Martin Linster
Erasmus University Rotterdam
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Featured researches published by Martin Linster.
Science | 2012
Sander Herfst; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Martin Linster; Salin Chutinimitkul; Emmie de Wit; Vincent J. Munster; Erin M. Sorrell; Theo M. Bestebroer; David F. Burke; Derek J. Smith; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; Ron A. M. Fouchier
Avian flu can acquire the capacity for airborne transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus can cause morbidity and mortality in humans but thus far has not acquired the ability to be transmitted by aerosol or respiratory droplet (“airborne transmission”) between humans. To address the concern that the virus could acquire this ability under natural conditions, we genetically modified A/H5N1 virus by site-directed mutagenesis and subsequent serial passage in ferrets. The genetically modified A/H5N1 virus acquired mutations during passage in ferrets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible in ferrets. None of the recipient ferrets died after airborne infection with the mutant A/H5N1 viruses. Four amino acid substitutions in the host receptor-binding protein hemagglutinin, and one in the polymerase complex protein basic polymerase 2, were consistently present in airborne-transmitted viruses. The transmissible viruses were sensitive to the antiviral drug oseltamivir and reacted well with antisera raised against H5 influenza vaccine strains. Thus, avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses can acquire the capacity for airborne transmission between mammals without recombination in an intermediate host and therefore constitute a risk for human pandemic influenza.
Science | 2012
Colin A. Russell; Judith M. Fonville; André E. X. Brown; David F. Burke; David L. Smith; Sarah Linda James; Sander Herfst; Sander van Boheemen; Martin Linster; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Leah C. Katzelnick; Ana Mosterin; Thijs Kuiken; Eileen A. Maher; Gabriele Neumann; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; Yoshihiro Kawaoka; Ron A. M. Fouchier; Derek J. Smith
Some natural influenza viruses need only three amino acid substitutions to acquire airborne transmissibility between mammals. Avian A/H5N1 influenza viruses pose a pandemic threat. As few as five amino acid substitutions, or four with reassortment, might be sufficient for mammal-to-mammal transmission through respiratory droplets. From surveillance data, we found that two of these substitutions are common in A/H5N1 viruses, and thus, some viruses might require only three additional substitutions to become transmissible via respiratory droplets between mammals. We used a mathematical model of within-host virus evolution to study factors that could increase and decrease the probability of the remaining substitutions evolving after the virus has infected a mammalian host. These factors, combined with the presence of some of these substitutions in circulating strains, make a virus evolving in nature a potentially serious threat. These results highlight critical areas in which more data are needed for assessing, and potentially averting, this threat.
Nature | 2013
Mathilde Richard; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Miranda de Graaf; Theo M. Bestebroer; Monique I. Spronken; Sander van Boheemen; Dennis de Meulder; Pascal Lexmond; Martin Linster; Sander Herfst; Derek J. Smith; Judith M. A. van den Brand; David F. Burke; Thijs Kuiken; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; Ron A. M. Fouchier
Wild waterfowl form the main reservoir of influenza A viruses, from which transmission occurs directly or indirectly to various secondary hosts, including humans. Direct avian-to-human transmission has been observed for viruses of subtypes A(H5N1), A(H7N2), A(H7N3), A(H7N7), A(H9N2) and A(H10N7) upon human exposure to poultry, but a lack of sustained human-to-human transmission has prevented these viruses from causing new pandemics. Recently, avian A(H7N9) viruses were transmitted to humans, causing severe respiratory disease and deaths in China. Because transmission via respiratory droplets and aerosols (hereafter referred to as airborne transmission) is the main route for efficient transmission between humans, it is important to gain an insight into airborne transmission of the A(H7N9) virus. Here we show that although the A/Anhui/1/2013 A(H7N9) virus harbours determinants associated with human adaptation and transmissibility between mammals, its airborne transmissibility in ferrets is limited, and it is intermediate between that of typical human and avian influenza viruses. Multiple A(H7N9) virus genetic variants were transmitted. Upon ferret passage, variants with higher avian receptor binding, higher pH of fusion, and lower thermostability were selected, potentially resulting in reduced transmissibility. This A(H7N9) virus outbreak highlights the need for increased understanding of the determinants of efficient airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between mammals.
