by their own ideologies, confirming the inability of the legal model to influence or explain this aspect of judicial behavior. Our results also indicate that the proclivity of prior research to specify an express period of acclimation may be flawed. Instead, acclimation is a dynamic process, ever evolving over justices’ entire duration of service.

Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years

We examine the levels of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity and use of selection systems in state and federal appellate courts in the United States for the year 2005 and compare them with our earlier findings for a twenty-year period. We observe no recent increases in the number of state courts employing the merit system of selection, and other systems also remain stable, as continuity currently defines the types of selection systems used in the states. However, we find an increasing number and percentage of state and federal appellate judges who are women and members of racial and ethnic minorities, with change being the order of the day for these nontraditional judges joining the bench. Finally, we show that particular methods of selection are unrelated to rates of judicial diversity. Specifically, we find that the merit system, once derided by some as disfavoring nontraditional judges, continues to have no apparent association with diversity. While there are myriad rationales for state policy makers to choose one particular selection method over any other, our findings affirm, once again, that associated levels of diversity need not be included in that decision.

Dissensual Decision Making Revisiting the Demise of Consensual Norms within the U.S. Supreme Court

This analysis seeks to understand the decline of Supreme Court consensual norms often attributed to the failed leadership of Chief Justice Stone. A new unit of analysis—justice-level dissent and concurrence rates—supports an alternative view of observed increases in dissensual decision making. When these measures are estimated with time-series techniques, results offer evidence of multiple changepoints in this norm of the Court that both lead and lag Stone’s elevation. Broader contextual explanations related to the alteration of the Court’s discretionary issue agenda and its ideological and demographic composition also contribute to fractures in the once-unanimous voting coalitions.

Strategic Retirements of Elected and Appointed Justices: A Hazard Model Approach

Strategic accounts of judges usually consider various aspects of dispensation of cases. We look beyond these traditional areas of study in judicial politics to examine whether state supreme court justices render strategic retirement decisions. More specifically, we posit a dual theory of strategic retirements conditioned upon the institutional arrangements in which elected and appointed justices make retirement decisions. Employing an event history framework that analyzes the duration of state supreme court justices’ tenure and reason for departing the bench in the several selection and retention systems from 1980 to 2005, we show that elected and appointed justices engage in strategic retirement behavior but do so as a function of the diverse environments in which they operate. Our study implicates a number of theoretical, empirical, and normative issues regarding the selection and retention of state supreme court justices.