Marvin Miller

Detecting nuclear warheads

In the absence of shielding, “ordinary” nuclear weapons—those containing kilogram quantities of ordinary weapon‐grade (6 percent plutonium‐240) plutonium or uranium‐238—can be detected by neutron or gamma counters at a distance of tens of meters. Objects such as missile canisters can be radiographed with high‐energy x‐rays to reveal the presence of the dense fissile core of any type of nuclear warhead, or the radiation shielding that might conceal a warhead. If subjected to neutron irradiation, the fissile core of any type of unshielded warhead can also be detected by the emission of prompt‐or delayed‐fission neutrons at a distance on the order of 10 meters.

Disposition of Separated Plutonium

In the immediate term, plutonium, recovered from dismantled nuclear warheads and from civil reprocessing plants, will have to be stored securely, and under international safeguards if possible. In the intermediate term, the principal alternatives for disposition of this plutonium are: irradiation in mixed‐oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies in commercial unmodified light‐water reactors or in specially adapted light‐water reactors capable of operating with full cores of MOX fuel or incorporation into a matrix with high‐level waste (HLW). Of these three options, blending plutonium into HLW as it is being glassified for final disposal is probably the least costly and the least burdensome to safeguards resources.

Nuclear Power and Energy Security: A Revised Strategy for Japan

SUMMARY During the period of nuclear power’s rapid growth, shared assumptions regarding uranium resources and technological capabilities led the majority of industrial nations to remarkably similar strategies for nuclear power deployment. These common assumptions motivated the choice, more than 40 years ago, of the Light Water Reactor (LWR) as the near-term power reactor, to be followed, as soon as possible, by the introduction and deployment of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR). The FBR, which uses much less uranium than an LWR of the same capacity, was a crucial part of the strategy because uranium was then believed to be a scarce resource. This strategy, based on the LWR producing the startup fuel for the FBR, implicitly included spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium recycle, and disposal of separated wastes in geologic repositories. Nations with limited indigenous energy reserves, most notably France and Japan, made particularly strong commitments to this strategy. This article was originally presented as a paper at the PARES Workshop: Energy Secu

A CUTOFF IN THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is now considering a convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons. While the UN General Assembly has consistently supported resolutions calling for such a cutoff since 1978, the recent discussions are principally the result of a proposal by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, for a {open_quotes}multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} ({open_quotes}International safeguards{close_quotes} refers to verification measures by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to assure that nuclear material is not being used for weapons or other explosive purposes.) Such a convention would allow states which already have stocks of unsafeguarded fissile material to maintain them outside of safeguards, but it would allow future production of fissile material only if the material is safeguarded. The authors examine five points in order to better define some poorly understood technical and political issues: (1) the proper scope of a cutoff convention; (2) weapons stockpiles and requirements in the affected states; (3) effective verification; (4) cost-benefit analysis; and (5) how to prevent competition with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 75 refs., 1 tab.

Nuclear Shadows in the Middle East: Prospects for Arms Control in the Wake of the Gulf Crisis

* This paper was originally written in June 1990 and substantially rewritten in November-December 1990. It has not been revised since.

Uranium enrichment and heavy water production

Estimates of demand for uranium enrichment and heavy water for use in nuclear fuel cycles in countries outside the centrally planned economies are balanced against current and planned additions to the capacity for these services. The demand estimates are based on recent OECD projections of nuclear power growth to the year 2025 and the possible mix of reactor types. Past experience indicates that such projections should be viewed with caution. However, a robust conclusion is that the expansion of nuclear power worldwide need not be constrained by a lack of capacity for either uranium enrichment or heavy-water production. The competition between current suppliers, as well as the desire on the part of several other countries to achieve an independent enrichment capability, will spur the development of advanced enrichment technologies. Based on studies to date, it appears that it will be possible to develop acceptable procedures for the efficient safeguarding of enrichment plants. Thus, from the proliferation perspective, the spread of a technology is probably a greater risk than the existence of a safeguarded commercial plant based on that technology. This argues for continued efforts to restrict access, particularly in the case of technologies that may be amenable to production of highly enriched uranium on a relatively small scale.