Mathieu d'Acremont

Impulsivity and decision making.

The purpose of the present study was to explore the links among the four facets of impulsivity (urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, and sensation seeking) proposed by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) and decision-making processes. Thirty undergraduate students completed a self-report questionnaire evaluating impulsivity as well as a task measuring decision-making processes, the Iowa Gambling Task. Zero-order correlations and multilevel analysis revealed that only lack of premeditation was specifically linked to disadvantageous decisions on the Gambling Task. This suggests that premeditation is related to decision making influenced by somatic (or emotional) markers.

Alcohol cues increase cognitive impulsivity in individuals with alcoholism

BackgroundIndividuals with alcoholism are characterized by both attentional bias for alcohol cues and prepotent response inhibition deficit. We tested the hypothesis that alcoholics exhibit greater cognitive disinhibition when the response to be suppressed is associated with alcohol-related information.MethodsForty recently detoxified individuals with alcoholism were compared with 40 healthy non-substance abusers on the “Alcohol-Shifting Task”, a variant of the go/no-go paradigm requiring a motor response to targets and no response to distracters. The aim was to test the ability of alcoholics to discriminate between alcohol-related and neutral words. Sometimes, the alcohol-related words were the targets for the “go” response, with neutral words as distracters, sometimes the reverse. Several shifts in target type occurred during the task.ResultsAlcoholics made significantly more commission errors (i.e., press a key when a distracter displayed) and more omission errors (i.e., not press a key when a target displayed) than controls. Moreover, the number of commission errors was greater in alcoholics when alcohol-related stimuli had to be detected.ConclusionsThese results demonstrate that alcoholics exhibit a basic prepotent response inhibition deficit, which is enhanced when the response to be suppressed is related to alcohol. We discuss clinical and theoretical implications of these findings.

A French Adaptation of the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale

Impulsivity is an important and multifaceted psychological construct. Recently, Whiteside and Lynam (2001) have developed the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale that distinguishes four dimensions of impulsivity: Urgency, lack of Premeditation, lack of Perseverance, and Sensation seeking. In the present study, we investigated the psychometric properties of a French adaptation of the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students completed the UPPS Scale. Exploratory and confirmatory analyses revealed a four factors solution similar to that found in the original study. Also, the results indicated that there was good to very good internal reliability for the four subscales.

Heterogeneous inhibition processes involved in different facets of self-reported impulsivity: evidence from a community sample.

Whiteside and Lynam (Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R. (2001). The Five Factor Model and impulsivity: Using a structural model of personality to understand impulsivity. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 669-689) clarified the multifaceted nature of impulsivity by identifying four distinct facets of self-reported impulsive behaviors: urgency, (lack of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance, and sensation seeking. Building on work by Bechara and Van der Linden (Bechara, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2005). Decision-making and impulse control after frontal lobe injuries. Current Opinion in Neurology, 18, 734-739), the main objective of this study was to investigate the hypothesis that perseverance and urgency map onto the two distinct inhibitory functions distinguished by Friedman and Miyake (Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference control functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 101-135): prepotent response inhibition and resistance to proactive interference. Participants (N=126) completed the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale and three tasks: a recent-negatives task to assess proactive interference in working memory, and two Go/No-Go tasks at different paces, the slower of which also assessed task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). Consistent with the hypothesis, TUTs were positively correlated with lack of perseverance, and multiple regressions revealed that urgency was specifically related to errors in prepotent response inhibition, and lack of perseverance to errors due to difficulties overcoming proactive interference.

Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ)

The main purpose of this study was to validate a French version of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ). A sample of 224 young adults completed the French translation of the CERQ and the Beck Depression Inventory II. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that a nine-factor model also explained the data collected with the French version. Internal reliability scores for each strategy ranged from .68 to .87. As in the original version, we found that the emotion regulation strategies could be grouped into adaptive and less adaptive cognitive regulation strategies. In addition, we observed that Self-blame and Rumination are key cognitive regulation strategies predicting whether high or low depressive symptoms are reported.

