Martina Wiltschko

On the Syntax and Semantics of (Relative) Pronouns and Determiners

This paper addresses two related problems. The major empirical problem concerns the difference between two pronominal forms found in German: personal pronouns and so-called d-pronouns, which are also used as relative pronouns. The major theoretical question concerns the nature of relative pronouns in general. I will argue that d-pronouns are definite determiners, i.e., full Determiner Phrases (DPs) containing an empty NP whereas personal pronouns are merely the spell out of phi features (AgrD) not containing an NP-projection. This will allow us to account for the distributional differences between the two forms. In addition, I will argue for a restriction on Operator-variable chains that will derive the fact that only d-words but not personal pronouns can be used as relative pronouns in a language that makes use of the A′-movement strategy for relativization. It will also follow that relativization without A′-movement is possible with either a personal pronoun or a gap occupying the relativized position.

On the interpretability of tense on D and its consequences for case theory

Abstract Pesetsky and Torrego (Pesetsky, D., Torrego, E., 2001. T-to-C movement: causes and consequences. In: Kenstowicz, M. (Ed.), Ken Hale: A Life in Language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) argue that in English T on D is [−interpretable] and this has the effect of structural case assignment. I propose that in Halkomelem Salish T on D is [+interpretable]. This proposal accounts for several properties of Halkomelem: i) nouns can bear tense marking, which manipulates the temporal interpretation of nouns, ii) there is no TP and iii) there is no nominative case. The value of interpretability of a given feature can thus be viewed as an important locus of parametrization.

The person hierarchy: Primitive or epiphenomenal? Evidence from Halkomelem Salish

There are two apparent person-hierarchy effects in Halkomelem Salish discussed in this paper: split ergativity, and person based gaps in the transitive paradigm. Aissen (1999) argues that Optimality Theory (OT) can be used to account for these person hierarchy effects. Since OT is a formal theory of markedness, it should naturally account for markedness effects that result from the person hierarchy. In Aissen’s account, Silverstein and Dixon’s intuition is formalized by means of harmonic alignment between different hierarchies (Prince and Smolensky 1993). Thus, the hierarchies in (1) and (2) are primitives in an OT account.

Animating the narrow syntax

Abstract In this paper we demonstrate that there are two related, but distinct types of animacy in the Plains Algonquian language, Blackfoot – morphological animacy (m-animacy) and high animacy (H-animacy). We argue that the two types of animacy are constructed in different ways: M-animacy is a head feature that determines noun class and plays a role in syntactic agreement operations, whereas H-animacy is a selectable feature of arguments. The two kinds of animacy also have different distributions: Only languages that have animacy-based form classes have m-animate nominals, but H-animate nominals are universal because all languages have predicates that select for high animates. We discuss empirical differences between m-animate and H-animate nominals that are intended to serve as diagnostics for the exploration of animacy in other languages.

‐exw as Third‐Person Object Agreement in Halkomelem1

This paper looks at the distribution of Halkomelem ‐exw, which occurs on certain transitive suffixes in certain environments (i.e., with third‐person objects). Two analyses are compared: (i) ‐exw can be analyzed as being part of some transitive suffixes (lexw and stexw) or (ii) ‐exw can be analyzed as a third‐person object agreement suffix. On the basis of empirical evidence having to do with passive and reflexive morphology, I argue that we should analyze ‐exw as a third‐person object agreement suffix. This analysis implies that Halkomelem should not be analyzed as a split ergative language, given that third‐person intransitive subject agreement does not pattern with third‐person object agreement.

Intonation and Particles as Speech Act Modifiers: A Syntactic Analysis

Abstract This study investigates how discourse particles and intonation contribute to the modification of speech act. In particular, it focuses on the interplay between the speaker’s and the addressee’s commitment toward the proposition in assertions, biased questions, and requests for confirmation. A syntactic analysis is proposed, in which speaker commitment and call on addressee are represented as two functional projections of the speech act structure. Data from nontonal (Canadian English) and tonal languages (Cantonese and Medumba) are analyzed for cross-linguistic comparison. In Canadian English, the particle “eh” and rising intonation are associated with speaker commitment and call on addressee, respectively. In Cantonese, a single particle associates with these. In Medumba, the two positions are occupied by two distinct particles. This neo-performative approach toward speech act structure differs from Ross’s 1970 original insight by positing a high functional layer called grounding, rather than a higher matrix clause of the familiar type.

Reflexives in Upriver Halkomelem

For sentences where the object is coreferent with the subject of the clause (i.e., reflexive sentences), Upriver Halkomelem uses either a special reflexive suffix or the regular object suffix. Given what we know about the distribution of dedicated reflexive forms, the Upriver Halkomelem pattern is unexpected. In this paper, I argue that the special reflexive forms of Upriver Halkomelem are lexicalized and, as a consequence, they cannot block the occurrence of regular object suffixes in a reflexive environment. With this analysis, many of the special properties of Upriver Halkomelem reflexives fall out without further stipulation. Finally, I argue that the apparent “reflexive” use of the “intransitive” suffix (-em) in Upriver Halkomelem derives from the syntax of inalienable possession.