Martyn Pickersgill

The social life of the brain: Neuroscience in society

Neuroscience is viewed by a range of actors and institutions as a powerful means of creating new knowledge about our selves and societies. This article documents the shifts in expertise and identities potentially being propelled by neuroscientific research. It details the framing and effects of neuroscience within several social domains, including education and mental health, discussing some of the intellectual and professional projects it has animated therein (such as neuroethics). The analysis attends to the cultural logics by which the brain is sometimes made salient in society; simultaneously, it points towards some of parameters of the territory within which the social life of the brain plays out. Instances of societal resistance and agnosticism are discussed, which may render problematic sociological research on neuroscience in society that assumes the universal import of neuroscientific knowledge (as either an object of celebration or critique). This article concludes with reflections on how sociotechnical novelty is produced and ascribed, and the implications of this.

Mapping the New Molecular Landscape: Social Dimensions of Epigenetics

Epigenetics is the study of changes in gene expression caused by mechanisms other than changes in the DNA itself. The field is rapidly growing and being widely promoted, attracting attention in diverse arenas. These include those of the social sciences, where some researchers have been encouraged by the resonance between imaginaries of development within epigenetics and social theory. Yet, sustained attention from science and technology studies (STS) scholars to epigenetics and the praxis it propels has been lacking. In this article, we reflexively consider some of the ways in which epigenetics is being constructed as an area of biomedical novelty and discuss the content and logics underlying the ambivalent promises being made by scientists working in this area. We then reflect on the scope, limits and future of engagements between epigenetics and the social sciences. Our discussion is situated within wider literatures on biomedicine and society, the politics of “interventionist STS”, and on the problems of “caseness” within empirical social science.

The Co-production of Science, Ethics, and Emotion

The concept of “ethical research” holds considerable sway over the ways in which contemporary biomedical, natural, and social science investigations are funded, regulated, and practiced within a variety of countries. Some commentators have viewed this “new” means of governance positively; others, however, have been resoundingly critical, regarding it as restrictive and ethics bodies and regulations unfit for the task they have been set (or have set themselves). Regardless, it is clear that science today is an “ethical” business. The ways in which formal and informal ethical discourses and practices—what might be called “regimes of normativity”—structure scientific work and the meanings it is ascribed with have, however, been underexplored. This article attends to how science and ethics articulate; how they are, in many ways, co-produced. Exploring these processes of co-production casts into sharp relief the essential emotionality of science; the relationships investigators have with their colleagues, work, and research participants pulse with emotion, potentially shaping in important ways the very kinds of knowledge that laboratories produce.

Mapping the New Molecular Landscape

Epigenetics is the study of changes in gene expression caused by mechanisms other than changes in the DNA itself. The field is rapidly growing and being widely promoted, attracting attention in diverse arenas. These include those of the social sciences, where some researchers have been encouraged by the resonance between imaginaries of development within epigenetics and social theory. Yet, sustained attention from science and technology studies (STS) scholars to epigenetics and the praxis it propels has been lacking. In this article, we reflexively consider some of the ways in which epigenetics is being constructed as an area of biomedical novelty and discuss the content and logics underlying the ambivalent promises being made by scientists working in this area. We then reflect on the scope, limits and future of engagements between epigenetics and the social sciences. Our discussion is situated within wider literatures on biomedicine and society, the politics of “interventionist STS”, and on the problems of “caseness” within empirical social science.

Connecting neuroscience and law: anticipatory discourse and the role of sociotechnical imaginaries

In recent years, attempts have increasingly been made to connect neuroscience and law. Scientists and lawyers are imagining and actively fostering the realization of futures in which neuroscience will play a prominent role in the activity of courts. In this article I take these debates as my empirical object. I trace the emergence of neurolegal discourse, explore its focus on free will and lie detection, and show how expectations about the potential role neuroscience might play in the law are being embedded in new research programs and funding streams. In so doing, I analyze the role of particular “sociotechnical imaginaries” in stimulating, directing and restricting neurolegal discourse and highlight the ways in which new visions of law, science and scientists are produced in the process. Sociotechnical imaginaries are shown to be salient in structuring anticipatory discourse, and represent a key target for social scientific intervention in such debates.

