Martin J. Doherty

METALINGUISTIC AWARENESS AND THEORY OF MIND: JUST TWO WORDS FOR THE SAME THING?

Abstract Three- to 5-year-old children were tested on a traditional False Belief task, in which children have to predict where a protagonist will look for an unexpectedly moved object, and a new metalinguistic task. In this task children named an item (e.g., “rabbit”) and they had to monitor that another person used a synonym for naming the same item (e.g., “bunny”). Both tasks were mastered about the age of 4 years with a strong correlation between the two tasks that remained above .70 even after partialling out control measures and verbal intelligence. Moreover, younger childrens difficulties with the metalinguistic task did not extend to a control task of equivalent logical structure and complexity. A simplified version of the task in which children had to produce synonyms themselves yielded very similar results. The findings confirm that metalinguistic awareness can be demonstrated around 4 years and they support the theory that the ability to understand belief relates to the development of understanding representations.

Theory of mind finds its Piagetian perspective: why alternative naming comes with understanding belief

In the last of a series of experiments 48 3–5-year old children were tested on an alternative naming game with “synonyms,” e.g., if puppet calls the depicted item a “rabbit” the child has to call it a “bunny,” or the child has to judge puppet’s performance when roles are reversed. The game was also played with categories (rabbit–animal), name/colour (rabbit–black), colour/colour (black–white), and part/part (head–tail). The younger children (≤3.5 years) had severe problems with “synonyms” and categories (alternative names for the items, 80% correct). Children’s increasing success with age on the alternative names tasks was closely paralleled (.53 ≤ r ≤ .72) by their mastery of the false belief task in which they had to predict that a mistaken story character would look for a desired object in the wrong location. For explaining the synchrony between alternative naming and understanding false belief we draw on the Piagetian idea that children come to represent perspective at some point in their development. To apply this idea to the alternative naming game we draw on the philosophical discussion about sortals (terms that specify what sort of object something is) creating perspective differences.

Children's understanding of homonymy: metalinguistic awareness and false belief.

The aim of this study was to explain why children have difficulty with homonymy. Two experiments were conducted with forty-eight children (Experiment 1) and twenty-four children (Experiment 2). Three- and four-year-old children had to either select or judge another persons selection of a different object with the same name, avoiding identical objects and misnomers. Older children were successful, but despite possessing the necessary vocabulary, younger children failed these tasks. Understanding of homonymy was strongly and significantly associated to understanding of synonymy, and more importantly, understanding of false belief, even when verbal mental age, chronological age, and control measures were partialled out. This indicates that childrens ability to understand homonymy results from their ability to make a distinction characteristic of representation, a distinction fundamental to both metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind.

The control of attention to faces

Humans attend to faces. This study examines the extent to which attention biases to faces are under top-down control. In a visual cueing paradigm, observers responded faster to a target probe appearing in the location of a face cue than of a competing object cue (Experiments 1a and 2a). This effect could be reversed when faces were negatively predictive of the likely target location, making it beneficial to attend to the object cues (Experiments 1b and 2b). It was easier still to strategically shift attention to predictive face cues (Experiment 2c), indicating that the endogenous allocation of attention was augmented here by an additional effect. However, faces merely delayed the voluntary deployment of attention to object cues, but they could not prevent it, even at short cue-target intervals. This finding suggests that attention biases for faces can be rapidly countered by an observers endogenous control.

A New Look at Gaze:Preschool Children's Understanding of Eye-Direction

Abstract This study challenges the consensus view that children can judge what someone is looking at from infancy. In the first experiment 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were asked to judge what a person in a drawing was looking at and which of two people was “looking at” them. Only 6% of 2-year-olds and young 3-year-olds passed both gaze-direction tasks, but over 70% passed an analogous point-direction task. Most older 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds passed all three tasks. Experiment 2 compared childrens ability to judge what the experimenter was looking at with performance on the picture tasks. Three-year-olds performed significantly worse than 4-year-olds on the real life and picture gaze tasks. Performances on the two types of gaze task were highly correlated. Experiment 3 included stimuli with the additional cue of head-direction. Even the younger children performed well on these stimuli. These results suggest that, regardless of task format, children cannot judge what someone is looking at from eye-direction alone until the age of 3 years. Weaknesses in the evidence supporting the consensus view are highlighted and discussed.

