Martin Beckstein

What does it take to be a true conservative

Is there any reason to discriminate among the rival claims self-proclaimed conservatives make for being truly conservative? This article argues that at least some of these claims can legitimately be dismissed by an independent third. Drawing on and critically interrogating the theories of conservatism provided by Huntington, Oakeshott, as well as Brennan and Hamlin, this article argues that many characterizations of conservatism mistake contingent circumstances explaining why people historically were or conceivably might be reluctant to promote social change for a fully formed conservative ideology. Not least, risk- and uncertainty-centered accounts, which have gained in popularity as of recently, constitute no viable basis for plausible claims to being truly conservative. Rather than specifying what it takes to be a true conservative, these accounts provide a formalized description of one kind of contingent circumstances that may lead a principled non-conservative to adopt conservative political attitudes.

The concept of a living tradition

Starting with Popper, social theorists across the board have acknowledged that traditions serve socially valuable functions. However, while traditions are usually understood as ‘living’ entities that come in overlapping varieties and evolve over time, the socially valuable functions attributed to tradition tend to presuppose invariability in ways of thinking and acting. Addressing this tension, this article provides a detailed analysis of the concept of tradition, and directs special attention to conceivable criteria for the authentic continuation of a tradition. It is argued that the ways of thinking and acting that constitute the material of a tradition must – among faithful members of that tradition – stand in a relation of equivalence – not identity or similarity. The implications of this account concern our ability to decide (normatively) conflicts over authenticity among rival tradition branches as well as the role that traditions play in policy-making.

Conservatism Between Theory and Practice: The Case of Migration to Europe

This paper explores the neglected relationship between conservatism as a political theory, and conservatism as political practice, using the example of recent immigration to Europe. A cursory glance at how European politicians have responded to migration challenges suggests that they roughly divide into a leftist ‘liberal’ and a rightist ‘conservative’ camp, between those that favour some form of an open-arms policy and those who prefer to close borders. The situation, however, is more complex. This article engages with the resources of conservative theory to argue that there are many distinct conservative-theoretical positions for any one policy point. Using contemporary migration patterns as a case-study, we suggest that Conservative parties have not borrowed much from conservative theory in its variety of incarnations. In fact, conservative theory can buttress a course of action that is generous toward migrants and at odds with the claims of right-wing populist movements. While certain strands of conservatism imagine a homogenous people, there are others that are no less propluralization than liberal theory, and sometimes more so.

Methodenpluralismus in der Politischen Ideengeschichte

Zusammenfassung: Methodenpluralismus in der Politischen Ideengeschichte Verschiedenartige Interpretationsansatze werden nicht nur von verschiedenen Vertreterinnen und Vertretern der Politischen Ideengeschichte verwendet, sondern auch in jeder einzelnen politikwissenschaftlichen Untersuchung, die Texte interpretiert. Durchaus fraglich ist, wie sich eine solche »eklektische« Forschungspraxis rechtfertigt, zumal sie zentrale Kriterien der Wissenschaftlichkeit wie insbesondere Transparenz und Konsistenz kaum zu gewahrleisten vermag. Der vorliegende Aufsatz argumentiert, dass methodenplurale Forschung keine Option, sondern unhintergehbare Realitat ist. Uber den Ruckgriff auf die philosophische Eklektik der deutschen Fruhaufklarung und den amerikanischen Pragmatismus wird eine Alternative zu einer im alltagssprachlichen Sinn eklektischen Forschungspraxis aufgezeigt, welche das Problem von theoretischen Spannungen nicht uberspielt und die bessere Uberprufbarkeit von Forschungsergebnissen ermoglicht. Summary: The Plurality of Methods in the History of Political Thought Different methods of interpretation are practiced not only by different historians of Political Thought, but also within each and every individual study in Political Science that in some way interprets texts. This »eclectic« practice might be reasonable, but so far it stands on shaky grounds, as it does not warrant the key values of scientific inquiry such as transparency and consistency. This article shows that there is actually no viable alternative to the selective combination of interpretive methods. However, there is a plausible way for coping with this problem: scholars should adopt a meta-methodological attitude that combines the virtues of the early Enlightenment tradition of philosophic eclecticism and American pragmatism.

Book Review: Political Theory: The Cambridge Companion to OakeshottThe Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott by PodoksikEfraim (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 386 pp., £19.99, ISBN 978 0 521 14792 7

These bare wrongings are harms despite the fact that Rationalism can make no sense of them being harmful without someone’s interest being affected by them. In Owens’ view, much of the social function of activities like promising and the value of friendship is determined by our need to shape the world we live in to fit our (non-Rationalistic) phenomenology of intentional agency. Crucial concepts in moral psychology and moral agency like ‘consent’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘obligation’ are examined in varying degrees of detail – although, at times, some views are more skeletal than others. The discussion of sexual consent and rape in Chapter 7, for example, lays out only the barest of theories about the nature of what ‘consent’ to sex might really be. This is a mere quibble, however. This is an original and challenging attempt to ground the nature of normativity, placed in the welcome contexts of (as Scanlon would say) what we owe to each other.

Book Review: Political Theory: The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott

These bare wrongings are harms despite the fact that Rationalism can make no sense of them being harmful without someone’s interest being affected by them. In Owens’ view, much of the social function of activities like promising and the value of friendship is determined by our need to shape the world we live in to fit our (non-Rationalistic) phenomenology of intentional agency. Crucial concepts in moral psychology and moral agency like ‘consent’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘obligation’ are examined in varying degrees of detail – although, at times, some views are more skeletal than others. The discussion of sexual consent and rape in Chapter 7, for example, lays out only the barest of theories about the nature of what ‘consent’ to sex might really be. This is a mere quibble, however. This is an original and challenging attempt to ground the nature of normativity, placed in the welcome contexts of (as Scanlon would say) what we owe to each other.

The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott by Efraim Podoksik (ed.). Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2011 . 386pp., £19.99, ISBN 978 0 521 14792 7

These bare wrongings are harms despite the fact that Rationalism can make no sense of them being harmful without someone’s interest being affected by them. In Owens’ view, much of the social function of activities like promising and the value of friendship is determined by our need to shape the world we live in to fit our (non-Rationalistic) phenomenology of intentional agency. Crucial concepts in moral psychology and moral agency like ‘consent’, ‘forgiveness’ and ‘obligation’ are examined in varying degrees of detail – although, at times, some views are more skeletal than others. The discussion of sexual consent and rape in Chapter 7, for example, lays out only the barest of theories about the nature of what ‘consent’ to sex might really be. This is a mere quibble, however. This is an original and challenging attempt to ground the nature of normativity, placed in the welcome contexts of (as Scanlon would say) what we owe to each other.