Mark Schafer

Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code

In this article we introduce a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carters operational code. Using speeches from the public record, we construct indices for the elements of the operational code construct. Based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches, President Jimmy Carters views of the political universe and approaches to political action in different issue areas are identified and compared. The results of the analysis provide reasonable support for the face, construct, and content validity of the operational code indices. We find that Carters view of the political universe and approach to political action were consistent across issue areas during the first three years of his term as president. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan President Carters support for human rights remained steadfast. Statistically significant shifts occurred in his views of the Soviet Union and others in the political universe and in his approach to political action regarding the conduct of U.S.-Soviet relations and other issues.

Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relations

Cognition is central to the study of international affairs and underlies concepts such as power and interest. Yet, in spite of its importance, only recently have methodologies been developed to systematically analyze cognition. This essay begins by identifying the role that cognition plays in international politics; it then looks at some of the challenges faced in trying to assess cognition and how technology is assisting with these challenges. The heart of the article is a review of work from four different research programs on cognition: operational code analysis, cognitive mapping, image theory, and conceptual complexity. Each area is examined with regard to theoretical developments, methodological approaches, and the correspondence of its forecasts with observed behavior. The essay concludes by discussing the possibility of synthesizing these four approaches and by raising some unresolved issues in our understanding of cognition and its role in international phenomena.

Urbanization and Development: The Emergence of International Nongovernmental Organizations amid Declining States

Half of the worlds population will live in cities by the early twenty-first century, and, of the ten most populated cities, nine will be in the developing world. Unfortunately, this is occurring at a time when national governments are increasingly unable to provide basic public services to growing populations. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have dramatically increased their efforts in urban areas and in economic and social development in general. Although sociologists have examined the causes and effects of Third World urbanization and development, they have not focused on the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in this process. We argue that inclusion of NGOs in the literature is necessary and even compatible with several current theories of development. We test the impact of INGOs on three interrelated measures of urbanization and development: overurbanization, economic growth, and access to safe water. The results show that INGOs slow overurbanization and promote economic and social development.

Antecedents of Groupthink: A Quantitative Study

This article reports results of a quantitative analysis of I. L. Janiss (1982) original specification of the groupthink model. The study builds on the earlier work on 19 cold war crises conducted by Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987), who found that information-processing errors in group decision making were directly related to unfavorable outcomes. The present research looks further back in Janiss casual story to investigate the factors that give rise to the information-processing errors. This data identify five key antecedent conditions: lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of tradition of methodical procedures, overestimation of the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures toward uniformity. Several factors that Janis anticipated as important antecedent conditions do not correlate with faulty decision making, such as group homogeneity and a recent failure. The results indicate that faulty decision making has its roots in leadership style, traditional group procedures, and patterns of group behavior.

The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink

This article investigates whether certain factors pertaining to the process of foreign policy decision making have a measurable, qualitative effect on foreign policy outcomes . The research is grounded in the groupthink literature but incorporates different dimensions of similar underlying notions from other international relations areas as well. Three different types of process factors are investigated: situational factors, such as stress and time constraints; factors associated with the structure of the group; and information processing factors. We test the influence of these factors on two types of outcomes—a decisions effect on national interests and its effect on the level of international conflict. We investigate this link in 31 cases of decision from 1975 through 1993. Scores for the outcome variables are based on survey responses from 21 foreign policy experts. For the process variables, we develop sets of operational definitions and then code each case based on extensive reading of case-study materials. OLS regression models are used to assess the hypotheses. We find that situation variables matter very little in terms of affecting outcomes and quality of information processing. On the other hand, both group structural factors and information processing are significantly related to outcomes in terms of national interests and level of international conflict.

Bill Clinton's Operational Code: Assessing Source Material Bias

This paper considers Bill Clintons operational code as reflected in prepared speeches and spontaneous remarks. Differences between the two types of verbal material, their respective differences over time, and their respective variation after key intervening political events were subjected to analysis of variance as well as descriptive analyses. The results suggest that measurements based on spontaneous comments are preferable, particularly in providing sensitive measures of personal predispositions.

The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes

This study uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to analyze and compare the operational codes of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors during the Vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in Johnsons general operational code as revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam. Johnsons public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). Period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of Johnson and those of his advisors.

Images and Policy Preferences

This article reports the results of an experiment that tests the independent and interactive effects of two dimensions of international images: perceived historical relationship and cultural differences. Priming techniques are used to manipulate images in subjects who are involved in a simulated international conflict. Dependent variables include attitudes and behaviors, the latter in the form ofpolicy preferences arranged on a cooperative-conflictual continuum. The results indicate that images do matter. When the perceived relationship is hostile, subjects develop more negative attitudes toward their opponents and choose more conflictual policies. Cultural differences produce more negative attitudes in all conditions but result in more negative policy selections only when the perceived relationship is hostile. In other words, in considering policy moves, cultural differences exacerbate conflict between enemies, but make no difference between friends, in spite of the negative outgroup attitudes they elicit. Do international images affect attitudes and behavior in conflict situations? If so, do different dimensions of images matter? Is there an interaction effect between different dimensions of images? Building on the theoretical and case-based research associated with image theory, this article investigates these substantive questions. Existing case-based research on images has its limitations, particularly in terms of internal validity and establishing the temporal component of causation. Because of this concern, experimental methods are used here in conjunction with priming materials and a simulated international conflict. Two dimensions of images are manipulated: perceived historical relationship and cultural differences. Effects are analyzed in terms of three different dependent variables: attitudes toward the opposing country, attitudes on strategy, and behavior in terms of cooperative and conflictual policy choices. The next two sections of the article review the literature on image theory and expand on the substantive research questions. After that, the

Cooperative and conflictual policy preferences: the effect of identity, security, and image of the other

What is the connection between identity and conflict behavior? This article begins by exploring some of the theoretical currents in this area, notably social identity theory, Eriksons work on identity development, Burtons ontological needs, and image theory. The theories differ somewhat in their expectations of the effect of identity development. Two studies were conducted to investigate these differences. The first, a priming experiment, partitioned identity and its effects. The second, a group-based simulation study, measured actual development of ingroup identity and assessed its effect on conflict behavior. Results from the first study show that identity does affect conflict behavior, but only as it is mediated by levels of insecurity. Increased feelings of security correspond to more cooperative behavior. Positive and negative images of the opponent, on the other hand, did not influence conflict behavior. In the second study, higher levels of ingroup identity resulted in more conflictual behavior. As with the first study, image of the other was not significantly related to conflict behavior. Language: en

Operational Code Analysis at a Distance: The Verbs in Context system of Content Analysis

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) argued many years ago that those of us interested in understanding foreign policy decisions needed to get inside the “black box” of the decision-making process. Doing so, they pointed out, required a focus on the agents involved in the process. This agent-centered approach differed significantly from the broader, structural approaches that had marked the study of global politics prior to their revolutionary work. At an intuitive level it makes sense to focus on the process and the agents involved, and indeed, most of our casual conversations about international politics and foreign policy center around individuals and small decision-making groups. Many of the major subfields in international politics are nonetheless populated by structural or systems-level approaches, which either ignore individuals altogether or make simplified assumptions about agent-centered or micro-level processes that are under-theorized or not tested.