Mark Sagoff

Aggregation and deliberation in valuing environmental public goods:: A look beyond contingent pricing

Starting from a distinction between Kantian (principle-based) and utilitarian (preference-based) approaches in political theory, this essay argues that we may understand normative judgments individuals make about policy to express principled views of the public interest or purpose not private preferences about their own consumption opportunities. These judgments, in other words, state opinions about what we ought to do as a society rather than report preferences about what I want as a utility-maximizer. This essay then argues that contingent valuation can take into account these kinds of judgments—which dominate public discourse about the environment—only if it moves toward a deliberative, discursive, jury-like research method emphasizing informed discussion leading toward a consensus based on an argument about the public interest.

Should Preferences Count

As a normative discipline, welfare and therefore resource economics postulates that preferences should count in the allocation of resources. This postulate cannot be justified in relation to choice or to well-being. The normative qualities that attend choices-e.g., accountability, responsibility, commitment, and consent-explain why choices should count, but not preferences, which are not actions but theoretical entities constructed ad hoc from stipulated descriptions of behavior they are then said to explain. The satisfaction of preferences, moreover, has no demonstrable relation with any conception of welfare or well-being not simply defined in terms of it.

ON PRESERVING THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Further consider consideration of the new foundations for environmental law is presented here. Except for the limit of our technology, there is no economic or even utilitarian rationale available for preserving the natural environment. It is possible to imagine that the Sequoia National Forest tells the developer that it wants a ski lift by a certain declivity of its hills and snowiness during the winter and that it needs a four lane highway by the appearance of certain valley passages and obvious scenic turnouts on the mountainsides. The connection between our cultural history and our environmental policy is explained. A nonutilitarian rationale, constitutionally based, is proposed for preserving the natural environment.

On the Value of Endangered and Other Species

This paper describes two frameworks—utilitarian and Kantian—society uses to make decisions concerning environmental management and, in particular, species protection. The utilitarian framework emphasizes the consequences of choices for prior preferences. A perfectly competitive market, on this model, correctly values environmental resources. The Kantian approach identifies rules appropriate to recognized situations given the identity of the decision maker. It relies on democratic political processes and institutions to provide the means by which citizens determine the identity of their community—its moral character and aspirations—and match appropriate rules to recognized situations. This paper argues that markets do not fail in any general way in measuring the economic value of plants and animals. Market prices, in general, correctly represent the marginal or exchange value of species. If society legislates against extinction, this must be understood as an exercise in Kantian decision making in view of the moral value of species, not as an attempt to “correct” a market failure or to promote social welfare or utility.

Four Dogmas of Environmental Economics

Four dogmas have shaped modern neoclassical economics. The first proposes that markets may fail to allocate resources efficiently, that is, to those willing to pay the most for them. The second asserts that choices, particularly within markets, reveal preferences. The third is the assumption that people always make the choices they expect will benefit them or enhance their welfare. The fourth dogma holds that perfectly competitive markets will allocate resources to their most beneficial uses. This is the doctrine of the invisible hand. I argue that these dogmas of applied welfare economics should be abandoned. One consequence of doing so will be an increased interest in the institutional context of production. A second will be a turn toward empiricism.

Zuckerman's dilemma. A plea for environmental ethics.

E.B. Whites Charlottes Web serves as an environmental parable for our time. As we reflect on our relationship with nature, we might consider the three ways in which Wilbur the pig was valued in Whites story. His instrumental value cashes out in ham hocks and sausage. His aesthetic value earns him a ribbon at the county fair. His moral value is the value he has in and of himself, and Charlotte the spider loves him for it. We can value nature the way Charlotte valued Wilbur, or we can, as the farmer Zuckerman did at first, see the natural world only in terms of the pork chops it provides.

The Value of Integrity

The concept of integrity is a normative one; it presupposes that some good is at stake. This essay does not attempt to define ‘integrity” in an ecological context but seeks to understand why integrity in that context is valuable and worthy of protection.

Intrinsic value: a reply to Justus et al.

