Mark Schelker

Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector

Corporate auditors review and evaluate financial statements. Audit quality depends on auditor expertise and independence. To enhance auditor independence the selection process and auditor rotation requirements have been debated intensively. The available empirical evidence is not conclusive and suffers from serious endogeneity problems. I propose learning from the public sector where auditors play a similar role and present empirical evidence on the impact of auditor expertise, term length and rotation requirements on government performance at the US state level. I find evidence indicating that greater auditor expertise and rotation requirements have a positive effect on state credit ratings.

Auditor expertise: Evidence from the public sector

Public Auditors are fundamental institutions to supervise government agents. Without accurate information principals would find it hard to make adequate decisions. Since agents face strong incentives to misreport, competent audits of financial information are crucial. This paper is the first attempt to study the relationship between auditor expertise and fiscal performance. More competent auditors are more effective supervisors; they reduce the leeway of agents to misreport and improve fiscal outcomes. The empirical results support this hypothesis. I find that States requiring the auditor to hold a professional degree feature significantly lower debt and expenditures as well as higher credit ratings.

Rethinking Public Auditing Institutions: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities

In the economic literature various political institutions designed to control the government have been analyzed. However, an important institution has been neglected so far: independent auditing institutions with an extended mandate to analyze the budget draft and individual policy proposals. We argue that auditors with an extended mandate improve transparency and provide essential information on the impact of policy proposals on common pool resources. This leads to less wasteful spending and a more efficient allocation of public resources. We empirically analyze the policy impact of local auditors with an extended audit mandate in Switzerland. Auditors, who can evaluate and criticize policy proposals ex ante to policy decisions, significantly reduce the general tax burden and public expenditures. We find similar results with different datasets. These results are robust to various changes in the econometric specification.

Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Difference-in-Differences with an Application to Political Preferences Following the Vietnam Draft Lottery

Abstract We propose a difference-in-differences approach for disentangling a total treatment effect within specific subpopulations into a direct effect and an indirect effect operating through a binary mediating variable. Random treatment assignment along with specific common trend and effect homogeneity assumptions identify the direct effects on the always and never takers, whose mediator is not affected by the treatment, as well as the direct and indirect effects on the compliers, whose mediator reacts to the treatment. In our empirical application, we analyze the impact of the Vietnam draft lottery on political preferences. The results suggest that a high draft risk due to the draft lottery outcome leads to an increase in mild preferences for the Republican Party, but has no effect on strong preferences for either party or on specific political attitudes. The increase in Republican support is mostly driven by the direct effect not operating through the mediator that is military service.

Controlling Government by Democratically-Elected, Competing Political Bodies

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government and an independent unit can be found at the Swiss local level, where audit units compete with the government. In some parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures.

On the Economics of Remembering and Forgetting in the Digital Age

The digital revolution—the emergence of the Internet and new information and communication technologies—has generated much debate on regulating “remembering and forgetting”, i.e. the active management of information, and more specifically, regulation on the storage and deletion of information. This chapter provides some basic thoughts on and evaluations of the characteristics and properties of information, the role of government and potential interventions from an economics perspective.