Marko Jusup

Pattern transitions in spatial epidemics: Mechanisms and emergent properties.

n Abstractn n Infectious diseases are a threat to human health and a hindrance to societal development. Consequently, the spread of diseases in both time and space has been widely studied, revealing the different types of spatial patterns. Transitions between patterns are an emergent property in spatial epidemics that can serve as a potential trend indicator of disease spread. Despite the usefulness of such an indicator, attempts to systematize the topic of pattern transitions have been few and far between. We present a mini-review on pattern transitions in spatial epidemics, describing the types of transitions and their underlying mechanisms. We show that pattern transitions relate to the complexity of spatial epidemics by, for example, being accompanied with phenomena such as coherence resonance and cyclic evolution. The results presented herein provide valuable insights into disease prevention and control, and may even be applicable outside epidemiology, including other branches of medical science, ecology, quantitative finance, and elsewhere.n n

Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

Researchers test whether and how onymity, as opposed to anonymity, promotes cooperation in a social dilemma experiment. One of the most elusive scientific challenges for over 150 years has been to explain why cooperation survives despite being a seemingly inferior strategy from an evolutionary point of view. Over the years, various theoretical scenarios aimed at solving the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation have been proposed, eventually identifying several cooperation-promoting mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. We report the results of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments with anonymous and onymous pairwise interactions among individuals. We find that onymity significantly increases the frequency of cooperation and the median payoff per round relative to anonymity. Furthermore, we also show that the correlation between players’ ranks and the usage of strategies (cooperation, defection, or punishment) underwent a fundamental shift, whereby more prosocial actions are rewarded with a better ranking under onymity. Our findings prove that reducing anonymity is a valid promoter of cooperation, leading to higher payoffs for cooperators and thus suppressing an incentive—anonymity—that would ultimately favor defection.

Physics of metabolic organization.

We review the most comprehensive metabolic theory of life existing to date. A special focus is given to the thermodynamic roots of this theory and to implications that the laws of physics-such as the conservation of mass and energy-have on all life. Both the theoretical foundations and biological applications are covered. Hitherto, the foundations were more accessible to physicists or mathematicians, and the applications to biologists, causing a dichotomy in what always should have been a single body of work. To bridge the gap between the two aspects of the same theory, we (i) adhere to the theoretical formalism, (ii) try to minimize the amount of information that a reader needs to process, but also (iii) invoke examples from biology to motivate the introduction of new concepts and to justify the assumptions made, and (iv) show how the careful formalism of the general theory enables modular, self-consistent extensions that capture important features of the species and the problem in question. Perhaps the most difficult among the introduced concepts, the utilization (or mobilization) energy flow, is given particular attention in the form of an original and considerably simplified derivation. Specific examples illustrate a range of possible applications-from energy budgets of individual organisms, to population dynamics, to ecotoxicology.

Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

Significance The evolution of cooperation has a formative role in human societies—civilized life on Earth would be impossible without cooperation. However, it is unclear why cooperation would evolve in the first place because Darwinian selection favors selfish individuals. After struggling with this problem for >150 y, recent scientific breakthroughs have uncovered multiple cooperation-promoting mechanisms. We build on these breakthroughs by examining whether two widely known cooperation-promoting mechanisms—network reciprocity and costly punishment—create synergies in a social dilemma experiment. While network reciprocity fulfilled its expected role, costly punishment proved to be surprisingly ineffective in promoting cooperation. This ineffectiveness suggests that the rational response to punishment assumed in theoretical studies is overly stylized and needs reexamining. Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.

Inferring physiological energetics of loggerhead turtle (Caretta caretta) from existing data using a general metabolic theory

Loggerhead turtle is an endangered sea turtle species with a migratory lifestyle and worldwide distribution, experiencing markedly different habitats throughout its lifetime. Environmental conditions, especially food availability and temperature, constrain the acquisition and the use of available energy, thus affecting physiological processes such as growth, maturation, and reproduction. These physiological processes at the population level determine survival, fecundity, and ultimately the population growth rate-a key indicator of the success of conservation efforts. As a first step towards the comprehensive understanding of how environment shapes the physiology and the life cycle of a loggerhead turtle, we constructed a full life cycle model based on the principles of energy acquisition and utilization embedded in the Dynamic Energy Budget (DEB) theory. We adapted the standard DEB model using data from published and unpublished sources to obtain parameter estimates and model predictions that could be compared with data. The outcome was a successful mathematical description of ontogeny and life history traits of the loggerhead turtle. Some deviations between the model and the data existed (such as an earlier age at sexual maturity and faster growth of the post-hatchlings), yet probable causes for these deviations were found informative and discussed in great detail. Physiological traits such as the capacity to withstand starvation, trade-offs between reproduction and growth, and changes in the energy budget throughout the ontogeny were inferred from the model. The results offer new insights into physiology and ecology of loggerhead turtle with the potential to lead to novel approaches in conservation of this endangered species.