The context-sensitivity of visual size perception varies across cultures

There is evidence that East Asian cultures have more context-sensitive styles of reasoning, memory, attention, and scene perception than Western cultures. Lower levels of the perceptual hierarchy seem likely to be similar in all cultures, however, so we compared context sensitivity in Japan with that in the UK using a rigorous psychophysical measure of the effects of centre – surround contrast on size discrimination. In both cultures context sensitivity was greater for females working in the social sciences than for males working in the mathematical sciences. More surprisingly, context sensitivity was also much greater in Japan than in the UK. These findings show that, even at low levels of the visual-processing hierarchy, context sensitivity varies across cultures, and they raise important issues for both vision scientists and cross-cultural psychologists.

The Rapid Development of Explicit Gaze Judgment Ability at 3 years.

Two studies examined development of the ability to judge what another person is looking at. In Study 1, 54 2- to 4-year-olds judged where someone was looking in real-life, photograph, and drawing formats. A minority of 2-year-olds, but a majority of older children, passed all tasks, suggesting that the ability arises at around 3 years of age. Study 2 examined the fine-grained gaze judgment of 76 3- to 6-year-olds and 15 adults using gaze differences of 10 degrees and 15 degrees . Development of gaze judgment was gradual, from chance at 3 years of age to near adult-level performance at 6 years of age. Although performance was better when a congruent head turn was included, 3-year-olds were still at chance on 10 degrees head turn trials. The findings suggest that the ability to explicitly judge gaze is novel at 3 years of age and develops slowly thereafter. Therefore, the ability does not develop out of earlier gaze following. General implications for the evolution and development of gaze processing are discussed.

Children's difficulty in learning homonyms.

Mazzocco (1997) claimed that children have persistent difficulty in learning pseudo-homonyms--words like rope used to refer to a novel object (e.g. spade). Because the novel objects were familiar, the pseudohomonyms in her study were also synonyms (i.e. rope and spade both now mean spade). The results could therefore be due to childrens well-known difficulties in learning synonyms. In Experiment 1, 55 six- to ten-year-olds used story context to select referents for pseudo-homonyms from picture sets containing the intended referents, with primary referents amongst the distractors. Children were equally poor when the intended referents were familiar (e.g. spade) as when they were unfamiliar (e.g. tapir)-35 and 38% correct, respectively. This indicates that familiarity of referent does not account for childrens difficulties. In Experiment 2, 64 five- to ten-year-olds received instruction about homonymy, then a story set without pictures of the primary referents, in order to make the experimenters intentions clear. Children were then shown one of the story sets from Experiment 1. Performance was just as poor (38% correct), indicating that misunderstanding of task demands did not account for failure. The conclusion is that Mazzoccos findings represent a psychologically interesting developmental difficulty.

The relation between hiding skill and judgment of eye direction in preschool children

This study examines J. H. Flavell, S. G. Shipstead, and K. Crofts (1978) finding that 2 1/2-year-old children can hide an object behind a screen but cannot achieve the same result by placing the screen in front of the object. Experiment 1 replicated this finding alongside a task in which children judged what a person in a picture was looking at. Performance on the move-object task approached ceiling; performances on the move-screen and looking-where tasks were highly correlated even after age and control task performance were partialed out (r = .54, p < .01). Experiment 2 examined whether the finding resulted because the object was more interesting to manipulate than the screen. The move-object task remained easier than the move-screen task with an interesting screen and a dull object. The move-screen task again correlated specifically with the looking-where task. Results are explained in terms of engagement, a precursor to a mature understanding of attention.

People don't keep their heads still when looking to one side, and other people can tell

Twenty pairs of photographs were made of adults looking 25° to the left and 25° to the right while attempting to face forwards. The eye regions of each photograph were concealed. Twenty adults attempted to sort each pair into left-looking and right-looking pictures. They were successful 65% of the time, p < 0.001. This suggests models have difficulty looking to one side without a perceptible head turn or comparable facial cue. This previously unrecognised phenomenon has implications for research on detection of gaze.