Martin Engel

Buttons, Boxes, Ticks, and Trust

Consumers shall be considerate and responsible, have the necessary information available and choose from a vast array of goods whatever best satisfies their needs. The ideal understanding of the European consumer relies on splendid supply and sound choice. Whereas the supply of goods and services in the Union as well as in most Member States is impressive, consumer choice in form of B2C contracts is a weak point. Sure enough, choosing contractual options and agreeing to proposed conditions has definitely become fancier in the digital age. Customers tick appealing boxes with green checkmarks and hit stylish buttons to plot a way through the conclusion of a contract. At the same time, choices have not become easier at all as traders and legislators have come to know how to expertly strike the keys of choice architecture. Thus, how much of contemporary consumer choice does in fact match the ideal of considerate and responsible decisions? Examining three examples of how relevant information is presented to consumers in order to contribute to their “empowerment”, we come to the conclusion that the current EU consumer policies fail, at least occasionally, to take into account key lessons that cognitive psychology and behavioural law and economics have taught us over the past decades. We conclude by giving an outline of how the current strategies could be amended so as to make them more effective towards the overall goals of consumer empowerment and consumer confidence.

Common Patterns of Consensual Conflict Resolution

Einvernehmliche Streitbeilegung gibt es seit Menschengedenken. In den letzten Jahren haben die Mediationsrichtlinie sowie zwei weitere Regulierungsvorschläge der Europäischen Union den Methoden alternativer Konfliktlösung neue Aufmerksamkeit beschert. Der Beitrag beleuchtet verschiedene Ordnungsmuster konsensualer Streitbeilegung, erörtert den gegenwärtigen Stand dieser Methoden in Europa und beschäftigt sich schließlich mit der Frage, welche Rolle der nationale Gesetzgeber bei der Förderung alternativer Streitbeilegung spielen sollte.

Das deutsche Glücksspielmonopol – Eine ordnungspolitische und rechtsökonomische Analyse

Abstract The article investigates the attempt by the German legislator to monopolize the national gambling market. Since January 2008, the new gambling treaty aims to organize the gambling market in a well-regulated manner as well as to reduce gambling addiction. An analysis of the market structure reveals that the treaty lacks a reasonable economic justification. Moreover, an empirical investigation of current market practices shows that the prohibition of online gambling has led to various monopoly avoidance strategies on the part of both the German gambling industry and gamblers themselves. Finally, the new regulation faces various legal challenges with respect to the EU Services Directive. The article proposes an alternative regulation, which may overcome the current economic and legal difficulties.