Martin Peterson

TRANSFORMATIVE DECISION RULES

A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Leviscondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.

On the application of rights‐based moral theories to siting controversies

In this paper we discuss how rights‐based moral theories can increase our understanding of siting controversies. It is argued that the notion of residual obligations can be used to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the individual right not to be exposed to involuntary risks arising from e.g. the establishment of a new industry, and the rights of industries and other large organizations to build plants that are associated with risks for people living nearby. Use is made of a typology of residual obligations according to which the types are obligations to compensate, to communicate, to improve, to search for knowledge, and to have an appropriate attitude. Each of these types of residual obligations can be shown to be relevant in siting controversies.

Rights, risks, and residual obligations

The notion of residual obligations can be used as a tool to overcome, at least in part, the conflict between the individuals prima facie right not to be exposed to involuntary risks, and the rights of industries and other large organisations to carry out activities that are associated with risks. A typology of residual obligations is developed, and it is applied in a discussion of the moral obligations of those who impose risks on others. The major types are obligations to compensate, to communicate, to improve, to search for knowledge, and to have an appropriate attitude. It is argued that conscientious compliance with risk-related residual obligations is an essential component of what makes it morally acceptable to expose others to risk.

The limits of catastrophe aversion

We discuss the management of catastrophe-risks from a theoretical point of view. The concept of a catastrophe is informally and formally defined, and a number of desiderata for catastrophe-averse decision rules are introduced. However, the proposed desiderata turn out to be mutually inconsistent. As a consequence of this result, it is argued that the rigid form of catastrophe aversion articulated by, for example, the maximin rule, the maximum probable loss rule, (some versions of) the precautionary principle, and the rule proposed in Ekenberg et al. (1997, 2000) should be given up. An alternative form of non-rigid catastrophe aversion is considered.

Equality AND priority

This article argues that, contrary to the received view, prioritarianism and egalitarianism are not jointly incompatible theories in normative ethics. By introducing a distinction between weighing and aggregating, the authors show that the seemingly conflicting intuitions underlying prioritarianism and egalitarianism are consistent. The upshot is a combined position, equality-prioritarianism, which takes both prioritarian and egalitarian considerations into account in a technically precise manner. On this view, the moral value of a distribution of well-being is a product of two factors: the sum of all individuals priority-adjusted well-being, and a measure of the equality of the distribution in question. Some implications of equality-prioritarianism are considered.

Risk, equality, and the priority view

This paper (i) reveals a conflict between equality and efficiency in societys risk management, and (ii) proposes a strategy for addressing it. According to the proposed strategy, the difference in risk levels faced by individuals is normatively irrelevant, even though the absolute level faced by an individual can sometimes motivate extra concern. It is shown that this position can be conceived of as a slight extension of Derek Parfits (1991 and 1997) much discussed priority view, from deterministic decisions to indeterministic ones.

From Outcomes to Acts : A Non-Standard Axiomatization of the Expected Utility Principle

This paper presents an axiomatization of the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the independence axiom or sure-thing principle. Perhaps more importantly the new axiomatization is based on an ex ante approach, instead of the standard ex post approach. An ex post approach utilizes the decision makers preferences among risky acts for generating a utility and a probability function, whereas in the ex ante approach a set of preferences among potential outcomes are on the input side of the theory and the decision makers preferences among risky acts on the output side.

Yes, The Precautionary Principle Is Incoherent: Invited Commentary

This article is a reply to Thomas Boyer-Kassems discussion of my criticism of the precautionary principle published in this journal about a decade ago. Boyer-Kassem does not question the logical validity of the theorem proved in my original article, but he brings up important questions about its scope. He also challenges the plausibility of some of the assumptions on which it is based. In this comment, I argue that each objection can be adequately dealt with. As a decision rule, the precautionary principle is (still) incoherent.

Order-Independent Transformative Decision Rules

A transformative decision rule alters the representation of a decision problem, either by changing the set of alternative acts or the set of states of the world taken into consideration, or by modifying the probability or value assignments. A set of transformative decision rules is order-independent in case the order in which the rules are applied is irrelevant. The main result of this paper is an axiomatic characterization of order-independent transformative decision rules, based on a single axiom. It is shown that the proposed axiomatization resolves a problem observed by Teddy Seidenfeld in a previous axiomatization by Peterson.

Transformative decision rules, permutability, and non-sequential framing of decision problems

The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing, or `problem specification, or `editing phase ofdecision making. In the present study we analyze a fundamentalaspect of transformative decision rules, viz. permutability. A setof transformative decision rules is, roughly put, permutable justin case it does not matter in which order the rules are applied.It is argued that in order to be normatively reasonable, sets oftransformative decision rules have to satisfy a number ofstructural conditions that together imply permutability. Thisformal result gives support to a non-sequential theory of framing,i.e., a theory which prescribes no uniform order in which differentsteps in the framing process have to be performed.