Cell | 2014
Martin Linster; Sander van Boheemen; Miranda de Graaf; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Pascal Lexmond; Benjamin Mänz; Theo M. Bestebroer; Jan Baumann; Debby van Riel; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; Mikhail Matrosovich; Ron A. M. Fouchier; Sander Herfst
Recently, A/H5N1 influenza viruses were shown to acquire airborne transmissibility between ferrets upon targeted mutagenesis and virus passage. The critical genetic changes in airborne A/Indonesia/5/05 were not yet identified. Here, five substitutions proved to be sufficient to determine this airborne transmission phenotype. Substitutions in PB1 and PB2 collectively caused enhanced transcription and virus replication. One substitution increased HA thermostability and lowered the pH of membrane fusion. Two substitutions independently changed HA binding preference from α2,3-linked to α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors. The loss of a glycosylation site in HA enhanced overall binding to receptors. The acquired substitutions emerged early during ferret passage as minor variants and became dominant rapidly. Identification of substitutions that are essential for airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between ferrets and their associated phenotypes advances our fundamental understanding of virus transmission and will increase the value of future surveillance programs and public health risk assessments.
Journal of Virology | 2012
Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Sander Herfst; Lonneke M. Leijten; Peter van Run; Theo M. Bestebroer; Martin Linster; Rogier Bodewes; Joost H. C. M. Kreijtz; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; Ron A. M. Fouchier; Thijs Kuiken; Debby van Riel
ABSTRACT The route by which highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus spreads systemically, including the central nervous system (CNS), is largely unknown in mammals. Especially, the olfactory route, which could be a route of entry into the CNS, has not been studied in detail. Although the multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in the hemagglutinin (HA) of HPAI H5N1 viruses is a major determinant of systemic spread in poultry, the association between the MBCS and systemic spread in mammals is less clear. Here we determined the virus distribution of HPAI H5N1 virus in ferrets in time and space—including along the olfactory route—and the role of the MBCS in systemic replication. Intranasal inoculation with wild-type H5N1 virus revealed extensive replication in the olfactory mucosa, from which it spread to the olfactory bulb and the rest of the CNS, including the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Virus spread to the heart, liver, pancreas, and colon was also detected, indicating hematogenous spread. Ferrets inoculated intranasally with H5N1 virus lacking an MBCS demonstrated respiratory tract infection only. In conclusion, HPAI H5N1 virus can spread systemically via two different routes, olfactory and hematogenous, in ferrets. This systemic spread was dependent on the presence of the MBCS in HA.
Virus Research | 2013
Masaki Imai; Sander Herfst; Erin M. Sorrell; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Martin Linster; M. De Graaf; Ron A. M. Fouchier; Yoshihiro Kawaoka
Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans and cause severe respiratory disease and fatalities. Currently, these viruses are not efficiently transmitted from person to person, although limited human-to-human transmission may have occurred. Nevertheless, further adaptation of avian H5N1 influenza A viruses to humans and/or reassortment with human influenza A viruses may result in aerosol transmissible viruses with pandemic potential. Although the full range of factors that modulate the transmission and replication of influenza A viruses in humans are not yet known, we are beginning to understand some of the molecular changes that may allow H5N1 influenza A viruses to transmit via aerosols or respiratory droplets among mammals. A better understanding of the biological basis and genetic determinants that confer transmissibility to H5N1 influenza A viruses in mammals is important to enhance our pandemic preparedness.