A biologically inspired immunization strategy for network epidemiology

n Abstractn n Well-known immunization strategies, based on degree centrality, betweenness centrality, or closeness centrality, either neglect the structural significance of a node or require global information about the network. We propose a biologically inspired immunization strategy that circumvents both of these problems by considering the number of links of a focal node and the way the neighbors are connected among themselves. The strategy thus measures the dependence of the neighbors on the focal node, identifying the ability of this node to spread the disease. Nodes with the highest ability in the network are the first to be immunized. To test the performance of our method, we conduct numerical simulations on several computer-generated and empirical networks, using the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model. The results show that the proposed strategy largely outperforms the existing well-known strategies.n n

Exploiting a cognitive bias promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

The decoy effect is a cognitive bias documented in behavioural economics by which the presence of a third, (partly) inferior choice causes a significant shift in people’s preference for other items. Here, we performed an experiment with human volunteers who played a variant of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in which the standard options of “cooperate” and “defect” are supplemented with a new, decoy option, “reward”. We show that although volunteers rarely chose the decoy option, its availability sparks a significant increase in overall cooperativeness and improves the likelihood of success for cooperative individuals in this game. The presence of the decoy increased willingness of volunteers to cooperate in the first step of each game, leading to subsequent propagation of such willingness by (noisy) tit-for-tat. Our study thus points to decoys as a means to elicit voluntary prosocial action across a spectrum of collective endeavours.The decoy effect refers to the fact that the presence of a third option can shift people’s preferences between two other options even though the third option is inferior to both. Here, the authors show how the decoy effect can enhance cooperation in a social dilemma, the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.

How Fear of Future Outcomes Affects Social Dynamics

Mutualistic relationships among the different species are ubiquitous in nature. To prevent mutualism from slipping into antagonism, a host often invokes a “carrot and stick” approach towards symbionts with a stabilizing effect on their symbiosis. In open human societies, a mutualistic relationship arises when a native insider population attracts outsiders with benevolent incentives in hope that the additional labor will improve the standard of all. A lingering question, however, is the extent to which insiders are willing to tolerate outsiders before mutualism slips into antagonism. To test the assertion by Karl Popper that unlimited tolerance leads to the demise of tolerance, we model a society under a growing incursion from the outside. Guided by their traditions of maintaining the social fabric and prizing tolerance, the insiders reduce their benevolence toward the growing subpopulation of outsiders but do not invoke punishment. This reduction of benevolence intensifies as less tolerant insiders (e.g., “radicals”) openly renounce benevolence. Although more tolerant insiders maintain some level of benevolence, they may also tacitly support radicals out of fear for the future. If radicals and their tacit supporters achieve a critical majority, herd behavior ensues and the relation between the insider and outsider subpopulations turns antagonistic. To control the risk of unwanted social dynamics, we map the parameter space within which the tolerance of insiders is in balance with the assimilation of outsiders, the tolerant insiders maintain a sustainable majority, and any reduction in benevolence occurs smoothly. We also identify the circumstances that cause the relations between insiders and outsiders to collapse or that lead to the dominance of the outsiders.

Predicting the Rise of EU Right-Wing Populism in Response to Unbalanced Immigration

Among the central tenets of globalization is the free migration of labor. Although much has been written about the benefits of globalization, little is known about its limitations and how antiglobalist sentiment can be strongly affected by high levels of immigration. Analyzing poll data from a group of EU countries affected by the recent migrant crisis, we find that over the last three years the percentage of right-wing (RW) populist voters in a given country depends on the prevalence of immigrants in this country’s population and the total immigration inflow into the entire EU. The latter is likely due to the perception that the EU functions as a supranational state in which a lack of inner borders means that “someone else’s problem” can easily become “my problem.” We find that the increase in the percentage of RW voters substantially surpasses the percentage of immigration inflow, implying that if this process continues, ongoing democratic processes will cause RW populism to prevail and globalization to rapidly decrease. We locate tipping points between the fraction of immigrants and the rise of RW populism, and we model our empirical findings using a complex network framework in which the success of globalization rests on a balance between immigration and immigrant integration.

Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources

Maintaining human cooperation in the context of common-pool resource management is extremely important because otherwise we risk overuse and corruption. To analyse the interplay between economic and ecological factors leading to corruption, we couple the resource dynamics and the evolutionary dynamics of strategic decision making into a powerful analytical framework. The traits of this framework are: (i) an arbitrary number of harvesters share the responsibility to sustainably exploit a specific part of an ecosystem, (ii) harvesters face three strategic choices for exploiting the resource, (iii) a delegated enforcement system is available if called upon, (iv) enforcers are either honest or corrupt, and (v) the resource abundance reflects the choice of harvesting strategies. The resulting dynamical system is bistable; depending on the initial conditions, it evolves either to cooperative (sustainable exploitation) or defecting (overexploitation) equilibria. Using the domain of attraction to cooperative equilibria as an indicator of successful management, we find that the more resilient the resource (as implied by a high growth rate), the more likely the dominance of corruption which, in turn, suppresses the cooperative outcome. A qualitatively similar result arises when slow resource dynamics relative to the dynamics of decision making mask the benefit of cooperation. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of managing common-pool resources.