Marta Hernandez-Jover

Building a picture: Prioritisation of exotic diseases for the pig industry in Australia using multi-criteria decision analysis.

Abstract Diseases that are exotic to the pig industry in Australia were prioritised using a multi-criteria decision analysis framework that incorporated weights of importance for a range of criteria important to industry stakeholders. Measurements were collected for each disease for nine criteria that described potential disease impacts. A total score was calculated for each disease using a weighted sum value function that aggregated the nine disease criterion measurements and weights of importance for the criteria that were previously elicited from two groups of industry stakeholders. One stakeholder group placed most value on the impacts of disease on livestock, and one group placed more value on the zoonotic impacts of diseases. Prioritisation lists ordered by disease score were produced for both of these groups. Vesicular diseases were found to have the highest priority for the group valuing disease impacts on livestock, followed by acute forms of African and classical swine fever, then highly pathogenic porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome. The group who valued zoonotic disease impacts prioritised rabies, followed by Japanese encephalitis, Eastern equine encephalitis and Nipah virus, interspersed with vesicular diseases. The multi-criteria framework used in this study systematically prioritised diseases using a multi-attribute theory based technique that provided transparency and repeatability in the process. Flexibility of the framework was demonstrated by aggregating the criterion weights from more than one stakeholder group with the disease measurements for the criteria. This technique allowed industry stakeholders to be active in resource allocation for their industry without the need to be disease experts. We believe it is the first prioritisation of livestock diseases using values provided by industry stakeholders. The prioritisation lists will be used by industry stakeholders to identify diseases for further risk analysis and disease spread modelling to understand biosecurity risks to this industry.

Evaluation of post-farm-gate passive surveillance in swine for the detection of foot and mouth disease in Australia.

Pigs are considered high risk for the introduction and spread of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Australia. One of the most likely pathways of introduction of FMD into Australia would be through the illegal importation of FMD-contaminated meat, which is then fed to feral or domestic pigs. Locations where animals from different origins are commingled, such as livestock markets and abattoirs, pose a risk for disease spread. Early detection of exotic diseases at these locations is crucial in limiting the spread of an outbreak. The aims of this study were to evaluate the likelihood of exotic disease detection with current passive disease surveillance activities for pigs at saleyards and abattoirs in eastern Australia, and make recommendations for improving surveillance. Sensitivity (Se) of the current post-farm-gate passive surveillance for detection of exotic diseases was estimated using the scenario tree modelling methodology (Martin et al., 2007a). Four surveillance system components were identified: (i) domestic saleyard, (ii) export saleyard, (iii) domestic abattoir, and (iv) export abattoir. Pig farms were classified according to herd size (Small vs. Large) and subsequently into two risk categories depending on the probability of swill feeding (Swill feeding vs. Not swill feeding). A scenario tree representing the pathways by which infected animals could be detected was developed and the Se of detection in each surveillance system component was estimated. Industry statistics, information on previous exotic disease outbreaks, and interviews with pig producers were used to estimate herd category proportions and the relative risk of swill feeding. Quantitative estimates for probabilities of detection were sourced from State legislation and policies, stakeholder consultation and observational studies at saleyards and abattoirs. Results of a FMD case study showed a Se of detection at a representative location for each surveillance system component during a 2-week period of 0.19 at domestic saleyards, 0.40 at export saleyards, 0.32 at domestic abattoirs and, 0.53 at export abattoirs. This output assumed the country was infected with herd and unit design prevalences of 1% and 30%, respectively. Improving disease awareness of saleyard and abattoir stockmen, increasing the presence of inspectors at these venues and identifying those herds posing a higher risk for FMD introduction, could improve the capacity of the country for early detection of emerging animal diseases.

Biosecurity risks associated with current identification practices of producers trading live pigs at livestock sales.