Neurobiological studies of risk assessment: A comparison of expected utility and mean-variance approaches

When modeling valuation under uncertainty, economists generally prefer expected utility because it has an axiomatic foundation, meaning that the resulting choices will satisfy a number of rationality requirements. In expected utility theory, values are computed by multiplying probabilities of each possible state of nature by the payoff in that state and summing the results. The drawback of this approach is that all state probabilities need to be dealt with separately, which becomes extremely cumbersome when it comes to learning. Finance academics and professionals, however, prefer to value risky prospects in terms of a trade-off between expected reward and risk, where the latter is usually measured in terms of reward variance. This mean-variance approach is fast and simple and greatly facilitates learning, but it impedes assigning values to new gambles on the basis of those of known ones. To date, it is unclear whether the human brain computes values in accordance with expected utility theory or with mean-variance analysis. In this article, we discuss the theoretical and empirical arguments that favor one or the other theory. We also propose a new experimental paradigm that could determine whether the human brain follows the expected utility or the mean-variance approach. Behavioral results of implementation of the paradigm are discussed.

Cognitive deficits and biases for food and body in bulimia: Investigation using an affective shifting task

OBJECTIVE Studies suggest that attentional deficits and biases play a role in the development and maintenance of eating disorders. Many of these studies have methodological limitations and their results are difficult to interpret. In this study, we examine attentional deficits and biases in bulimia. METHOD 18 bulimic participants and 18 controls performed an adaptation of the go/no-go affective shifting task. That task allows the investigation of attention, inhibitory control and mental flexibility for stimuli related to the body and food. RESULTS Bulimic participants tended to react faster than controls in the go/no-go affective task. They also had poorer discrimination ability than controls and showed inhibition problems, particularly when the targets were related to food. The magnitude of these effects ranged from moderate to large. No difference between groups was found concerning mental flexibility. DISCUSSION These results suggest that bulimics present cognitive deficits and are more impulsive, especially with food-related stimuli. These cognitive deficits and biases may be at least partially responsible for the development and maintenance of bulimia.

A German Adaptation of the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale: Psychometric Properties and Factor Structure

Impulsivity occupies a prominent place in psychopathology, yet the precise nature of its implication in mental disorders is still poorly understood. This is partly due to inconsistencies among existing conceptualizations and measurements of impulsivity. In an attempt to overcome these inconsistencies, S. P. Whiteside and D. R. Lynam (2001) developed the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale, which distinguishes four facets of impulsivity: urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, and sensation seeking. The present study examined the psychometric properties of a German adaptation of the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale by administering it to a sample of psychology students. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the responses of 310 native German speaking participants suggested a four-factor solution similar to that found in the original study. Results indicated that these four subscales possess very good internal consistency.

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for social and non-social events in social phobia.

Previous studies failed to show clear differences between people with social phobia and non-anxious individuals regarding the specificity and affective intensity of their autobiographical memories for social events. However, these studies did not assess the subjective experience associated with remembering. In this study, people with social phobia and non-anxious control participants recalled social and non-social events, and rated the phenomenal characteristics of their memories. The memories of people with social phobia for social events contained fewer sensorial details but more self-referential information than controls’ memories. In addition, people with social phobia remembered social situations from an observer perspective, viewing themselves as if from outside, to a greater extent than controls. By contrast, the two groups did not differ concerning their memories for non-social events. These findings are discussed in relation to cognitive models of social phobia.

The Human Brain Encodes Event Frequencies While Forming Subjective Beliefs

To make adaptive choices, humans need to estimate the probability of future events. Based on a Bayesian approach, it is assumed that probabilities are inferred by combining a priori, potentially subjective, knowledge with factual observations, but the precise neurobiological mechanism remains unknown. Here, we study whether neural encoding centers on subjective posterior probabilities, and data merely lead to updates of posteriors, or whether objective data are encoded separately alongside subjective knowledge. During fMRI, young adults acquired prior knowledge regarding uncertain events, repeatedly observed evidence in the form of stimuli, and estimated event probabilities. Participants combined prior knowledge with factual evidence using Bayesian principles. Expected reward inferred from prior knowledge was encoded in striatum. BOLD response in specific nodes of the default mode network (angular gyri, posterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex) encoded the actual frequency of stimuli, unaffected by prior knowledge. In this network, activity increased with frequencies and thus reflected the accumulation of evidence. In contrast, Bayesian posterior probabilities, computed from prior knowledge and stimulus frequencies, were encoded in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus. Here activity increased for improbable events and thus signaled the violation of Bayesian predictions. Thus, subjective beliefs and stimulus frequencies were encoded in separate cortical regions. The advantage of such a separation is that objective evidence can be recombined with newly acquired knowledge when a reinterpretation of the evidence is called for. Overall this study reveals the coexistence in the brain of an experience-based system of inference and a knowledge-based system of inference.