Mark T. Schuver

Cross-Institutional Exploratory of Faculty Compensation Models to Incentivize Distance Learning Participation

In higher education, courses and curriculum are purportedly the intellectual property of the faculty of academic departments. Academic departments, then, provide instructors or faculty to teach. The assignment of faculty to teach in distance-based programs directly implies there needs to exist some level of financial incentive for the home department of those faculty, as well as direct incentive to the faculty who are involved in teaching. After all expenses are accounted for, then, what model for faculty compensation provides the greatest level of incentive to participate in professional studies? Building on previous scholarship and over a year of additional research, this paper focuses on the impact of numerous employed faculty compensation models across multiple public 4-year institutions of higher education. A survey of these many institutions of higher learning, regarding their compensation strategy for tenure, tenure-track and adjunct faculty, was collected and compiled. This paper shares the results of this cross-institution study premised on previously reported research, and, furthers the discussion by exploring the ramifications of utilizing adjunct faculty for cost containment purposes. Department Incentive Models Previous research1,2,3 reported on three department incentive models employed:  Push – where the departments receive no residual (profit) from the fee-based programs their faculty/instructors were a part.  Split – where each participating academic department received a 50% 50% spilt of net residual, with the Dean’s Office of the college receiving the remaining 50% split.  Pull – where each participating department received 100% of the net residual from participating programs. The “push” model required a mandate from the Dean of the college that said each department will participate in professional fee-based programs and the programs will be run through the centralized fee-based administrative organization as the designated sole fee-based administering organizational entity. While the mandate was required for a “push” type of model, and focused heavily on what was good for the college, the department response and willingness to participate in fee-based programs was marginal. The push model relied heavily on the efficiencies gained from centralization of fee-based programs. In the reported on scenario, centralization provided common policies, practices, P ge 26428.2 methodologies and procedures, as well as common interfaces to cross-college academic and administrative units. The “split” model, where each participating department received 50% of the net residual and the Dean’s Office received the remaining 50% of net residual was met with greater interest and increased departmental participation. The underlying connotation of the split model was the realization there existed administrative expenses which had to be covered by residual generating activities and initiatives, of which feebased program offerings was one. On the surface, support of administrative activities was expected and generally provided for. As is generally the case, however, benefits can quickly become entitlements and questions arise as to why the remaining 50% was being used for administrative purposes or support. This mind-set ignores the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization, assuming differentiation truly exists. The natural evolution and current model employed is a “pull” model where the participating departments receive 100% of the net residual. This model evolved from past experience in creating corporate universities by members of the administering organization. The underlying mind-set of this model is to create a pull effect by returning essentially 100% of the net residuals to the participating academic departments, therefore creating maximum incentive to participate. The use of a residual maximizing model not only returns funds outside of general State fund allocations, but, over time, becomes a source of revenue for funding student activities, faculty participation in research and related initiatives. Like any budget line item with uncertainty, it needs to be remembered there should be minimal dependence on variable funds, participation in fee-based programs, however, becomes more pronounced using this model. Faculty/Instructor Incentive Models Following this same reported study1,2,3, the faculty/instructor incentive (compensation) models evolved from models that were rubric-based, flat rate, and determined by the department. Initially, the administering organization held the responsibility for incentivizing faculty through compensation. The first employed model was rubric based. It utilized a weighted factor set of criteria that was determined to be reflective of increasingly greater ability to deliver successful professional fee-based programs. Criteria of this model included elements such as:  Years of applicable experience  Academic rank  Quantity of scholarship  Quality of scholarship P ge 26428.3