Approximately 5% of pigs produced in Australia is believed to be traded at livestock sales. Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with producers (106 and 30 producers, respectively), who traded pigs at livestock sales. The purpose of the study was to gather information on how producers identified their pigs in order to evaluate how these practices may impact the ability to trace pig movements in the event of an emergency animal disease outbreak or food safety hazard. Results were analyzed according to herd size (0 to 150 sows, 150+ sows) and location (peri-urban, regional) as prior studies suggested a higher biosecurity risk among smaller farms and due to perceptions that peri-urban farms pose additional risk. Most producers (91.5%) had less than 150 sows and a high proportion (70.8%) resided in regional areas compared with only 29.2% residing in peri-urban areas. A higher proportion of large-scale producers identified their pigs than small-scale producers. A third of small-scale producers reported not identifying breeding stock and most did not identify progeny. The most common forms of on-farm identification used were ear tags for breeding stock and ear notches for progeny. Producers identified breeding stock to assist with mating management and genetic improvement. Ear notches were used to determine the litter of origin of progeny. All large-scale producers owned a registered swine brand and used the official body tattoo for post-farm-gate identification. However, approximately 15% of small-scale producers did not own a registered swine brand, and an additional 8% did not identify their pigs post-farm-gate. Producers were satisfied with tattoos as a methodology for post-farm-gate identification of pigs and considered other methodologies cost-prohibitive. However, variations in the maintenance of the branding equipment, the type of ink used and the time of tattoo application in relation to the animal sale were highlighted during focus group discussions. These results suggest that there is a need for education and extension activities, especially among small-scale pig producers, regarding the benefits of identifying animals on-farm. In addition, increased awareness of the traceability legislation that exists in Australia to meet the National Performance Standards for Livestock Traceability in this country is required.

On-farm characteristics and biosecurity protocols for small-scale swine producers in eastern Australia.

Pigs are considered high risk for the introduction and spread of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Australia. Facilities where animals from different origins are commingled, such as saleyards, pose a high risk for disease spread. Sound on-farm management practices and biosecurity protocols are the first line of defence against a potential on-farm disease outbreak. This study evaluated the practices of 104 producers (vendors who sold pigs and purchasers of live pigs for grow-out) who traded pigs at 6 peri-urban and rural saleyards in eastern Australia. Specifically, management and on-farm biosecurity practices were assessed using an in-depth questionnaire. Univariable and multivariable logistic regression analyses were used to investigate (1) producer associations: producer type, State, motivation to keep pigs, farm type, gender, years having owned pigs, and the acquisition of formal livestock qualifications; and (2) pig associations: herd size, housing, management (husbandry and feeding) practices and biosecurity (including pig movement) practices. Backyard operations (<20 sows) were undertaken by 60.6% of participants, followed by small-scale pig operations (28.8%; 21-100 sows). Few producers (16.3%) reported residing in close proximity (<5 km) to commercial operations; however, less rural producers had neighbouring hobby pig operations within 5 km of their property (P=0.033). Motivation for keeping pigs was significantly associated with a number of biosecurity practices. Producers who kept pigs for primary income were more likely to provide footwear precautions (P=0.007) and ask visitors about prior pig contacts (P=0.004). Approximately 40% of backyard and small-scale producers reported not having any quarantine practices in place for incoming pigs, compared to only 9.1% among larger producers. The main reasons cited for not adopting on-farm biosecurity practices in this study included having no need on their property (43.1%) and a lack of information and support (by the industry and/or authorities; 18.5%). Up to three-quarters of all producers maintained an open breeding herd, regularly introducing new pigs to the main herd. Saleyards are an important source of income for backyard and small-scale producers as well as an important risk factor for the introduction and dissemination of endemic and emerging animal diseases. Differing management and biosecurity practices as well as the motivations of these producers keeping pigs in small numbers and trading pigs at saleyards need to be taken into account in the development of successful biosecurity extension programmes for this sector of the Australian pork industry.

A qualitative study of the management and biosecurity practices of 13 interviewed pig owners selling via informal means in New South Wales, Australia

ThereisincreasinginterestinthetradingpracticesofproducerswhomarketpigsatliveauctioninAustraliaand the potential for infectious disease establishment and spread. The practices that underpin the commercial pork industry in Australiaarewellknown.However,littleisknownaboutinformalmovementsofpigsinAustralia,andthebiosecurityrisks associated with pig production enterprises that utilise these methods of trade. The aim of this study was to qualitatively evaluate the biosecurity and pig-keeping practices of owners who trade pigs informally for Foot and Mouth Disease and Classical Swine Fever exposure and spread. Interviews were conducted with 13 pig owners who trade via informal means between April and June 2009. Information provided by producers was able to be validated for the six interviews conducted on-farm.Therewaslimitedapplicationofrecommendedbiosecuritypracticeson-farmandfewkepthealthandmanagement records.All interviewees rearedother livestockspecies,such asruminants and/or poultry,as wellas pigs.Mostinterviewed owners claimed toquarantine introduced pigs fromthe main herd; however,few complied with industry recommendations. The results of this study suggest that pig owners (n = 13 interviewed) who currently trade their pigs informally pose few threats for the introduction of emergency animal disease. Pig keepers largely obtained their pig feed from reputable sources andappeared tohaveasound understandingof swillfeeding.However,thelackofon-farmbiosecurity, variablequarantine practices and the failure to keep health records could play a role in the spread of an emergency animal disease if it was to be introduced. Furtherworkisbeingundertaken todetermine, qualitatively, theriskassociatedwith themanagementpractices undertaken by informal pig traders and Foot and Mouth Disease and Classical Swine Fever introduction and spread.

