Mary Lynn Garcia

Analysis and Evaluation

This chapter describes the analysis and evaluation of physical protection systems (PPS) design. After the PPS objectives have been established and a new or upgraded design has been developed, it is necessary to analyze the effectiveness of the design in meeting the objectives. A rigorous quantitative analysis is required for protection of assets with unacceptably high consequence of loss, even if the probability of an adversary attack is low. A qualitative analysis is more suitable when evaluating lower security applications. Analysis of the PPS establishes the assumptions under which a design was formed, relate system performance to threats and assets, and allow a cost–benefit decision to be made. A PPS is a complex configuration of detection, delay, and response elements that can be analyzed to determine system effectiveness. The analysis helps in identifying system deficiencies, evaluating improvements, and enables cost-versus effectiveness comparisons. Quantitative analysis is used for assuring protection of critical, high-value assets where testing data is available, either from performance tests run on the PPS or from tests run in the laboratory.

Exterior Intrusion Sensors

Intrusion detection systems consist of exterior and interior intrusion sensors, video alarm assessment, entry control, and alarm communication systems all working together. Exterior sensors are those used in an outdoor environment, and interior sensors are those used inside buildings. This chapter examines various aspects of exterior intrusion sensors, whose performance is described by three fundamental characteristics that include probability of detection, nuisance alarm rate, and vulnerability to defeat. It is important for the system designer to specify the detection criteria required or expected of a sensor or sensor system. This specification should be clear as to what will be detected, what actions are expected, and any other considerations such as weight or speed of movement. Nuisance alarm rate is a function of the number of nuisance alarms over a given time period. In an ideal sensor system, the nuisance alarm rate would be zero. It is found that passive sensors detect some type of energy that is emitted by the target of interest or detect the change of some natural field of energy caused by the target.

Physical protection system design.

This chapter discusses various aspects of the physical protection system (PPS). Once a PPS is designed or characterized, it must be analyzed and evaluated to ensure that it meets the physical protection objectives. The PPS design must allow the combination of protection elements working together to assure protection rather than regarding each feature separately. Implementation of the PPS design addresses the systematic and integrated protection of assets in anticipation of adversary attacks, rather than in reaction to attacks after they occur. PPS system performs better if detection is as far from the target as possible and delays are near the target. In addition, there is close association between detection and assessment. The ultimate objective of a PPS is to prevent the accomplishment of overt or covert malevolent actions and these objectives are accomplished by either deterrence or a combination of detection, delay, and response. Delay is the slowing down of adversary progress and it can be accomplished by people, barriers, locks, and activated delays. The relationship of PPS functions is also elaborated in the chapter.

EASI Computer Model for Analysis

This chapter describes various aspects of the Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) computer model. There are many quantitative analytical computer models that can help an analyst to evaluate the effectiveness of PPS. EASI is a simple, easy-to-use method of evaluating physical protection system (PPS) performance along a specific path and under specific conditions of threat and system operation. This model computes the probability of interruption from an analysis of the interactions of detection, delay, response, and communication. An adversary interruption occurs in the EASI model if the PPS works properly, resulting in confronting the adversary with a response force large enough to prevent them from proceeding further along their path. The input for the model requires detection and communication inputs as probabilities that the total function will be successful, whereas delay and response inputs as mean times and standard deviations for each element. The response time input to EASI is in the form of a single mean time and standard deviation representing the sum of all the elements.

Alarm Communication and Display

Publisher Summary This chapter describes alarm communication and display (AC&D) systems, which is the part of a physical protection system (PPS) that transports alarm and assessment information to a central point and presents the information to a human operator. New developments in electronics, computer, and network technology have changed the design of alarm communication and display systems over time. The two critical elements of an AC&D system are the transportation or communication of data and the presentation or display of that data to a human operator in a meaningful manner. The most useful AC&D systems have specific characteristics. Systems have to be designed to withstand the environments in which they are placed. If a component experience wide temperature variations, such as in an exterior environment, the equipment have to be designed to withstand those variations without failing. AC&D systems should also be easy for an operator to use. Hierarchical networks add complexity to an AC&D communications system, which moves alarm data from sensors to a central location. This central location is usually a single computer or is sometimes a collection of computers. The central computer processes the alarm data into useful information. These processing functions make up the information-handling subsystem.

