Martina Viarengo

The Expansion and Convergence of Compulsory Schooling in Western Europe, 1950–2000

This paper examines the expansion of compulsory schooling in fifteen Western European countries over 1950–2000. We show that a convergence process has occurred across these countries since 1950. We argue that the major driver of this phenomenon is the existence of decreasing aggregate returns to education that have limited the extension of compulsory schooling. Then we test whether convergence holds when confronted with other explanations described in the literature. Conditional convergence does hold and we find that openness has been another significant determinant of compulsory years of schooling, reflecting the need of a skilled labour force in an increasingly globalized world.

Colonial Institutions, Trade Shocks, and the Diffusion of Elementary Education in Brazil, 1889-1930

Brazil at the turn of the twentieth century offers an interesting puzzle. Among the large economies in the Americas it had the lowest level of literacy in 1890, but by 1940 the country had surpassed most of its peers in terms of literacy and had done a significant improvement of its education system. All of this happened in spite of the fact that the Constitution of 1891 included a literacy requirement to vote and gave states the responsibility to spend on education. That is to say, Brazilian states had a significant improvement in education levels and a significant increase in expenditures on education per capita despite having institutions that limited political participation for the masses (Lindert, 2004; Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2009) and having one of the worst colonial institutional legacies of the Americas (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robison, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; and Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002). This paper explains how state governments got the funds to pay for education and examines the incentives that politicians had to spend on education between 1889 to 1930. Our findings are threefold. First, we show that the Constitution of 1891, which decentralized education and allowed states to collect export taxes to finance expenditures, rendered states with higher windfall tax revenues from the export of commodities to spend more on education per capita. Second, we prove that colonial institutions constrained the financing of education, but that nonetheless the net effect of the increase in commodity exports always led to a net increase in education expenditures. Finally, we argue that political competition after 1891 led politicians to spend on education, Since only literate adults could vote, we show that increases in expenditures (and increases in revenues from export taxes) led to increases in the number of voters at the state level.In this paper, we examine the role of trade shocks in promoting the diffusion of elementary education in subnational units in Brazil during a period (1889-1930) in which they had relative financial autonomy to collect export taxes and spend on public goods. The argument is that trade shocks affect asymetrically the tax revenues of state governments and, thus, their expenditures on elementary education per capita according to what crop mix they had. We then show that states with more egalitarian and democratic institutions use positive trade shocks to invest in education, while the opposite takes place in states with less democratic institutions (e.g., in states that had more slaves). We also show using OLS and instrumental variables that positive trade shocks increased expenditures on education per capita and led to higher literacy rates and to more schools per children. The resulting distribution of human capital across states persists until today.

The State, Socialization, and Private Schooling: When Will Governments Support Alternative Producers?

Abstract Understanding the institutional features that can improve learning outcomes and reduce inequality is a top priority for international and development organisations around the world. Economists appear to have a good case for support to non-governmental alternatives as suppliers of schooling. However, unlike other policy domains, freer international trade or privatisation, economists have been remarkably unsuccessful in promoting the adoption of this idea. We develop a general positive model of why governments typically produce schooling which introduces the key notion of the lack of verifiability of socialisation and instruction of beliefs, which makes third party contracting for socialisation problematic. We use the model to explain variations around the world in levels of private schooling. We also predict the circumstances in which efforts to promote the different alternatives to government production – like charter, voucher, and scholarship – are likely to be successful.

Closing the Gender Gap in Education: Does it Foretell the Closing of the Employment, Marriage, and Motherhood Gaps?

In this paper we examine several dimensions of gender disparity for a sample of 40 countries using micro-level data. We start by documenting the reversal of the gender education gap and ranking countries by the year in which it reversed. Then we turn to an analysis of the state of other gaps facing women: we compare men and women’s labor force participation (the labor force participation gap), married and single women’s labor force participation (the marriage gap), and mothers’ and non-mother’s labor force participation (the motherhood gap). We show that gaps still exist in these spheres in many countries, though there is significant heterogeneity among countries in terms of the size of and the speed at which these gaps are changing. We also show the relationship between the gaps and ask how much the participation gap would be reduced if the gaps in other spheres were eliminated. In general, we show that while there seems to be a relationship between the decline of the education gap and the reduction of the other gaps, the link is rather weak and highly heterogeneous across countries.