Transmission of highly virulent community-associated MRSA ST93 and livestock-associated MRSA ST398 between humans and pigs in Australia

Pigs have been recognised as a reservoir of livestock associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (LA-MRSA) in Europe, Asia and North America. However, little is known about the presence and distribution of MRSA in the Australian pig population and pig industry. This study describes the presence, distribution and molecular characteristics of the human adapted Australian CA-MRSA ST93 isolated from pigs, people, and the environment within a piggery. Isolates were subjected to antibiotic susceptibility testing, DNA microarray, whole genome sequencing, multi locus sequence typing, virulence and resistance gene characterization and phylogenetic analysis. MRSA were isolated from 60% (n = 52) of farm workers where 84% of isolates returned ST93 and the rest ST398. Of the thirty-one pig isolates tested further, an equal number of ST398 and ST93 (15 each) and one as ST30-V were identified. Four of six environmental isolates were identified as ST93 and two as ST398. This study has identified for the first time in Australia the occurrence of CA-MRSA ST93 and LA-MRSA ST398 amongst farm workers, pigs, and the farm environment. Comparative genome analysis indicates that ST398 is likely to have been introduced into Australia from Europe or North America. This study also reports the first linezolid resistant MRSA isolated in Australia.

Evaluating the risk of pathogen transmission from wild animals to domestic pigs in Australia.

Wild animals contribute to endemic infection in livestock as well as the introduction, reintroduction and maintenance of pathogens. The source of introduction of endemic diseases to a piggery is often unknown and the extent of wildlife contribution to such local spread is largely unexplored. The aim of the current study was to quantitatively assess the probability of domestic pigs being exposed to different pathogens from wild animals commonly found around commercial piggeries in Australia. Specifically, this study aims to quantify the probability of exposure to the pathogens Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Campylobacter spp. from European starlings (Sturnus vulgarus); Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Lawsonia intracellularis and Salmonella spp. from rats (Rattus rattus and Rattus norvegicus); and Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae, Leptospira spp., Brucella suis and L. intracellularis from feral pigs (Sus scrofa). Exposure assessments, using scenario trees and Monte Carlo stochastic simulation modelling, were conducted to identify potential pathways of introduction and calculate the probabilities of these pathways occurring. Input parameters were estimated from a national postal survey of commercial pork producers and from disease detection studies conducted for European starlings, rats and feral pigs in close proximity to commercial piggeries in Australia. Based on the results of the exposure assessments, rats presented the highest probability of exposure of pathogens to domestic pigs at any point in time, and L. intracellularis (median 0.13, 5% and 95%, 0.05-0.23) and B. hyodysenteriae (median 0.10, 0.05-0.19) were the most likely pathogens to be transmitted. Regarding European starlings, the median probability of exposure of domestic pigs to pathogenic E. coli at any point in time was estimated to be 0.03 (0.02-0.04). The highest probability of domestic pig exposure to feral pig pathogens at any point in time was found to be for M. hyopneumoniae (median 0.013, 0.007-0.022) and L. intracellularis (median 0.006, 0.003-0.011) for pigs in free-range piggeries. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the presence and number of wild animals around piggeries, their access to piggeries and pig food and water, and, in the case of feral pigs, their proximity to piggeries, are the most influential parameters on the probability of exposure. Findings from this study support identification of mitigation strategies that could be implemented at on-farm and industry level to minimize the exposure risk from European starlings, rats and feral pigs.