16 – Process Applications

Publisher Summary This chapter provides a discussion of how the principles described for designing and evaluating a physical protection systems (PPS) can also be applied to other security applications. Executive protection is a specialized area of security that is commonly found in government organizations and large corporations. While the protection of senior executives is an important part of the overall protection approach for these groups, the process that is used parallels the one used in PPS. For corporate security managers it is critical to understand the differences between public sector executive protection and corporate executive protection. When planning executive protection, facility characterization takes the form of checking all the locations that the principal frequents or will visit. The primary detection, delay, and response functions for executives generally are provided by the person providing protection. In the case of a ground vehicle, the facility is the vehicle itself. Characterizing the vehicle involves the same methodology as a fixed site, but the components vary. Technology used in vehicle protection could include exterior locks on cargo holds and the incorporation of RF tracking devices on pallets or individual components to aid in recovery of assets.

3 – Threat Definition

Publisher Summary This chapter elaborates various aspects of threat definition used in designing physical protection systems (PPS). The concept of the design basis threat (DBT) is often used to establish the expected threat to a facility and it is used as a management and design tool that helps facilitate informed decision-making by executives and establishes technical requirements for designers. For management, the DBT documents assumptions that were used for the evaluation or design. The physical threat to a facility must be defined as part of determining the objectives of the PPS. A threat definition results in a detailed description of the physical threat by a malevolent adversary to the system. Physical protection provides the most effective barrier to outsiders acting alone or in collusion with insiders, while the control of and accounting for assets are useful against insiders. Additional procedural protection measures against insiders include the use of personnel security assurance programs, such as pre-employment background checks and periodic updates and separation of job responsibilities, so that two or more employees are required to complete sensitive tasks. It is suggested that to determine the threat, information should be sought for regional, national, and international threats, depending on the mission and location of the facility.

8 – Alarm Assessment

Publisher Summary This chapter elaborates various aspects of alarm assessment, which can be provided through closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera coverage of each sensor sector or by visual checks by personnel. With a CCTV alarm assessment system, authorized personnel can rapidly assess sensor alarms at remote locations and avoid unnecessarily sending guards or other responders to an area. A key principle in the design and evaluation of a physical protection system (PPS) is that detection is not complete without assessment. Primary assessment is generally provided through the use of fixed cameras and most surveillance systems use pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras. Although primary assessment cameras can provide some supplementary information, secondary assessment or surveillance PTZ cameras that have variable fields of view may provide more opportunities to gather this supporting information. The use of assessment or surveillance relates to the value of the asset and the timeliness of the response that is required. Camera layouts for interior assessment follow the same principles and guidelines as for exterior cameras. It is highly recommended that exterior cameras be mounted on stable towers and mounts so that motion or movement in the wind is avoided.

15 – Risk Assessment

Publisher Summary This chapter elaborates the risk assessment of physical protection systems (PPS). The design and analysis of physical protection have to be addressed as an integrated system. In this way, all components of detection, delay, and response can be properly weighted according to their contribution to the PPS as a whole. Risk is defined as the likelihood of damage or loss multiplied by the potential magnitude of the loss. Good risk programs should include a combination of risk financing and risk control tools to treat the risk. The risk approaches used include avoidance, reduction, spreading, transfer, and acceptance. A team with broad experience is necessary to produce a complete and accurate vulnerability assessment. In order to truly make cost–benefit decisions, the system effectiveness and associated risk of the current, or baseline system, must be known. Different system performance or effectiveness are required against different threats. An additional tool that can be useful in the risk assessment of a facility is the consequence matrix, which relates the probability of adversary attack, consequence of loss of the asset, and the threat spectrum.

10 – Entry Control

Publisher Summary This chapter elaborates different aspects of entry control system used for physical protection. An entry control system allows the movement of authorized personnel and material in and out of facilities, while detecting and possibly delaying movement of unauthorized personnel and contraband. The objectives of an entry control system used for physical protection are to permit only authorized persons to enter and exit and to detect and prevent the entry or exit of contraband material. Personnel entry control is the portion of an entry control system used to authorize entry and to verify the authorization of personnel seeking entry to a controlled area. Systems are available in which a memorized number, referred to as a personal identification number (PIN), is used. The PIN have enough digits to prevent easy guesses. This is especially important where a PIN is the only criteria for granting entry. The photo identification badge is a common credential used for personnel entry control, but it is not always effective. The use of a stored-image system requires a guard to verify an individuals identity based on visual characteristics. It is found that the use of alphanumeric encoding allows both the badge-holders name and a badge number to be included.