Mary Ellen Carter

The Consequences of the FASB's 1998 Proposal on Accounting for Stock Option Repricing

We examine repricing activity surrounding the FASBs 1998 announcement regarding accounting for repriced options. We find that repricing increases during, and decreases after, the 12-day window between the announcement and proposed effective dates, consistent with firms timing repricings to avoid recording an expense. We find that firms experiencing increasing earnings patterns, firms with earnings around zero, and growth firms are more likely to reprice in the window, but having repriced recently decreases the likelihood of doing so. The evidence suggests that firms trade off financial reporting benefits against reputation costs in decisions to time repricings to get favorable accounting treatment.

Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms

We examine institutional investors’ preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. We find little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and governance mechanisms. However, using revealed preferences, we identify a small group of “governance-sensitive�? institutions that exhibit persistent associations between their ownership levels and firms’ governance mechanisms. We also find that firms with a high level of ownership by institutions sensitive to shareholder rights have significant future improvements in shareholder rights, consistent with shareholder activism. Further, we find that factors describing the characteristics of institutions’ portfolios are correlated with governance preferences. Large institutions, those holding a large number of portfolio stocks, and those with preferences for growth firms are more likely to be sensitive to corporate governance mechanisms, suggesting those mechanisms may be a means for decreasing monitoring costs and may be more essential for firms with a high level of growth opportunities. Finally, our results suggest that common proxies for governance sensitivity by investors (e.g., legal type, blockholding) do not cleanly measure governance preferences.

Compensation Peer Groups and Their Relation with CEO Pay

We examine whether companies select compensation peer groups opportunistically to increase CEO pay. Using 608 firms from the S&P 1500, 2,154 peer firms identified from their proxy statements, and a pool of potential peers representing the firm’s labor market in which it competes for talent, we find limited evidence that firms choose peer groups opportunistically. Although firms select bigger and better performing peer firms relative to other potential peers, only size has any power in explaining CEO pay. On the other hand, inconsistent with opportunism, sample firms select peers that are more similar to them on other economic characteristics, that use the same compensation consultant and that select the sample firm as a peer. Despite subjecting our analysis to a battery of tests, and even in subsamples where opportunism is more likely at play, we find little support for the conjecture that firms strategically select peer firms to influence greater CEO pay. Our evidence is more consistent with peer firms being used to benchmark CEO pay in a competitive labor market.

Executive Compensation Restrictions: Do They Restrict Firms’ Willingness to Participate in TARP?: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION RESTRICTIONS AND TARP

We examine the implications of regulatory intervention in pay�?setting, by studying whether executive compensation restrictions associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) influence banks’ participation in the program. We find that banks more likely to be impacted by the restrictions are less likely to participate in TARP. Among banks accepting funds, we find that the likelihood of repaying before the end of 2009 is positively related to CEO incentive compensation. We find greater subsequent executive turnover and lower pay increases in banks accepting funds, consistent with concerns about talent drain. We also find that proxies for self�?serving behavior are related to declining funds, suggesting pay preservation as a potential motive. Despite the motives behind declining funding, we find no evidence that the restrictions limited the objectives of TARP based on banks’ financial health or lending and may have allowed the government to allocate funds more effectively.

Premium Pay for Executive Talent: An Empirical Analysis

We examine the extent to which executive talent at the time of the hire affects the design of the executive’s compensation contract at the hiring firm. Using a sample of executives who switched jobs at least once between 1992 and 2007, we find that our proxies for executive talent are positively associated with compensation premiums at the new employer, after controlling for the standard determinants of pay. Moreover, tests for the association between pay for executive talent and performance at the hiring firm indicate that it does not always pay off to pay a premium to attract and retain talented executives, and that this association varies with the type of talent (i.e., “perceived” versus “objective”) the hiring firm rewards.

Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board Representation

Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996-2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.Using a large sample of executives in S&P1500 firms over 1996-2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex-ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.