Mary A. Peterson

A Century of Gestalt Psychology in Visual Perception I. Perceptual Grouping and Figure-Ground Organization

In 1912, Max Wertheimer published his paper on phi motion, widely recognized as the start of Gestalt psychology. Because of its continued relevance in modern psychology, this centennial anniversary is an excellent opportunity to take stock of what Gestalt psychology has offered and how it has changed since its inception. We first introduce the key findings and ideas in the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology, and then briefly sketch its development, rise, and fall. Next, we discuss its empirical and conceptual problems, and indicate how they are addressed in contemporary research on perceptual grouping and figure-ground organization. In particular, we review the principles of grouping, both classical (e.g., proximity, similarity, common fate, good continuation, closure, symmetry, parallelism) and new (e.g., synchrony, common region, element and uniform connectedness), and their role in contour integration and completion. We then review classic and new image-based principles of figure-ground organization, how it is influenced by past experience and attention, and how it relates to shape and depth perception. After an integrated review of the neural mechanisms involved in contour grouping, border ownership, and figure-ground perception, we conclude by evaluating what modern vision science has offered compared to traditional Gestalt psychology, whether we can speak of a Gestalt revival, and where the remaining limitations and challenges lie. A better integration of this research tradition with the rest of vision science requires further progress regarding the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the Gestalt approach, which is the focus of a second review article.

Implicit memory for possible and impossible objects: constraints on the construction of structural descriptions

Four experiments examined implicit memory or priming effects on an object decision task in which subjects decided whether structurally possible or impossible novel objects could exist in three-dimensional form. Results revealed equivalent levels of priming for possible objects after 1 vs. 4 5-s exposures to the same structural encoding task (Experiment 1) and when objects were studied with a single structural encoding task or 2 different structural encoding tasks (Experiment 3). Explicit memory, by contrast, was greatly affected by both manipulations. However, priming of possible objects was not observed when Ss were given only a single 1-s exposure to perform a structural encoding task (Experiment 2). No evidence for priming of impossible objects was observed in any of the 4 experiments. The data suggest that object decision priming depends on a presemantic structural description system that is distinct from episodic memory.

Must Figure-Ground Organization Precede Object Recognition? An Assumption in Peril

The assumption that figure-ground segmentation must precede object or shape recognition has been central to theories of visual perception We showed that assumption to be incorrect in an experiment in which observers reported the first perceived figure-ground organization of briefly exposed stimuli depicting two regions sharing a figure-ground border We manipulated the symmetry of the two regions and their orientation-dependent denotivity (roughly, their meaningfulness), and measured how each of these variables influenced figure-ground reports when the stimuli were exposed for 14, 28, 57, 86, or 100 ms, and followed immediately by a mask Influences on figure-ground organization from both symmetry and orientation-dependent object recognition processes were found, both were observed first in the 28-ms condition Object recognition inputs did not dominate symmetry inputs We suggest that object recognition processes may operate simultaneously on both sides of edges detected before figure-ground relationships are determined

Object recognition contributions to figure-ground organization: Operations on outlines and subjective contours

In previous research, replicated here, we found that some object recognition processes influence figure-ground organization. We have proposed that these object recognition processes operate on edges (or contours)detected early in visual processing, rather than on regions. Consistent with this proposal, influences from object recognition on figure-ground organization were previously observed in both pictures and stereograms depicting regions of different luminance, but not in randomdot stereograms, where edges arise late in processing (Peterson & Gibson, 1993). In the present experiments, we examined whether or not two other types of contours—outlines and subjective contours—enable object recognition influences on figure-ground organization. For both types of contours we observed a pattern of effects similar to that originally obtained with luminance edges. The results of these experiments are valuable for distinguishing between alternative views of the mechanisms mediating object recognition influences on figure-ground organization. In addition, in both Experiments 1 and 2, fixated regions were seen as figure longer than nonfixated regions, suggesting that fixation location must be included among the variables relevant to figure-ground organization.

Shape Recognition Inputs To Figure-Ground Organization in Three-Dimensional Displays

It is generally agreed that figure and ground relationships must be determined, at least provisionally, before shape representations can be assessed. We have proposed that some shape recognition processes can operate in parallel with processes assessing other variables relevant to figure-ground organization. The influence of these shape recognition processes should be observed only when shape edges can be detected early enough in visual processing so that the critical shape recognition operations can be finished before figure-ground computations are completed. In three experiments, we tested this prediction using stereograms portraying two regions equal in area, but unequal in denotivity (roughly, meaningfulness): One region was high in denotivity, the other region was low in denotivity. Binocular disparity specified that either the high denotative region or the low denotative region was in front (i.e., was figure). For some stereograms (random dot stereograms), no edge was visible between the two regions until after stereo fusion; for other stereograms (black-and-white stereograms), a luminance edge was visible before fusion. In black-and-white stereograms, but not in random-dot stereograms, high denotative regions could appear to be in front (i.e., to be figure) and the shapes they depicted could be recognized, even when this organization was inconsistent with the disparity. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that shape recognition processes can contribute to figure-ground computations, at least when the figure-ground border is a luminance contrast edge. Implications for shape recognition and perceptual organization are discussed.