PLOS Pathogens | 2011
Erhard van der Vries; Edwin J.B. Veldhuis Kroeze; Koert J. Stittelaar; Martin Linster; Anne van der Linden; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; Lonneke M. Leijten; Geert van Amerongen; Martin Schutten; Thijs Kuiken; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; Ron A. M. Fouchier; Charles A. Boucher; Sander Herfst
Only two classes of antiviral drugs, neuraminidase inhibitors and adamantanes, are approved for prophylaxis and therapy against influenza virus infections. A major concern is that influenza virus becomes resistant to these antiviral drugs and spreads in the human population. The 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus is naturally resistant to adamantanes. Recently a novel neuraminidase I223R mutation was identified in an A/H1N1 virus showing cross-resistance to the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir, zanamivir and peramivir. However, the ability of this virus to cause disease and spread in the human population is unknown. Therefore, this clinical isolate (NL/2631-R223) was compared with a well-characterized reference virus (NL/602). In vitro experiments showed that NL/2631-I223R replicated as well as NL/602 in MDCK cells. In a ferret pathogenesis model, body weight loss was similar in animals inoculated with NL/2631-R223 or NL/602. In addition, pulmonary lesions were similar at day 4 post inoculation. However, at day 7 post inoculation, NL/2631-R223 caused milder pulmonary lesions and degree of alveolitis than NL/602. This indicated that the mutant virus was less pathogenic. Both NL/2631-R223 and a recombinant virus with a single I223R change (recNL/602-I223R), transmitted among ferrets by aerosols, despite observed attenuation of recNL/602-I223R in vitro. In conclusion, the I223R mutated virus isolate has comparable replicative ability and transmissibility, but lower pathogenicity than the reference virus based on these in vivo studies. This implies that the 2009 pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus subtype with an isoleucine to arginine change at position 223 in the neuraminidase has the potential to spread in the human population. It is important to be vigilant for this mutation in influenza surveillance and to continue efforts to increase the arsenal of antiviral drugs to combat influenza.
Veterinary Pathology | 2010
Sander Herfst; J.M.A. van den Brand; Eefje J. A. Schrauwen; E. de Wit; Vincent J. Munster; G. van Amerongen; Martin Linster; F. Zaaraoui; W. F. J. van Ijcken; Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus; R. A. M. Fouchier; A. Andeweg; Thijs Kuiken
The pathogenesis of lower respiratory tract disease from the pandemic 2009 H1N1 (H1N1v) influenza A virus is poorly understood. Therefore, either H1N1v virus or a seasonal human H1N1 influenza A virus was inoculated into cynomolgus macaques as a nonhuman primate model of influenza pneumonia, and virological, pathological, and microarray analyses were performed. Macaques in the H1N1v group had virus-associated diffuse alveolar damage involving both type I and type II alveolar epithelial cells and affecting an average of 16% of the lung area. In comparison, macaques in the seasonal H1N1 group had milder pulmonary lesions. H1N1v virus tended to be reisolated from more locations in the respiratory tract and at higher titers than seasonal H1N1 virus. In contrast, differential expression of messenger RNA transcripts between H1N1v and seasonal H1N1 groups did not show significant differences. The most upregulated genes in H1N1v lung samples with lesions belonged to the innate immune response and proinflammatory pathways and correlated with histopathological results. Our results demonstrate that the H1N1v virus infects alveolar epithelial cells and causes diffuse alveolar damage in a nonhuman primate model. Its higher pathogenicity compared with a seasonal H1N1 virus may be explained in part by higher replication in the lower respiratory tract.
Journal of Virology | 2015
Udayan Joseph; Martin Linster; Yuka Suzuki; Scott Krauss; Rebecca A. Halpin; Dhanasekaran Vijaykrishna; Thomas P. Fabrizio; Theo M. Bestebroer; Sebastian Maurer-Stroh; Richard J. Webby; David E. Wentworth; Ron A. M. Fouchier; Justin Bahl; Gavin J. D. Smith
ABSTRACT The 1957 A/H2N2 influenza virus caused an estimated 2 million fatalities during the pandemic. Since viruses of the H2 subtype continue to infect avian species and pigs, the threat of reintroduction into humans remains. To determine factors involved in the zoonotic origin of the 1957 pandemic, we performed analyses on genetic sequences of 175 newly sequenced human and avian H2N2 virus isolates and all publicly available influenza virus genomes.
Emerging Infectious Diseases | 2018
Eric D. Laing; Martin Linster; Dolyce H. W. Low; Yihui Chen; Lianying Yan; Spencer L. Sterling; Sophie Borthwick; Erica Sena Neves; Julia S. L. Lim; Maggie Skiles; Benjamin P. Y.-H. Lee; Lin-Fa Wang; Christopher C. Broder; Gavin J. D. Smith
To determine whether fruit bats in Singapore have been exposed to filoviruses, we screened 409 serum samples from bats of 3 species by using a multiplex assay that detects antibodies against filoviruses. Positive samples reacted with glycoproteins from Bundibugyo, Ebola, and Sudan viruses, indicating filovirus circulation among bats in Southeast Asia.