Martin Beckenkamp

Environmental Dilemmas Revisited: Structural Consequences from the Angle of Institutional Ergonomics

The structure of a social dilemma lies behind many environmental problems. Mingling temporal aspects of resources with the structure of the social dilemma often leads to wrong conclusions. Therefore, it is worth analytically separating temporal aspects from structural aspects of the dilemma. This article concentrates solely on the structural aspects of the dilemma and the grades of complexity with respect to the number and stakes of the people involved, as well as the asymmetry of endowments and the salience of the optimal use of the resource in order to come close to the welfare optimum. Dilemmas with sufficient complexity are extremely vulnerable to individual defectors, and therefore institutions are necessary for the solution of the dilemma. Consequently, research in environmental psychology should not only target the individuals, but focus on institutional design with respect to (1) the structural diagnosis of environmental dilemmas; (2) methods that provide an insight into the structural problem of environmental dilemmas; (3) the impact of institutions on internalizing norms; and (4) the impact of structural knowledge about the dilemma of accepting institutions that help to solve the environmental dilemma. In analogy to software-ergonomics, psychology should initiate research in institutional ergonomics that helps to create addressee-friendly institutions.

Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoners dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoners dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.

Playing Strategically against Nature? Decisions Viewed from a Game-Theoretic Frame

Common research on decision-making investigates non-interdependent situations, i.e., “games against nature”. However, humans are social beings and many decisions are made in social settings, where they mutually influence each other, i.e., “strategic games”. Mathematical game theory gives a benchmark for rational decisions in such situations. The strategic character makes psychological decision-making more complex by introducing the outcomes for others as an additional attribute of that situation; it also broadens the field for potential coordination and cooperation problems. From an evolutionary point of view, behavior in strategic situations was at a competitive edge. This paper demonstrates that even in games against nature, people sometimes decide as if they were in a strategic game; it outlines theoretical and empirical consequences of such a shift of the frame. It examines whether some irrationalities of human decision-making might be explained by such a shift in grasping the situation. It concludes that the mixed strategies in games against nature demand a high expertise and can only be found in situations where these strategies improve the effects of minimax-strategies that are used in cases of risk-aversion.

A Game Theoretic Taxonomy of Social Dilemmas

Both social psychology and experimental economics empirically investigate social dilemmas. However, these two disciplines sometimes use different notions for very similar scenarios. While it is irrelevant for economists whether an experimental public-good game is conceptualised as a take-some or give-some game – i.e., whether something is conceptualised as produced or extracted – it is not irrelevant for some psychologists: they grasp public-goods games as “give-some” games. And whereas most economists define social dilemmas in reference to a taxonomy of goods, some psychologists think that dominant strategies are a necessary attribute. This paper presents a taxonomy that relies on a formal game-theoretic analysis of social dilemmas, which integrates and clarifies both approaches. Because this taxonomy focuses on the underlying incentive structure, it facilitates the evaluation of experimental results from both social psychology and experimental economics. Copyright Physica-Verlag 2006

Is there an optimization in bounded rationality? The ratio of aspiration levels

Simon’s (1955) famous paper was one of the first to cast doubt on the validity of rational choice theory; it has been supplemented by many more papers in the last three and a half decades. Nevertheless, rational choice theory plays a crucial role in classical and neoclassical economic theory, which presumes a completely rational agent. The central points characterizing such an agent are: (1) The agent uses all the information that is given to him. (2) The agent has clear preferences with respect to the results of different actions. (3) The agent has adequate competences to optimize his decisions. As an alternative to this conception, Simon (1955) himself suggests the concept of “bounded rationality”. In this context, Simon (1956) discusses a principle, which he names the “satisficing principle” (for explanations with respect to this notion cf. Gigerenzer & Todd 1999, p. 13). It assumes that, instead of searching for an optimal action, the search for an action terminates if an alternative has been found that satisfies a given “aspiration level”. It will be demonstrated that although the satisficing principle is nothing but a heuristic, there is a mathematical optimization at work when aspiration levels are used in this kind of problems. The question about the optimal aspiration level can be posed. Optimization within the framework of bounded rationality is possible. However, the way in which such an optimization can be achieved is very simple: Optimal thresholds in binary sequential decisions rest with the median.