Debating DSM-5: diagnosis and the sociology of critique

The development of the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—the DSM-5—has reenergised and driven further forward critical discourse about the place and role of diagnosis in mental health. The DSM-5 has attracted considerable criticism, not least about its role in processes of medicalisation. This paper suggests the need for a sociology of psychiatric critique. Sociological analysis can help map fields of contention, and cast fresh light on the assumptions and nuances of debate around the DSM-5; it underscores the importance of diagnosis to the governance of social and clinical life, as well as the wider discourses critical commentaries connect with and are activated by. More normatively, a sociology of critique can indicate which interests and values are structuring the dialogues being articulated, and just how diverse clinical opinion regarding the DSM can actually be. This has implications for the considerations of health services and policy decision-makers who might look to such debates for guidance.

Ordering Disorder: Knowledge Production and Uncertainty in Neuroscience Research

What is mental disorder and how can it be identified? These are complex and multifaceted questions, given the multiple ambiguities that centre on the psychopathological concepts employed within contemporary psychiatry and psychology. Yet, scientists investigating mental disorders must successfully resolve these uncertainties if research is to continue. For neuroscientists studying the contested conditions antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, psychiatric and psychological classifications and concepts are used to substantiate one another. This co-produces epistemological and ontological un/certainties, without wholly resolving philosophical and methodological questions regarding what mental disorders are and how they can be recognised. Indeed, these ambiguities are rendered (relatively) unimportant. This kind of practical uncertainty work is thus an important aspect of the investigative process, performing an essential role in the continuation of scientific knowledge production, the legitimation of professional orientations, and the validation of psychopathological concepts.

The changing brain: Neuroscience and the enduring import of everyday experience

Discourses of ‘neuroplasticity’ have become increasingly apparent in the neurosciences and wider society. These connect with broader narratives about the ‘changing brain’ throughout the life-course. Here, we explore their presence in the talk of a range of publics. Their presence is indicative of how novel neuroscience is accepted, or not, by our participants. In particular, we suggest that any acceptance of the science relates to their personal and/or professional experiences of change (to their own or others’ subjectivities) rather than to some intrinsic and widely-held significance of scientific concepts per se. Accordingly, we also submit that it is in part through the congruence of some neuroscientific claims to everyday experiences and perspectives that the former are rendered legible and salient. In this respect, ‘lay’ knowledge has considerable import for the wider cultural authorisation of that of ‘experts’.

From psyche to soma? Changing accounts of antisocial personality disorders in the American Journal of Psychiatry

The history of psychiatry is often portrayed through the metaphor of a pendulum, the profession swinging back and forth between a concern with psyche and soma. Recent work critiquing the pendulum metaphor, however, suggests that it does not account for the complexity of psychiatry.This article explores the metaphor through an analysis of the changing aetiological accounts of personality disorders associated with antisocial behaviour advanced in the American Journal of Psychiatry from 1950 onwards. It is argued that the social, scientific and economic factors which help shape overarching professional trends in psychiatry only partly structure personality disorder discourse. If the pendulum swings, therefore, not all psychiatrists move with it.

What is psychiatry? Co-producing complexity in mental health

What is psychiatry? Such a question is increasingly important to engage with in light of the development of new diagnostic frameworks that have wide-ranging and international clinical and societal implications. I suggest in this reflective essay that ‘psychiatry’ is not a singular entity that enjoins consistent forms of critique along familiar axes; rather, it is a heterogeneous assemblage of interacting material and symbolic elements (some of which endure, and some of which are subject to innovation). In underscoring the diversity of psychiatry, I seek to move towards further sociological purchase on what remains a contested and influential set of discourses and practices. This approach foregrounds the relationships between scientific knowledge, biomedical institutions, social action and subjective experience; these articulations co-produce both psychiatry and each other. One corollary of this emphasis on multiplicity and incoherence within psychiatric theory, research and practice, is that critiques which elide this complexity are rendered problematic. Engagements with psychiatry are, I argue, best furthered by recognising its multifaceted nature.