Mathieu Cassotti

The Shift from Local to Global Visual Processing in 6-Year-Old Children Is Associated with Grey Matter Loss

Background A real-world visual scene consists of local elements (e.g. trees) that are arranged coherently into a global configuration (e.g. a forest). Children show psychological evolution from a preference for local visual information to an adult-like preference for global visual information, with the transition in visual preference occurring around 6 years of age. The brain regions involved in this shift in visual preference have not been described. Methods and Results We used voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to study children during this developmental window to investigate changes in gray matter that underlie the shift from a bias for local to global visual information. Six-year-old children were assigned to groups according to their judgment on a global/local task. The first group included children who still presented with local visual processing biases, and the second group included children who showed global visual processing biases. VBM results indicated that compared to children with local visual processing biases, children with global visual processing biases had a loss of gray matter in the right occipital and parietal visuospatial areas. Conclusions These anatomical findings are in agreement with previous findings in children with neurodevelopmental disorders and represent the first structural identification of brain regions that allow healthy children to develop a global perception of the visual world.

Developmental changes of win-stay and loss-shift strategies in decision making

This study aims to clarify the developmental changes in real-life decision making when strategy is adjusted using both positive and negative feedback, that is, whether strategic adjustment evolves with age. A total of 84 participants divided into three age groups (children, adolescents, and adults) performed the standard version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Children and adolescents showed a strong bias in favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learned to decide advantageously during the course of the task. Interestingly, the results clearly demonstrate that children did not switch differently following gains and losses whereas adolescents and adults switched more often after a loss than after a gain, corresponding to the “loss-shift” and the “win-stay” strategies, respectively. The results also revealed that adults switched less often after losses compared to children and adolescents and, thus, used the loss-stay strategy more often than the 2 youngest groups. These new findings suggest that successful completion of the IGT by adults requires fine feedback monitoring and more frequent use of the win-stay and loss-stay strategic adjustments.

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: evidence from the Iowa gambling task.

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased --> biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased --> logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.

Bias detection: Response confidence evidence for conflict sensitivity in the ratio bias task

Human reasoning is often biased by heuristic thinking. A key question is whether people detect that their heuristic answer conflicts with logical considerations. Empirical studies suggest that the detection is typically successful but the generality of these findings has been questioned. The present study focuses on this issue. A response confidence measure was used to validate conflict sensitivity findings in the classical ratio bias task and identify individual differences in conflict detection efficiency. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving problems for which a cued heuristic response could be inconsistent or consistent with the correct response. Results confirmed that most reasoners showed a confidence decrease when they were biased, suggesting that they acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. However, there were also subgroups of reasoners who failed to show a confidence effect. Implications for the debate on conflict detection during thinking are discussed.

Is Human Decision Making under Ambiguity Guided by Loss Frequency Regardless of the Costs? A Developmental Study Using the Soochow Gambling Task.

Converging developmental decision-making studies have demonstrated that until late adolescence, individuals prefer options for which the risk of a loss is low regardless of the final outcome. Recent works have shown a similar inability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome among adults. The current study aimed to identify developmental changes in feedback-monitoring ability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome in decision making under ambiguity. Children, adolescents, and adults performed an adapted version of the Soochow Gambling Task. Our results showed that children and adolescents presented an exclusive preference for options associated with infrequent punishment. In contrast, only adults seemed to consider both loss frequency and the final outcome by favoring the advantageous options when the frequency of losses was low. These findings suggest that the ability to integrate both loss frequency and final outcome develops with age. Moreover, the analysis of strategic adjustments following gains and losses reveals that adults switch less often after losses compared with children and adolescents. This finding suggests that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate learning the characteristics of each option and improve the ability to choose advantageously.

Number Conservation is Related to Children’s Prefrontal Inhibitory Control: An fMRI Study of a Piagetian Task

Although young children can accurately determine that two rows contain the same number of coins when they are placed in a one-to-one correspondence, children younger than 7 years of age erroneously think that the longer row contains more coins when the coins in one of the rows are spread apart. To demonstrate that prefrontal inhibitory control is necessary to succeed at this task (Piaget’s conservation-of-number task), we studied the relationship between the percentage of BOLD signal changes in the brain areas activated in this developmental task and behavioral performance on a Stroop task and a Backward Digit Span task. The level of activation in the right insula/inferior frontal gyrus was selectively related to inhibitory control efficiency (i.e., the Stroop task), whereas the activation in the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) was selectively related to the ability to manipulate numerical information in working memory (i.e., the Backward Digit Span task). Taken together, the results indicate that to acquire number conservation, children’s brains must not only activate the reversibility of cognitive operations (supported by the IPS) but also inhibit a misleading length-equal-number strategy (supported by the right insula/inferior frontal gyrus).