Marriage, education and assortative mating in Latin America

In this article, we establish facts related to marriage and education in Latin American countries. Using census data from IPUMS International, we show how marriage and assortative mating patterns have changed from 1980 to 2000 and how the patterns in Latin America compare to the United States. We find that in Latin American countries, highly educated individuals are less likely to be married than the less educated, and the pattern is stronger for women. We also show that while it has been increasing over time, there is less positive assortative mating in Latin America than in the United States.

Does Public Sector Control Reduce Variance in School Quality

Does the government control of school systems facilitate equality in school quality? Whether centralized or localized control produces more equality depends not only on what ‘could’ happen in principle, but also on what does happen in practice. We use the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) database to examine the association between school sector and the variance in school fixed effects. We find, on average, the same inequality in adjusted learning achievement across the private and public schools. However, in some countries, such as Denmark, there is more equality across the public sector schools, while in others, such as Mexico, there is more equality across the private schools. Among the 18 non-OECD countries, the standard deviation across schools in adjusted quality is, on average, 36% higher in government schools. Our findings suggest that top-down educational systems in weak states can be lose-lose relative to localized systems relying on bottom-up control, producing both worse average performance and higher inequality.

The effect of opposite sex siblings on cognitive and noncognitive skills in early childhood

ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of having opposite sex siblings on cognitive and noncognitive skills of children in the United States at the onset of formal education. Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that, conditional on covariates, the sibling sex composition of the two firstborn children in a family is arguably exogenous. With regard to cognitive skills, learning skills and self-control measured in kindergarten, we find that boys benefit from having a sister, while there is no effect for girls. We also find evidence for the effect fading out as early as first grade.

The Illusion of Equality: The Educational Consequences of Blinding Weak States, for Example

Does the government control of school systems facilitate equality in school quality? There is a trade-off. On the one hand, government direct control of schools, typically through a large scale hierarchical organization, could produce equalization across schools by providing uniformity in inputs, standards, and teacher qualifications that localized individually managed schools could not achieve. But there is a tendency for large scale formal bureaucracies to “see” less and less of localized reality and hence to manage on the basis of a few simple, objective, and easily administratively verified characteristics (e.g. resources per student, formal teacher qualifications). Whether centralized or localized control produces more equality depends therefore not only on what “could” happen in principle but what does happen in practice. When government implementation capacity is weak, centralized control could lead to only the illusion of equality: in which central control of education with weak internal or external accountability actually allows for much greater inequalities across schools than entirely “uncontrolled” local schools. Data from Pakistan, using results from the LEAPS study, and from two states of India show much larger variance in school quality (adjusted for student characteristics) among the government schools—because of very poor public schools which continue in operation. We use the PISA data to estimate school specific learning achievement (in mathematics, science, and reading) net of individual student and school average background characteristics and compare public and private schools for 34 countries. For these countries there is, on average, exactly the same inequality in adjusted learning achievement across the private schools as across the public schools. But while inequality is the same on average, in some countries, such as Denmark, there was much more equality within the public sector while in others, such as Mexico, there was much more inequality among the public schools. Among the 18 non-OECD participating PISA countries the standard deviation across schools in adjusted quality was, on average, 36 percent higher in government than in private schools. In cases with weak states the proximate cause of high inequality again was that the public sector distribution of performance had a long left tail—schools with extremely poor performance. Relying on blinded weak states for top-down control of educational systems can be lose-lose relative to localized systems relying on bottom-up control—producing worse average performance and higher inequality.

Schools and the equal opportunity problem

compare results derived from samples of different size (see Daraio and Simar 2005). This is a promising area for a development of the literature, with the aim to obtain more precise measures about productivity of universities. Within this context, the book also illustrates how to include the consideration of the impact of external factors on efficiency. The basic idea, illustrated in Chapter Five, is to explain how efficiency differentials are actually influenced by external factors (such as socio-economic conditions of the areas in which universities are located, institutional characteristics, etc.). The authors developed a simple indicator of efficiency called ‘conditional efficiency measure’, and they compare this measure with the ‘unconditional’ score. The ratio between the two scores generates an indicator of the impact of external factors on efficiency. This approach overcomes some problems of the literature. Indeed, the traditional approach followed by several researchers was to apply one-stage or twostage approaches, by regressing efficiency scores on external variables; but the methodological research showed that this approach is often inconsistent (see Simar and Wilson 2007). Thus, the development of alternative approaches to include the effects of exogenous variables on efficiency and productivity represents an interesting area with numerous potential implications from an empirical point of view, also by reviewing results obtained by previous research. At the end, my opinion is that this book not only presents a wide and complete report of an extensive research effort, but also opens new directions for future research advancements in this field, that is very relevant both from theoretical considerations and policy-making implications.