Shape Recognition Contributions to Figure-Ground Reversal: Which Route Counts?

Observers viewed upright and inverted versions of figure-ground stimuli, in which Gestalt variables specified that the center was figure. In upright versions, the surround was high in denotivity, in that most viewers agreed it depicted the same shape; in inverted versions, the surround was low in denotivity. The surround was maintained as figure longer and was more likely to be obtained as figure when the stimuli were upright rather than inverted. In four experiments, these effects reflected inputs to figure-ground computations from orientation-specific shape representations only. To account for these findings, a nonratiomorphic mechanism is proposed that enables shape recognition processes before figure-ground relationships are determined.

Figure-Ground Segmentation Can Occur Without Attention

The question of whether or not figure-ground segmentation can occur without attention is unresolved. Early theorists assumed it can, but the evidence is scant and open to alternative interpretations. Recent research indicating that attention can influence figure-ground segmentation raises the question anew. We examined this issue by asking participants to perform a demanding change-detection task on a small matrix presented on a task-irrelevant scene of alternating regions organized into figures and grounds by convexity. Independently of any change in the matrix, the figure-ground organization of the scene changed or remained the same. Changes in scene organization produced congruency effects on target-change judgments, even though, when probed with surprise questions, participants could report neither the figure-ground status of the region on which the matrix appeared nor any change in that status. When attending to the scene, participants reported figure-ground status and changes to it highly accurately. These results clearly demonstrate that figure-ground segmentation can occur without focal attention.

Mental images can be ambiguous: Reconstruals and reference-frame reversals

Philosophers and psychologists have debated whether or not mental images of ambiguous-figures are reversible as pictures of such figures are. Previously, empirical evidence both pro (Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989) and con (Chambers & Reisberg, 1985) has been obtained. In a series of four experiments, we identify the conditions under which images of classic ambiguous figures like the duck/rabbit and the snail/elephant are reversible. We distinguish between two types of reversal: those that entail a change in reference-frame specification as well as a reconstrual of image components (reference-frame realignments) and those that entail reconstruals only (reconstruals). We show that reference-frame realignments can occur in imagery, particularly if observers are given an explicit or an implicit suggestion; and that reconstruals of images occur commonly, regardless of experimental conditions. In addition, we show that images constructed from good parts are more likely to reverse than images constructed from poor parts. On the basis of these results, we propose a functional organization of shape memory that is consistent with shape -recognition findings as well as with our reversal findings.

Inhibitory Competition Between Shape Properties in Figure-Ground Perception

Theories of figure-ground perception entail inhibitory competition between either low-level units (edge or feature units) or high-level shape properties. Extant computational models instantiate the 1st type of theory. The authors investigated a prediction of the 2nd type of theory: that shape properties suggested on the ground side of an edge are suppressed when they lose the figure-ground competition. In Experiment 1, the authors present behavioral evidence of the predicted suppression: Object decisions were slower for line drawings that followed silhouettes suggesting portions of objects from the same rather than a different category on their ground sides. In Experiment 2, the authors reversed the silhouettes figure-ground relationships and obtained speeding rather than slowing in the same category condition, thereby demonstrating that the Experiment 1 results reflect suppression of those shape properties that lose the figure-ground competition. These experiments provide the first clear empirical evidence that figure-ground perception entails inhibitory competition between high-level shape properties and demonstrate the need for amendments to existing computational models. Furthermore, these results suggest that figure-ground perception may itself be an instance of biased competition in shape perception.

Multiple perceptual strategies used by macaque monkeys for face recognition

Successful integration of individuals in macaque societies suggests that monkeys use fast and efficient perceptual mechanisms to discriminate between conspecifics. Humans and great apes use primarily holistic and configural, but also feature-based, processing for face recognition. The relative contribution of these processes to face recognition in monkeys is not known. We measured face recognition in three monkeys performing a visual paired comparison task. Monkey and humans faces were (1) axially rotated, (2) inverted, (3) high-pass filtered, and (4) low-pass filtered to isolate different face processing strategies. The amount of time spent looking at the eyes, mouth, and other facial features was compared across monkey and human faces for each type of stimulus manipulation. For all monkeys, face recognition, expressed as novelty preference, was intact for monkey faces that were axially rotated or spatially filtered and was supported in general by preferential looking at the eyes, but was impaired for inverted faces in two of the three monkeys. Axially rotated, upright human faces with a full range of spatial frequencies were also recognized, however, the distribution of time spent exploring each facial feature was significantly different compared to monkey faces. No novelty preference, and hence no inferred recognition, was observed for inverted or low-pass filtered human faces. High-pass filtered human faces were recognized, however, the looking pattern on facial features deviated from the pattern observed for monkey faces. Taken together these results indicate large differences in recognition success and in perceptual strategies used by monkeys to recognize humans versus conspecifics. Monkeys use both second-order configural and feature-based processing to recognize the faces of conspecifics, but they use primarily feature-based strategies to recognize human faces.