Maryanne Garry

A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories

Because image-enhancing technology is readily available, people are frequently exposed to doctored images. However, in prior research on how adults can be led to report false childhood memories, subjects have typically been exposed to personalized and detailed narratives describing false events. Instead, we exposed 20 subjects to a false childhood event via a fake photograph and imagery instructions. Over three interviews, subjects thought about a photograph showing them on a hot air balloon ride and tried to recall the event by using guided-imagery exercises. Fifty percent of the subjects created complete or partial false memories. The results bear on ways in which false memories can be created and also have practical implications for those involved in clinical and legal settings.

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.

You say tomato? Collaborative remembering leads to more false memories for intimate couples than for strangers

Research on memory conformity shows that collaborative remembering—typically in the form of discussion—can influence peoples memories. One question that remains is whether it matters with whom we discuss our memories. To address this question we compared peoples memories for an event after they discussed that event with either their romantic partner or a stranger. Pairs of subjects watched slightly different versions of a movie, and then discussed some details from the movie, but not others. Subjects were better at remembering non-discussed details than discussed details: when remembering discussed details they incorrectly reported information from their partners version instead of their own. In addition, subjects who discussed the event with their romantic partner (rather than with a stranger) were even more likely to report false memories. We discuss our findings in relation to other research on memory conformity, social influences on false memories, and memory systems within romantic relationships.

Actually, a picture is worth less than 45 words : Narratives produce more false memories than photographs do

Most memory “implantation” studies have elicited false memories by using fake narratives. Recently, Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) showed that doctored photographs can be used to create false childhood memories in adults. Fifty percent of Wade et al.’s sample reported details of taking a childhood hot air balloon ride, although they had never been in a balloon. In this experiment, we investigated whether photos or narratives influence memory more than the other. We exposed subjects to either a fake photograph or a fake narrative of a childhood hot air balloon ride. Subjects tried to remember the false event and three real events over 1 week. Narratives were more likely to produce false memory reports than were photos. We offer a fluency-based account of our results and suggest that narratives promote more familiarity in subjects than do photographs.

Registered Replication Report

Trying to remember something now typically improves your ability to remember it later. However, after watching a video of a simulated bank robbery, participants who verbally described the robber were 25% worse at identifying the robber in a lineup than were participants who instead listed U.S. states and capitals—this has been termed the “verbal overshadowing” effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). More recent studies suggested that this effect might be substantially smaller than first reported. Given uncertainty about the effect size, the influence of this finding in the memory literature, and its practical importance for police procedures, we conducted two collections of preregistered direct replications (RRR1 and RRR2) that differed only in the order of the description task and a filler task. In RRR1, when the description task immediately followed the robbery, participants who provided a description were 4% less likely to select the robber than were those in the control condition. In RRR2, when the description was delayed by 20 min, they were 16% less likely to select the robber. These findings reveal a robust verbal overshadowing effect that is strongly influenced by the relative timing of the tasks. The discussion considers further implications of these replications for our understanding of verbal overshadowing.

On the (non)persuasive power of a brain image

The persuasive power of brain images has captivated scholars in many disciplines. Like others, we too were intrigued by the finding that a brain image makes accompanying information more credible (McCabe & Castel in Cognition 107:343-352, 2008). But when our attempts to build on this effect failed, we instead ran a series of systematic replications of the original study—comprising 10 experiments and nearly 2,000 subjects. When we combined the original data with ours in a meta-analysis, we arrived at a more precise estimate of the effect, determining that a brain image exerted little to no influence. The persistent meme of the influential brain image should be viewed with a critical eye.

Absolut® Memory Distortions Alcohol Placebos Influence the Misinformation Effect

Can the simple suggestion that you have consumed alcohol affect your memory for an event? Alcohol placebos affect social behaviors but not nonsocial ones, and have not previously been shown to affect memory. We investigated the effect of alcohol placebos using materials that revealed both the social and the nonsocial influences of memory. Subjects drank plain tonic water, but half were told it was a vodka and tonic; then all subjects took part in an eyewitness memory experiment. Subjects who were told they drank alcohol were more swayed by misleading postevent information than were those who were told they drank tonic water, and were also more confident about the accuracy of their responses. Our results show that the mere suggestion of alcohol consumption may make subjects more susceptible to misleading information and inappropriately confident. These results also provide additional confirmation that eyewitness memory is influenced by both nonsocial and social factors.

The Trauma Model of Dissociation: Inconvenient Truths and Stubborn Fictions. Comment on Dalenberg Et Al. (2012)

Dalenberg et al. (2012) argued that convincing evidence (a) supports the longstanding trauma model (TM), which posits that early trauma plays a key role in the genesis of dissociation; and (b) refutes the fantasy model (FM), which posits that fantasy proneness, suggestibility, cognitive failures, and other variables foster dissociation. We review evidence bearing on Dalenberg et al.s 8 predictions and find them largely wanting in empirical support. We contend that the authors repeat errors committed by many previous proponents of the TM, such as attributing a central etiological role to trauma in the absence of sufficient evidence. Specifically, Dalenberg et al. leap too quickly from correlational data to causal conclusions, do not adequately consider the lack of corroboration of abuse in many studies, and underestimate the relation between dissociation and false memories. Nevertheless, we identify points of agreement between the TM and FM regarding potential moderators and mediators of dissociative symptoms (e.g., family environment, biological vulnerabilities) and the hypothesis that dissociative identity disorder is a disorder of self-understanding. We acknowledge that trauma may play a causal role in dissociation but that this role is less central and specific than Dalenberg et al. contend. Finally, although a key assumption of the TM is dissociative amnesia, the notion that people can encode traumatic experiences without being able to recall them lacks strong empirical support. Accordingly, we conclude that the field should now abandon the simple trauma-dissociation model and embrace multifactorial models that accommodate the diversity of causes of dissociation and dissociative disorders.

Suggestion, Cognition, and Behavior:

Deliberate and nondeliberate suggestions can influence cognitions and behaviors in surprising ways. Sometimes suggestions are helpful and improve our cognitions and behaviors, but at other times they are harmful. Suggestions can create response expectancies: the myriad ways in which we anticipate responding automatically to various situations. In this article, we discuss some of the most recent and intriguing reported effects of suggestion on cognition and behavior—effects that should make us stop and wonder, but should also make us reflect on the possibility that other well-known findings are the result of suggestion and expectation. The boundaries and underlying mechanisms of the effects of suggestion are puzzles waiting to be solved.

Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos—a plausible and less plausible event—and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in childrens confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.