A generic rabies risk assessment tool to support surveillance

The continued spread of rabies in Indonesia poses a risk to human and animal populations in the remaining free islands, as well as the neighbouring rabies-free countries of Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea and Australia. Here we describe the development of a generic risk assessment tool which can be used to rapidly determine the vulnerability of rabies-free islands, so that scarce resources can be targeted to surveillance activities and the sensitivity of surveillance systems increased. The tool was developed by integrating information on the historical spread of rabies, anthropological studies, and the opinions of local animal health experts. The resulting tool is based on eight critical parameters that can be estimated from the literature, expert opinion, observational studies and information generated from routine surveillance. In the case study presented, results generated by this tool were most sensitive to the probability that dogs are present on private and fishing boats and it was predicted that rabies-infection (one infected case) might occur in a rabies-free island (upper 95% prediction interval) with a volume of 1000 boats movements. With 25,000 boat movements, the median of the probability distribution would be equal to one infected case, with an upper 95% prediction interval of six infected cases. This tool could also be used at the national-level to guide control and eradication plans. An initial recommendation from this study is to develop a surveillance programme to determine the likelihood that boats transport dogs, for example by port surveillance or regularly conducted surveys of fisherman and passenger ferries. However, the illegal nature of dog transportation from rabies-infected to rabies-free islands is a challenge for developing such surveillance.

Public perceptions of the transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 from pigs and pork products in Australia

A cross-sectional study was conducted at the height of the pandemic influenza H1N1/09 outbreak in Australia in 2009. The objectives of the study were to evaluate public perceptions about transmission and prevention of the disease, to understand their concerns and preparedness to cope with the disease, and to investigate drivers influencing their behaviour. A questionnaire was designed and administered to 510 customers visiting 15 butcher shops in the Greater Sydney region between 26th June and 2nd August 2009. Data were analysed to estimate the proportion of people with certain perceptions and to evaluate the influence of these perceptions on two binary outcome variables: (1) whether or not people believed that avoiding pork would protect them from contracting H1N1/09, and (2) whether or not they actually made some changes to pork consumption after the outbreak. A majority of the respondents had perceptions based on fact about transmission and prevention of H1N1/09. As many as 96.8% of the respondents believed that washing their hands frequently was likely to protect them from contracting H1N1/09. Similarly, most believed that they could contract H1N1/09 by travelling on public transport with a sick person present (94.1%), by shaking hands with a sick person (89.2%), or by attending a community gathering (73.7%). Women were more likely than men to have factual perceptions about protective behaviours. Misconceptions regarding transmission of the disease were evident, with 21.7% believing that avoiding eating pork could protect them against H1N1/09, 11.1% believing that they could contract H1N1/09 by drinking tap water, 22.8% by handling uncooked pork meat and 15.6% by eating cooked pork. Approximately one third of respondents believed that working in a pig farm or an abattoir increased their likelihood of contracting H1N1/09 (36.9% and 32.3%, respectively). Younger people (<35 years old) were more likely to have these misconceptions than older people. Reduction in consumption of pork, ham or bacon was significantly associated with misconceptions regarding the risk of contracting H1N1/09 from eating pig meat products. It is recommended that in the event of a future disease emergency, communication activities providing factual information and targeting younger people should be used.

Comparisons of management practices and farm design on Australian commercial layer and meat chicken farms: Cage, barn and free range

There are few published studies describing the unique management practices, farm design and housing characteristics of commercial meat chicken and layer farms in Australia. In particular, there has been a large expansion of free range poultry production in Australia in recent years, but limited information about this enterprise exists. This study aimed to describe features of Australian commercial chicken farms, with particular interest in free range farms, by conducting on-farm interviews of 25 free range layer farms, nine cage layer farms, nine barn layer farms, six free range meat chicken farms and 15 barn meat chicken farms in the Sydney basin bioregion and South East Queensland. Comparisons between the different enterprises (cage, barn and free range) were explored, including stocking densities, depopulation procedures, environmental control methods and sources of information for farmers. Additional information collected for free range farms include range size, range characteristics and range access. The median number of chickens per shed was greatest in free range meat chicken farms (31,058), followed by barn meat chicken (20,817), free range layer (10,713), barn layer (9,300) and cage layer farms (9,000). Sheds had cooling pads and tunnel ventilation in just over half of both barn and free range meat chicken farms (53%, n = 8) and was least common in free range layer farms (16%, n = 4). Range access in free range meat chicken farms was from sunrise to dark in the majority (93%, n = 14) of free range meat chicken farms. Over half of free range layer farms (56%, n = 14) granted range access at a set time each morning; most commonly between 9:00 to 10.00am (86%, n = 12), and chickens were placed back inside sheds when it was dusk.