In a recent Forum article in TREE, Justus and co-authors distinguish intrinsic from instrumental value in terms of its relation to human beings [1xBuying into conservation: intrinsic versus instrumental value. Justus, J. et al. Trends Ecol. Evol. 2009; 24: 187–191Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (56)See all References][1]. They define ‘intrinsic value’ to mean ‘a value independent of humans’ or that ‘is valuer independent and thus independent of stakeholder valuation.’ In contrast, instrumental value derives ‘from valuers such as humans.’ According to this definition, ‘instrumental value is simply value that depends on valuers.’Justus and colleagues argue that if intrinsic value has no basis in what stakeholders consider important, it follows that ‘intrinsic value cannot have a role in conservation decision making’ [1xBuying into conservation: intrinsic versus instrumental value. Justus, J. et al. Trends Ecol. Evol. 2009; 24: 187–191Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (56)See all References][1]. A view popular in the 1970s ascribed rights to natural objects and in that way divorced intrinsic value from human valuation [2xShould Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects. Stone, C.D. See all References][2]. As a legal theory the idea that natural objects have intrinsic value in the sense of ‘standing’ or ‘rights’ independent of human valuers went nowhere – as Justus et al. correctly conclude it must.While their logic is impeccable, Justus et al. fail to show that conservationists generally believe that intrinsic value is ‘valuer independent.’ On the contrary, conservationists argue that people may value natural objects because of their inherent qualities rather than because of any benefit those objects offer them. In other words, conservationists distinguish (1) those attributes of nature we value as objects of our love, reverence, appreciation and respect from (2) those attributes of nature we value for the contribution they make to our wellbeing. Conservationists criticize the assumption associated with economics that human welfare, utility or benefit is the only thing that has value ‘in itself’ and that the value of any other good must be measured instrumentally as a means to produce it. Thus Holmes Rolston has argued that natural beauty has ‘an intrinsic objective value, valued by me but for what it is in itself’ [4xPhilosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics. Rolston, H. III. See all References][4]. Justus et al. do not cite to or quote from a conservationist so confused as to think that intrinsic value is ‘valuer independent.’Justus et al. mistakenly believe that aesthetic value is instrumental. They state, ‘Art is instrumentally, not intrinsically, valuable because [of]. .. the responses it produces in humans (e.g. pleasure)’ [1xBuying into conservation: intrinsic versus instrumental value. Justus, J. et al. Trends Ecol. Evol. 2009; 24: 187–191Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (56)See all References][1]. Pornography then might be the most valuable form of art because it produces the most pleasure. Evolution has prepared the pleasure centers for procreation not poetry. We use the faculty of pleasure to perceive in art properties that possess intrinsic value including expressive and symbolic significance. Value lies in the intrinsic properties of art – its meaning, complexity and unity-in-variety – and not in the pleasure or other emotional faculties by means of which we experience and appreciate those properties.Justus et al. consider important ‘what stakeholders prefer, and how strongly’ [1xBuying into conservation: intrinsic versus instrumental value. Justus, J. et al. Trends Ecol. Evol. 2009; 24: 187–191Abstract | Full Text | Full Text PDF | PubMed | Scopus (56)See all References][1]. This view threatens conservation because the intensity of preference, typically measured by willingness to pay (WTP), usually tilts in favor of economic development.Conservationists emphasize the importance of the reasons for a preference rather than the WTP to satisfy it. This is because conservationists believe that on reflection and in view of the security and decency of our souls some reasons are more persuasive than others. To secure an ecological heritage is a better reason for acting than to maximize a consumer porridge.Callicott has written, ‘A big part of the normative work of contemporary environmental ethics is to give our fellow valuers reasons to value nature intrinsically’ [11xIntrinsic value, quantum theory, and environmental ethics. Callicott, J.B. Environ. Ethics. 1985; 7: 275–285See all References][11]. Reasons to value nature intrinsically derive from religious, cultural and moral traditions as well as from aesthetic perceptions basic to our identity as human beings. None of these reasons presuppose, as Justus et al. claim, an odd sort of non-valuer valuation.

On the relation between preference and choice

Abstract The thesis that preference should count in the allocation of resources rests on a relation between preference and either (1) welfare or (2) choice. Since economic theory defines “welfare” in terms of “preference–satisfaction,” no empirical relation holds between preference and welfare. This paper contends that the relation between preference and choice is also stipulative. Since the same behavior can be described in any number of ways, consistent with any number of different choices, choice is just as much a construct as preference. Both preference and choice exist in the eye of the beholder, so neither can provide data for welfare economics.

What Does Environmental Protection Protect

Environmental protection isn’t what it used to be. During the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalists enacted a legislative agenda that seems like a dream today: statutes like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act. Back in the day, those who sought to protect the environment could point to rivers that caught fire, smog that filled the air, and toxic wastes that poisoned the water. People knew that LUST referred to leaking underground storage tanks. Environmentalists defended the environment—a conceptual construct—without having to know or say exactly what that concept included or meant.