Fear and anger have opposite effects on risk seeking in the gain frame

Emotions strongly influence our decisions, particularly those made under risk. A classic example of the effect of emotion on decision making under risk is the “framing effect,” which involves predictable shifts in preferences when the same problem is formulated in different ways. According to dual process theories, this bias could stem from an affective heuristic belonging to an intuitive type of reasoning. In this study, we examined whether specific incidental negative emotions (i.e., fear and anger) influence framing susceptibility and risk-taking identically. In each trial, participants received an initial amount of money, and pictures of angry or fearful faces were presented to them. Finally, participants chose between a sure option and a gamble option of equally expected value in a gain or loss frame. Risk-taking was modulated by emotional context: fear and anger influenced risk-taking specifically in the gain frame and had opposite effects. Fear increased risk-averse choices, whereas anger decreased risk-averse choices, leading to a suppression of the framing effect. These results confirm that emotions play a key role in framing susceptibility.

Global interference during early visual processing: ERP evidence from a rapid global/local selective task.

Visual perception depends on the integration of local elements of a visual scene into a global frame. Evidence from behavioral studies shows that (1) the detection of the global frame is faster than the detection of the local parts, a phenomenon called the global advantage, and that (2) an interference of the global shape is also present during local processing. Together, these effects are called the global precedence effect (GPE). Even if the global advantage appears to impact neural processing as early as the first 100 ms post-stimulus, previous studies failed to find a global interference effect before 200 ms post-stimulus. Using for the first time a rapid display of letter component stimuli during a global/local selective task in which conditions with perceptual conflict, congruent and incongruent conditions were considered, the present event-related potential (ERP) study shows a global interference effect occurring as early as the time range of the N1 component. In particular, only congruent stimuli elicited similar N1 amplitude during the global and local tasks, whereas an increased of the N1 amplitude during the global task was observed (as compared to the local task) for both stimuli with perceptual conflict and incongruent stimuli. This finding corroborates the recent neural models of human visual perception.

Does Ambiguity Aversion Influence the Framing Effect during Decision Making

Decision-makers present a systematic tendency to avoid ambiguous options for which the level of risk is unknown. This ambiguity aversion is one of the most striking decision-making biases. Given that human choices strongly depend on the options’ presentation, the purpose of the present study was to examine whether ambiguity aversion influences the framing effect during decision making. We designed a new financial decision-making task involving the manipulation of both frame and uncertainty levels. Thirty-seven participants had to choose between a sure option and a gamble depicting either clear or ambiguous probabilities. The results revealed a clear preference for the sure option in the ambiguity condition regardless of frame. However, participants presented a framing effect in both the risk and ambiguity conditions. Indeed, the framing effect was bidirectional in the risk condition and unidirectional in the ambiguity condition given that it did not involve preference reversal but only a more extreme choice tendency.

The impact of alexithymia on pathological gamblers' decision making: a preliminary study of gamblers recruited in "sportsbook" casinos.

Objective:We investigated whether alexithymia is at the root of the decision-making deficit classically reported in pathological gamblers. Background:Alexithymia has been shown to be a recurrent personality trait of pathological gamblers and to impair the decision-making abilities of nonpathological gamblers, but no previous studies have investigated whether alexithymia significantly affects pathological gamblers’ decision making. Although investigations of pathological gamblers typically have studied those seeking treatment, most pathological gamblers do not seek treatment. Thus, to study people representative of the general population of pathological gamblers, we conducted our study in “sportsbook” casinos with a small sample of gamblers who were not seeking treatment. Methods:We recruited gamblers in sportsbooks and classified them based on their scores on the South Oaks Gambling Screen and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale: 3 groups of pathological gamblers (6 alexithymic, 8 possibly alexithymic, and 6 nonalexithymic) and 8 healthy controls. All of the participants completed an adaptation of the Iowa Gambling Task. Results:The alexithymic group chose less advantageously on the task than the other groups. The severity of the deficit in decision-making abilities was related to the severity of alexithymia, even when we controlled for the effects of anxiety and depression. Conclusions:Our findings provide preliminary evidence that alexithymia might be a critical personality trait underlying pathological gamblers’ decision-making deficits.