The herd moves? Emergence and self-organization in collective actors

The puzzle about collective actors is in the focus of this contribution. The first section enters into the question of the adequateness and inadequateness of reductionist explanations for the description of entities. The considerations in this part do not draw on systems and hence not on principles of self-organisation, because this concept necessitates a systemic view. In other words, the first section discusses reductionism and holism on a very general level. The scope of these arguments goes far beyond self-organising systems. Pragmatically, these arguments will be discussed within the domain of corporative actors. Emergence is a concept embedded in system theory. Therefore, in the second part the previous general considerations about holism are integrated with respect to the concept “emergence”. In order to close the argument by exactly characterising self-organising systems and giving the conceptual link between self-organisation and emergence – which is done in the section four – the third section generally conceptualises systems. This conceptualisation is independent of whether these systems are self-organising or not. Feedback loops are specified as an essential component of systems. They establish the essential precondition of system-theoretic models where causes may also be effects and vice versa. System-theory is essential for dynamic models like ecological models and network thinking. In the fourth part mathematical chaos-theory bridges the gap between the presentation of systems in general and the constricted consideration of self-organising systems. The capability to behave or react chaotically is a necessary precondition of self-organisation. Nevertheless, there are striking differences in the answers given from theories of self-organisation in biology, economics or sociology on the question “What makes the whole more than the sum of its parts?” The fracture seems particularly salient at the borderline between formal-mathematical sciences like natural sciences including economy and other social sciences like sociology, for instance in the understanding and conceptualisation of “chaos” or “complexity”. Sometimes it creates the impression that originally well defined concepts from mathematics and natural science are metaphorically used in social sciences. This is a further reason why this paper concentrates on conceptualisations of self-organisation from natural sciences. The fifth part integrates the arguments from a system-theoretic point of view given in the three previous sections with respect to collective and corporative actors. Due to his prominence all five sections sometimes deal with the sociological system theory by Niklas Luhmann, especially in those parts with rigorous and important differences between his conception and the view given in this text. Despite Luhmann’s undoubted prominence in sociology, the present text strives for a more analytical and formal understanding of social systems and tries to find a base for another methodological approach.

Purchase Decisions with Non-Linear Pricing Options Under Risk - Experimental Evidence

We experimentally investigate purchase decisions with linear and non-linear pricing under risk. The experiment is based on a single period stochastic inventory problem with endogenous cost. It extends classic binary lottery experiments to test standard decision theoretic predictions concerning purchasing behavior in a rebate and a discount scheme. We investigate to what extent customers continue to purchase under two mathematically isomorph formats of nonlinear schemes even if switching to a linear pricing scheme is optimal. Our results indicate that rebate and discount schemes exert a significant attraction on customers. Given the increased role of non-linear pricing schemes, systematic deviations from optimal behaviour are an important element in the design of such schemes and may raise consumer protection and competition questions. We discuss how our results can be explained by decision heuristics.

Beware of Broken Windows! First Impressions in Public-Good Experiment

Broken Windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from un-disputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. In a series of lab experiments we put two components of the theory to the test. We show that first impressions and early punishment of antisocial behaviour are independently and jointly causal for cooperativeness. The effect of good first impressions and of early vigilance cannot be explained with, but adds to, participants’ initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong enough to maintain cooperation. Cooperation stabilizes if good first impressions are combined with some risk of sanctions. Yet if we control for first impressions, early vigilance only has a small effect. The effect vanishes over time.

The Social Dilemma of Climate Change: Socio-economic Implications

A social dilemma lies behind many environmental problems, such as climate change. Analytically separating temporal aspects from structural aspects of the environmental dilemma prevents wrong conclusions. This article concentrates solely on the structural aspects with different grades of complexity and different grades of ignorance in the dilemma. Dilemmas with sufficient complexity, such as climate change, and/or ignorance of the stakeholders are extremely vulnerable to individual defections. Therefore, governance is an absolute must and institutions are necessary. However, controls and sanctioning are key factors of institutions. Consequently, psychological approaches should not only target the individuals, but integrate in a multidisciplinary programme that focuses on governance tasks with respect to (1) the structural diagnosis of the social dilemma of climate change; (2) didactic instruments and methods that give addressees an insight into these structural problems; (3) the role of governance for the stakeholders on internalizing norms; and (4) the impact of structural knowledge on accepting institutions that help to solve the structural part of the sustainability problem. Psychological research in institutional ergonomics could help to create addressee-friendly governance, where the addressees know about the value and adequacy of certain restrictions for the sake of common welfare and sustainability.